Daily Report

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Pact Foreign Ministers Meet in Moscow 11 May

PM1205091989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers"]

[Text] A meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact countries was held on mutual arrangement in Moscow 11 May. Taking part in the meeting were Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov, Hungary's Deputy Foreign Minister G. Nagy, GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister H. Jaroszek, Romania's Ambassador to the USSR Ion Bucur, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanes.

Shevardnadze spoke in detail about the results of talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow. It was emphasized that, proceeding from the overall line of the Warsaw Pact countries directed at the development of positive tendencies in the world, the Soviet side strove to achieve during the talks advances on all items of the agenda of Soviet-U.S. relations, including themes of disarmament, regional problems, human rights and humanitarian cooperation, bilateral relations, and transnational questions that came up for discussion for the first time.

Special attention was given during the talks to questions connected with the preparation of a package of documents on strategic offensive arms and anti-ballistic missile systems. The USSR foreign minister spoke about new Soviet initiatives in the area of arms limitation, specifically for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which was set out by Gorbachev in his conversation with Baker.

Representatives of the allied states received with interest information on the Soviet-U.S. talks, noting its promptness. They expressed approval of the Soviet Union's consistent course directed at the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations and the unanimous view that it is in accordance with the concerted course directed at applying new political thinking to every-day international life. Representatives of the allied states showed complete understanding and support for the Soviet Union's readiness to withdraw all nuclear ammunition from the territories of Warsaw Pact countries in 1989-1991 if a similar step is taken by the United States, and also the decision about the removal as early as this year of 500 nuclear charges of tactical nuclear weapon systems. The hope was expressed for corresponding steps by NATO countries.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of comradely mutual understanding which is traditional for relations among allied socialist states.

Chief of Staff Lobov Cited on Pact Initiatives

LD1205083689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0916 GMT 11 May 89

[TEXT] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—For some 3 decades the defensive alliance of the member states of the Warsaw Pact has made a great contribution to the cause of relaxing tension in Europe and has recommended itself as a reliable buttress of peace and security for the people, Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, has stated. He granted an interview to a TASS correspondent in connection with the 34th anniversary on 14 May of the signing in Warsaw of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance by a number of socialist states.

Having recalled the history of the creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the general dwelled on the latest peace initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries. He pointed out that in order to avert the sudden unleashing of a war on the continent the socialist countries are proposing that the groupings of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO be reduced in such a way as to lose their offensive potential. They are proposing the creation of nonnuclear corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and a zone of reduced concentration of armaments in Europe, the establishment of a European center for reducing military danger and averting sudden attack, and other constructive measures. Until such a concept is adopted, Vladimir Lobov noted, the allied socialist states are compelled to maintain their joint armed forces at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense.

He recalled the decision of the Warsaw Pact states to reduce unilaterally their armed forces in Europe by an overall figure of more than 296,000 personnel, 12,000 tanks, 9,130 artillery systems, and 930 combat aircraft over a period of 2 years. What we have here, the general stressed, is the affirmation of a new historical reality, a turn away from excessive arming to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. The practical implementation of this principle will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the atmosphere in Europe and the world and on the course of the negotiations in Vienna on conventional armed forces and measures for strengthening trust and ensuring security in Europe.

Perfilyev Holds Foreign Ministry Briefing 11 May

Previews Gorbachev PRC Visit

LD1205131189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1215 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—At a news briefing held here today, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, talked about the program for Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the PRC.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman recalled that a 4-day official visit by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the PRC at the invitation of PRC Chairman [title as received] Yang Shangkun starts on 15 May. He will be accompanied by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister; Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee; Yuriy Maslyukov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee; Yevgeniy Chazov, USSR minister of health; and other comrades.

The program for the visit is very full, Vadim Perfilyev said. In Beijing, there will be meetings and talks with Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee; Yang Shangkun, president of the PRC; Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee; and Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council.

The emphasis will be on the political talks with China's leaders, Vadim Perfilyev pointed out. There is provision for the Soviet leader to address representatives of the Chinese public on national television. Visits are planned to a number of notable places and industrial enterprises, during which meetings and conversations may take place with residents of Beijing and Shanghai.

The Soviet-Chinese summit and the normilization of bilateral relations on the basis of the universally acknowledged principles of interstate communication, with account being taken of the realities of the modern world, are of great importance, the Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized, to the further development of bilateral links and contacts along the path of good-neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation. This will lead also to the strengthening and deepening of the trend toward iumproving the international situation and toward creating a new and more favorable political atmosphere in Asia and throughout the world.

Comments on NATO Modernization

LD1205135689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—The Soviet-Chinese summit meeting begining on 15 May will be of great significance for the further development of bilateral relations and contacts, as well as for the consolidation and deepening of trends toward improving the international situation, and the creation of a more favorable political atmosphere in Asia and throughout the world, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, said at a briefing here today.

He spoke about the program of Mikhail Gorbachev's stay in the PRC, noting that the emphasis will be placed on political talks with the Chinese leaders.

Commenting on a statement by Luigi Ciriaco de Mita, chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers, in support of the postponement of the adoption by the NATO countries of a decision on the modernization of short-range missiles, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the Soviet Union is ready to start immediately talks on tactical nuclear weapons. "We are convinced that what is necessary is not the modernization of missiles but the development and the perfection of the whole system of security and stability in Europe and a transition from military restraint to political and legal restraint".

Vadim Perfilyev noted that the very fact of the organization of joint Zairean-U.S. military exercises, which have been planned for the middle of May, and the choice of the time for them to be held, cannot fail to attract attention. They are being planned in the immediate proximity of Angola's borders, in the area of a situation of conflict, a final settlement to which is currently the objective of the persistent efforts of the countries of the region and other states, including the United States, as well the United Nations. "Such an action," the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed, "can hardly help to strengthen trust between states in this part of Africa and create an atmosphere favorable to overcoming the difficulties there."

He rejected reports in the American press, in particular the WASHINGTON TIMES, about the acute growth in the rate of production of tanks in the USSR in the first quarter of this year. "This information," Vadim Perfilyev noted, "has absolutely nothing in common with reality. The Soviet Union has stated its intention to withdraw unilaterally 10,000 tanks from its military supplies and, proceeding from this, is developing its policy regarding their production."

Says Panama at 'Boiling Point'

LD1205140589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1316 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—The situation in and around Panama since the announcement of the decision by the country's National Election Tribunal to annul the results of the 7 May general elections has reached the boiling point, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, said at a briefing here today. The elections took place in

a situation of a domestic political struggle which turned into direct clashes between the opposing forces and overt interference by the United States in that country's internal affairs.

One thing is perfectly clear, Perfilyev said: "It is a matter for the Panamanian people themselves to sort out the situation which has developed and to lead it out of deadlock. Any external interference merely aggravates the situation, which is already very serious."

Attempts to internationalize the conflict are causing particular anxiety, the Soviet diplomat emphasized. "The emergence of another hotbed of international tension cannot be permitted. In order to prevent it, common sense and restraint on the part of all states who have interests in this region are necessary."

Announces Thai Crown Prince To Visit

LD1205142189 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow May 12, TASS—Crown Prince Wachiralongkorn of Thailand has been invited for an official visit to the Soviet Union by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and is expected to arrive in the country on May 15, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman announced today.

Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, said it is the first such visit of a high-ranking member of the Thai royal family to the Soviet Union.

The prince is expected to have meetings and discussions in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in Moscow and will visit Leningrad, Kiev and Yalta.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the upcoming visit, regarding it as part of a dialogue between the two countries which began in March 1979, the spokesman said.

It was then that the Thai prime minister made his first official visit to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union hopes that the upcoming visit of the crown prince and further contacts with members of the Thai royal family will give a new impulse to Soviet-Thai relations and deepen mutual understanding and strengthen trust between the two peoples, Perfilyev said.

James Baker Arrives in Brussels for NATO Session

LD1105205789 Moscow TASS in English 2044 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Brussels May 12 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker arrived in the Belgian capital on Thursday. He will deliver a speech today at the session of the NATO Council in which foreign ministers of NATO countries will take part. The U.S. secretary of state will speak about the results of the talks with Soviet leaders during his official visit to Moscow which was completed on May 11.

Interviews With CPSU's Falin Published in Austria

On Baker Visit, NATO, PRC

AU1105124589 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 11 May 89 p 4

[Unattributed report: "NATO Must Change Its Strategy"]

[Text] Vienna—Valentin Falin paid a visit to Vienna recently in his capacity as chief of the CPSU International Department. VOLKSSTIMME asked Falin about the talks that the U.S. secretary of state is currently holding in Moscow, the situation within NATO, and Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to the PRC.

Referring to the first visit to Moscow by the new U.S. secretary of state, Falin stated that the Soviet Union has the impression that the present administration has not yet come to terms with Reagan's legacy, and it is therefore not ready to conduct serious talks. He said that he is not certain whether Baker is in a position to outline the specific positions of the United States on all essential issues. It is true that the U.S. secretary of state has agreed that the START negotiations should be resumed in Geneva in June, but the beginning will shortly be followed by the summer recess, which means that efficient work will not start before the fall. However, it is not the date that is important, but the positions.

"Waning Interest"

Falin expressed concern about "waning U.S. interest" in a ban on chemical weapons. This will become a delicate situation for Bush who has always advocated the destruction of chemical weapons. It is still an open question how the president will solve this dilemma, Falin stressed.

Moscow is also discussing the development of regional conflicts. In this connection the United States will face reproaches that it does not observe the Geneva accords.

A positive momentum is to be observed in the developments in and around Cambodia and in southern Africa. The Soviet side will also voice interest in cooperation on ecological issues.

Just Like Before the INF Treaty?

The conflict within NATO over short-range missiles has not only been caused by tactical maneuvers in Bonn. NATO cannot pursue the same strategy in 1989 that it adopted in 1949, namely the strategy of nuclear deterrence and nuclear destruction. If new missiles with a range of 450 km are really deployed in the FRG, this will lead to a situation similar to the one that existed before

the conclusion of the INF Treaty which provides for the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe. The Soviet Union has also scrapped its SS 23, with a range of 480 km, under this treaty. The new nuclear missiles in Europe might initiate a new arms race, Falin stressed.

Preconditions for Relations Between Parties

Referring to the forthcoming visit to Beijing by Gorbachev, Falin stated that the normalization of relations between two countries where 1.5 billion people are living is of extraordinary significance for developments in the world. The visit is not the conclusion of this process but it testifies to good-neighborliness. It will also create the preconditions for the establishment of relations between parties. This will not be a return to the type of relations that existed after 1949, but the new conditions and new realities will be taken into consideration.

On FRG, Austria, PRC

AU1105151889 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 11 May 89 p 4

[Interview with Valentin Falin, chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by Hilde Saltz in Vienna: " 'The Future Depends on the Degree of Reason'; The USSR Advocates Early Decisions in the Field of Arms Control"; date not given]

[Text] DIE PRESSE: U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney considers it possible that Germany will be reunited. Would a united Germany threaten Soviet interests?

Valentin Falin: I believe that Mr Cheney, who talks about reunification, has not mentioned those who are responsible for the division.... The Americans split Germany's soul in August 1943.... Now we have got what we deserved. In the future this question will be solved by history itself because no honest politician of today can predict in what way and under what circumstances developments will occur in Europe and the two German states. There are many unknown factors. Discussing them today would result in a loss of time. The slogan "never come back" [preceding phrase in English] applies to history.... In my view in the next few years the whole of mankind will be confronted with other problems.... One thing is certain, and the problem of relations between the two German states has proven this: The policy of force has passed sentence on itself. The future depends on the degree of reason.

[Saltz] What is your view of Vienna's role as a bridge between East and West and Austria's role in various disarmament negotiations?

[Falin] I believe that...in this neutral role as a real broker, a mediator between East and West, Austria has not only found it purpose in life, a new policy, and has also successfully developed it. We in the Soviet Union appreciate this..., because this role is not confined to offering hospitality. It is much more: So far, not all states have succeeded in creating an optimum atmosphere for constructive negotiations, and many things in nature, as well as in politics, depend on the atmosphere. Because of the good experiences gathered in the past few years, Austria is increasingly becoming a place where political activities are developed and where they take place. We can say that the need to replace the policy of force by the policy of balanced interests and reason is expressed here. I believe that until today the conclusions that probably should have been drawn from the former Vienna arms control negotiations were not, although there are, of course, more constructive trends in this respect. This must be admitted, but trends are not enough. We have to advance as fast as possible because time is important capital, time is not neutral, lost time means lost chances of making peace stable. The money, resources, and energy which are presently wasted for the arms race by many states have to be used for humanitarian purposes....

I can definitely state on behalf of the Soviet side that we advocate early and effective decisions to improve the quality of security in Europe and to make wars in Europe materially impossible, notwithstanding the processes which are taking place within individual states. This is not only possible but also necessary if we are to act responsibly as regards the peoples' vital interests, in order to take the democratic, ecological, and social problems into account.

[Saltz] Do you believe that the United States is of the same opinion, that is, that no time should be wasted and one should work in the direction of the constructive trends you have mentioned?

[Falin] I am not so sure. After the elections, the Americans asked for time for reflection.... However, elections do not only take place for the sake of reflection. If the United States and many other nations use their elections only for reflection, reflection would become louder and policies would be continued in the same way. This is really dangerous. However, at least there are opportunities and objective prerequisites for rapid and good progress. These prerequisites should not be added to the catalogue of missed opportunities. We had enough such missed opportunities in the past.

[Saltz] Do you see any difference between the Reagan administration and the Bush administration?

[Falin] The Bush administration has promised to present its new policy to us, and when this happens we will learn whether there is a difference and, if so, what. So far, we have been able to ascertain this on one question, that is, Nicaragua. We expect partly positive changes.

[Saltz] Is the USSR ready to eliminate short-range missiles completely?

[Falin] The point is not the short-range missiles, but a reduction in tactical and operational weapons. It is not correct to reduce the problem of these weapons to missiles. Mankind does not care whether missiles, artillery, or nuclear bombs are at stake. We have to reduce these weapons with the utmost consistency so that Europe will not be threatened by a nuclear or conventional war.... Such a war would mean the final catastrophe for Europe.

[Saltz] In how far have the three Chinese claims which are the condition for the normalization of bilateral relations—Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, Afghanistan, and the border conflict—been fulfilled prior to state and party leader Gorbachev's visit to Beijing?

[Falin] Here we cannot talk of claims, because large states such as China or the Soviet Union are not able to make claims against each other. These are wishes and fantasies.... Many things have happened, for example in Afghanistan, where the Soviet side has exactly fulfilled its obligations in time. Unfortunately, the other partners who signed the Geneva agreement have not done so. What is more, after the signing of these documents they have intensified and increased their interference in Afghanistan's affairs. This was also a reason why the situation has not improved but has partly become far worse after the Soviet troop withdrawal. As regards Cambodia, the situation is developing very constructively. We hope that this will continue. We are contributing to this.... I also think that it is possible that we and the Chinese will come to terms in the border dispute.

[Saltz] In some East European countries the call for a reform to CEMA becomes audible. What is the USSR's attitude in this respect?

[Falin] We are in favor of a CEMA reform, because we believe that the present CEMA policy and structures have become outdated. However, the discussion does not focus on the question of whether there should be changes, but in how far they should be up-to-date and modern. I believe that the existing problems can be solved—if not at once and by all states together, then by those who are ready to master such problems. Unfortunately, there is not always agreement on such issues because the CEMA countries' stages of development are very different.... However, all EC problems cannot be solved single-handedly either.

On Disarmament, Restructuring, EC

AU1105153589 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 11 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Valentin Falin, chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by Josef Kirchengast in Vienna: "Defense Forces at Lowest Level"; date not given]

[Text] DER STANDARD: The NATO dispute about the modernization of short-range missiles has revived the historical fear of the Germans, of the possibility of a reunification with neutralist tendencies, above all in the United States. Is there a similar fear in the Soviet Union?

Falin: These are only speculations in order to prepare a climate in which the decision on modernization can be made after all. As regards neutrality and other speculations about the two German states, these are attempts to arouse fear and to bring the Europeans closer to the U.S. position.

DER STANDARD: Do you see something positive in the latest proposal within NATO which connects the negotiations on the reduction of short-range missiles with progress in the Vienna talks on reduction in the conventional sector?

Falin: Not only the short-range missiles, but tactical and operational nuclear weapons as a whole are at stake. We are ready to negotiate simultaneously on conventional weapons and on tactical and operational nuclear weapons.

DER STANDARD: There is the opinion that the denuclearization of Europe, that is, the elimination of all nuclear weapons, will rather increase the danger of war if there is an imbalance in the conventional sector. And, in the opinion of Western observers, the troop reductions announced by Mikhail Gorbachev contain an implicit admission of previous superiority.

Falin: We do not say: first denuclearization and then reduction of the conventional armed forces. We even want to start with a reduction in the conventional sector. If this is more advantageous for the West—all right, we are ready for this. The defense potentials on both sides should only be maintained at the lowest level, so that war between two nations becomes materially impossible, irrespective of events in individual countries.

DER STANDARD: Compared to most other Warsaw Pact states, the GDR is clearly lagging behind as regards perestroyka and the readiness for reforms. Is this connected with the increasingly closer ties between Moscow and Bonn?

Falin: No; here the so-called rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn is of no consequence because these closer ties hardly disturb the GDR and hardly provoke any objections on its part. The GDR leadership has been briefed in detail on our measures relating to Bonn, and this will remain so. Referring to perestroyka, the Soviet Union's attitude in principle is the following: We have started perestroyka in the interest of the Soviet people and we will continue it accordingly. We do not tell any of our allies to imitate it.

DER STANDARD: A former high-ranking U.S. Government official recently stated in Vienna that he could absolutely envisage a social democratic Hungary and a christian democratic Poland within the Warsaw Pact. Can you also imagine this?

Falin: Many U.S. officers and politicians are wiser after the end of their careers than during their terms of office; however, some of them also speculate more. All this is speculation, and it is probably not absolutely proper to continue to speculate on the basis of such speculations. What Poland and Hungary decide is decided by the peoples of these states in their own interest. We recognize this right to decide for oneself, and this was clearly stated by General Secretary Gorbachev in front of the United Nations.

DER STANDARD: Now the obligatory question as regards Austria: Is EC membership compatible with neutrality?

Falin: I believe that this is hardly compatible, just like fire and water.

DER STANDARD: Have you seen any change in thinking in Austria lately, above all in the smaller government party, the Austrian People's Party, which so far has clearly pursued a course in favor of the EC?

Falin: Let us not anticipate events. Let us calmly and responsibly draw adequate conclusions from the facts.

On Cold War, German Reunification

AU1105134989 Vienna KURIER in German
11 May 89 p 3

[Report on interview with Valentin Falin, chief of the CPSU International Department, by Otto Klambauer in Vienna: "Putting an End to Cold War"—date not given]

[Excerpts] One of the most important foreign-policy advisors of Kremlin leader Gorbachev, Central Committee member Valentin Falin, is currently in Vienna. In an interview with KURIER, Falin comments on the most important issues concerning the climate between East and West. [passage omitted]

—On the Cold War: The most important thing is to put an end to the Cold War. Efforts are indeed under way to achieve this! We have not only wasted our energies, resources, and the present much too long, but also our future. We must learn many things again that we had forgotten during the Cold War. We have to master things again that we had lost during the Cold War. For this reason, no side should initiate such developments again, neither the East nor the West. They are too dangerous and may lead to a disaster.

—On the concentration of East-West policy on Germany: It would be too simple to say that discussions are currently focusing only on the Germans. East-West relations are not a matter that concerns only the FRG and the GDR. The problem (of East-West relations) has to be seen in its entirety, in which the two German states play a central role of course. They play a central role because the concentration of weapons in these two states is 20 times as high as in other parts of the world.

—On the reunification of Germany that has recently been mentioned by Defense Secretary Cheney: This is partly speculation, and partly the regret for the mistake the Americans made when they split Germany 45 years ago. Two sovereign German states are today members of the United Nations. In case both should consider it appropriate one day to become neutral in military terms, this will lead to a new situation in Europe which we will discuss when this actually takes place. At this point, however, we do not know of any such thoughts in Bonn or around Bonn. If the (U.S.) defense secretary knows more it would be appropriate for him to inform the public as well. [passage omitted]

CPSU's Falin Heads Delegation to Budapest Forum

PM1105154189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 May 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Departure for Budapest"]

[Text] Representatives of the CPSU headed by V.M. Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, left Moscow to take part in the roundtable meeting of European political parties, which opens in Budapest 11 May.

United States & Canada

Baker 11 May Meeting With Gorbachev Reported

PM1205090989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 May 89 Second Edition pp 1-2

["Meeting Between M.S. Gorbachev and J. Baker"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in the Kremlin on the morning of May 11.

For approximately one hour they had a conversation in the presence of only Eduard Shevardnadze. Baker handed over to Gorbachev a letter from President George Bush. The interlocutors exchanged opinions on the importance and main contents of Soviet-American interaction, including summit meetings.

Then the conversation was continued with the participation of more officials from both sides. The conversation was devoted mainly to two themes: possibilities of and the prospects for Soviet-American relations in the light of the restructuring drive in the USSR and problems of security and disarmament.

Though different views are expressed in the press, this meeting is a timely one, Gorbachev said. I am sure the dialogue should be continued, should be brought to a new level, advancing to real interaction and cooperation on all problems. An optimistic attitude to this is justifiable, as it is confirmed not only by general considerations, but also by definite experience. The whole world wants this. And let us hope we shall be able to increase by new ideas and arrangements the "capital" that has been accumulated in contacts with the previous administration and that is already "bringing" dividends, Gorbachev said.

The main thing is not to lose touch with reality. We have already experienced over many years that a different approach is ineffective and dangerous for both countries and for peace. Meanwhile realism and getting rid of delusions resulted in progress in many fields and in achievement of what had earlier seemed impossible, he said.

At Baker's request and taking into consideration the fact that the new administration is working out its concept of relations with the USSR on the basis of studying the processes of restructuring, Gorbachev described in detail the specific features of its current stage—in the economy, in the political and cultural area, and in social and labour psychology. Perhaps we are now passing through the most difficult moment, when contradiction between great expectations born of restructuring and dificulties in real processes that are unavoidable in such a huge country and in such a grandiose revolutionary undertaking is felt with particular acuteness, he said.

I am confident of the success of restructuring, despite dramatic situations and some miscalculations. Restructuring is no longer just a policy, philosophy, plans and wishes. It is a reality of our society which has become different. People have straightened up and begun to speak out in real ernest. New people are coming to the fore—and this is most important. We have laid solid groundwork in the economy and the political field. And the forthcoming congress of people's deputies will be a highly important event in organising fast developing renewal processes, he said.

It would be the greatest mistake now to stall, let alone to roll back. And we shall be advancing on the right track, correctly, firmly, and calculatedly, without yielding to temptations of "great leaps" and "great changes," and not falling for efforts to intimidate us with chaos, disintegration, etc., Gorbachev said.

The question of the conversion of military production and reduction of the USSR Armed Forces was touched upon in the context of the talk about restructuring.

Noting that in America there indeed are different opinions about restructuring, Baker said that in the U.S. Administation no one wishes its failure. He believes that restructuring spells big possibilities for stable and fruitful relations between the USSR and the United States.

There was a substantive and on some points specific conversation on problems of security and disarmament.

Baker noted that the great attention that he had suggested Shevardnadze should give in their talks to regional problems, where "it is important to pass on from rivalry to cooperation," does not mean that the administration is playing down the importance of arms control.

Satisfaction was expressed with the fact that the ministers had agreed that talks on strategic nuclear arms be resumed next June. Baker said that the administration will continue these talks, taking into consideration what has been achieved at the previous stages.

Gorbachev pointed in this connection to three problems that during the forthcoming talks on strategec offensive arms should find such a solution as would not undermine confidence in each other, would not give rise to suspicion that someone wishes to place the other side at a disadvantage.

The negotiating process has so far been contained by the question of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles and the problem of the relationship between a treaty on strategic offensive arms and the operating treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems as signed by the sides in 1972.

We already have experience on how to embark on breakthroughs when an impasse has formed somewhere. Resuming talks on strategic offensive arms, we must be prepared for such a courageous approach, using the experience of the drafting and conclusion of the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, Gorbachev said.

Baker said the American side remembers Soviet concerns but has its own concerns as well.

Gorbachev suggested to Baker starting drafting work on a bilateral agreement on the controlled cessation of the production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials. He reminded the U.S. secretary of state that the USSR is prepared to discontinue all nuclear explosions on the basis of reciprocity. He also suggested that a joint statement be adopted right now, based on the results of Baker's visit, to express the basic attitude of the USSR and the United States to the need to eliminate chemical weapons and put an end to their production. The U.S. secretary of state voiced a desire to return to the issue before the start of the related talks at the level of experts.

Gorbachev informed Baker of the Soviet Union's additional proposals at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces.

It is proposed that agreement be reached on a radical reduction of Warsaw Treaty and NATO armaments and armed forces in Europe by 1996-1997.

1. By that time each military alliance should have the same number of Armed Forces and armaments that are the subject of the talks in Vienna, namely, 1,350 thousand men each, 1,500 tactical strike aircraft each, 1,700 combat helicopters each, 20,000 tanks each, 24,000 cannons, mortars and multiple rocket launchers each, and 28,000 units of army vehicles and armoured carriers each.

2. For this purpose both sides would have to make large cuts. Each alliance would reduce its armed forces by over one million. NATO would have to reduce its strike aircraft and combat helicopters by approximately 2,500 units. The Warsaw Treaty would also be reducing these systems, but in smaller amounts as it has a smaller volume of such weapons systems now.

The Warsaw Treaty would reduce tanks by 40,000 units, cannons and mortars by approximately 46,000 units, and army vehicles and armoured carriers by approximately 42,000 units. NATO would be reducing these kinds of armaments to a lesser extent, as it now has smaller amounts of such armaments than the Warsaw Treaty organisation.

3. Gorbachev also said the Soviet Union has already decided to unilaterally withdraw 500 warheads of tactical nuclear weapon systems (166 aviation systems, 50 artillery, and 284 missile systems) from the territory of its allies to its own territory in 1989.

4. In the 1989-1991 period the USSR is prepared to remove all nuclear ammunition from the territories of its allies provided a reciprocal step is made by the U.S.A.

There was a debate on the question of the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons for Europe. Gorbachev recalled that just two years ago at the same table consent was given to George Shultz to include SS-23 missiles with a range of up to 500 kilometres in the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, though the treaty formally did not apply to them. The USSR gave this consent provided neither side will be manufacturing or deploying such missiles. And now the U.S.A. is insisting that Western Europe should accept their modernised versions, actually new missiles of the same type. And this is being done at a most important moment, when talks aimed at a decisive reduction of military confrontation in Europe have been started.

Baker presented familiar arguments on this score, referring to NATO's "deterrence doctrine" and Soviet superiority in conventional arms and short-range nuclear weapons. These arguments are unconvincing because it is suggested that asymmetries be eliminated as early as the first stage of the Vienna talks, Gorbachev said.

Besides, the resolution of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons would proceed parallel to the reduction of conventional weapons rather than ahead of it. This is why the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals for separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons are fair and expedient.

Modernization, Gorbachev said, is a matter of special concern not only for the Soviet Union, not only for Eastern Europe, but also for Europe as a whole. For it applies to a huge part of Europe and justifiably concerns the public, all Europeans. Modernisation calls in question the U.S. intentions. It is necessary to think on how to combine the Vienna talks with this problem.

Gorbachev invited the American Administration to a substantive exchange of opinions on this score and expressed readiness to make progress on removing nuclear weapons from European territory altogether on a reciprocal basis. Gorbachev and Baker expressed satisfaction with having formed contact with each other and with their discussion, which was useful from both the philosophical and the political standpoints.

Let us "score points" with our peoples, with the world public by our constructive and realistic policy, Gorbachev said. "We also wish to participate in real politics," the U.S. secretary of state stressed.

Taking part in the meeting were also Sergey Akhromeyev, Alexander Bessmertnykh, Anatoliy Dobrynin, Yuriy Dubinin, Sergey Tarasenko, Anatoliy Chernyayev, Robert Gates, Robert Zoellick, Jack Matlock, Rozanne Ridgeway, Dennis Ross, Margaret Tutwiler.

Baker 11 May Moscow News Conference Reported

Welcomes Glasnost, Restructuring

LD1105145489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1423 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—The visit to the Soviet Union was most useful and productive, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stated at a news conference here today. In his view, the negotiations were of a constructive character. On behalf of the U.S. President, the secretary of state expressed U.S. readiness to accelerate the dialogue between the two countries over a whole range of issues. James Baker welcomed the policy of glasnost and restructuring which, he said, had contributed to altering the political situation and had opened up an opportunity for broadening the spheres for constructive interaction.

Informing journalists about the themes of the negotiations held, the secretary of state noted that it had been decided to resume a discussion of all matters connected with arms control. In particular, the talks on nuclear and space armaments will be resumed in mid-June. The standing consultative commission on compliance with the ABM Treaty also will be reassembling in mid-June. Talks on matters relating to the banning of nuclear tests wil be resumed in Geneva on 26 June. Bilateral discussions on problems related to chemical weapons will also be held within the framework of the UN Disarmament Conference, which will gather in Geneva the following month.

James Baker indicated that it had proved possible in Moscow to attain certain progress in creating a common basis for Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the matter of seeking solutions to a number of conflict situations in various regions. There was a detailed examination of approaches to problems of the Middle East and Central America. With regard to Central America, it was decided to aim for a political and diplomatic solution.

Agreement was reached, the secretary of state continued, on setting up a permanently operating working group on questions of cooperation in the area of environmental protection, and the struggle against natural disasters, international terrorism, and the spread of drugs.

On the level of bilateral relations, James Baker said, an action plan was worked out and adopted concerning the expansion of work in a whole series of areas, including the conclusion of treaties on new agreements [zaklyucheniye dogovorov po novym soglasheniyam] and the opening of new information and cultural centers in both countries.

Discusses Mideast, Trade, Afghanistan

LD1105152489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1435 GMT 11 May 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—[passage omitted] Answering journalists' questions, the U.S. secretary of state said the talks had revealed a certain drawing closer together of the two sides' viewpoints on questions relating to a settlement of the situation in the Middle East. He noted that the convening of an international conference might play a positive role in the matter of a Middle East settlement, but at the same time spoke in favor of supporting the proposal by the Israeli Prime Minister regarding the holding of elections on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip.

[Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 12 May in its Second Edition, page 7 carries a similar report which adds: "In J. Baker's opinion, regional conflicts must constantly be at the focus of attention in Soviet-U.S. talks."]

The head of the U.S. foreign policy department insisted on the position that nuclear weapons have been and remain a factor for restraint and should be preserved on some scale. Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, James Baker considers that talks on this theme may be started only after elimination of the existing imbalance. The Warsaw Pact countries, he said, have a great advantage over NATO in this type of armaments.

The secretary of state linked the possibility of lifting the Jackson-Vannik amendment concerning the granting of most-favored nation status to the Soviet Union in trade with the adoption in the USSR of more liberal legislation in the area of emigration.

The standpoints of the USSR and United States with regard to a settlement of the Afghan problem still differ, he indicated. The United States, in his words, is not aiming for the establishment in Afghanistan of a regime hostile to the USSR, but has an interest in giving the Afghan people a chance for self-determination.

James Baker stated that during the talks there was a study of the possibility of holding Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. In his words, the parties agreed to continue a discussion of this question at the next foreign-minister level meeting which, he believes, may take place in September this year.

Says U.S. Ready To Resume Dialogue

LD1105165389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] [Announcer] Any minute now, in the Foreign Ministry Press Center, a press conference given by Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, will start. Our special correspondent, Vladimir Pasko, has just entered the studio and, as far as I know, the press conference has not yet started.

[Pasko] It has not yet started, but many people have assembled. Journalists are showing colossal interest, quite simply, in this meeting and I must say that it is fully justified. I can now only acquaint you with the content, of course very briefly, of that press conference, which U.S. Secretary of State Baker arranged.

[Announcer] It took place 2 hours ago.

[Pasko] Yes, it took place 2 hours ago. Well, what can we say? The secretary of state, in essence, repeated the evaluations and positions set out in the reports that we mentioned in earlier bulletins. In his announcement he quite clearly expressed satisfaction with the general results of the talks.

[Begin Baker recording in English, fading into Pasko's superimposed Russian report] This visit was very useful and productive, the secretary of state says. We have held constructive talks, he announced at the very beginning of his speech. I am deeply satisfied with how our meetings went. President Bush has asked me to state clearly to the leaders of the Soviet Union that the United States is ready and is striving to resume relations again on all questions. In the last 2 days, Minister Shevardnadze and I have been laying the foundation for continuity and the introduction of changes in all spheres of our relations. We have begun to extend the range of subjects that we will be reviewing periodically. We have considered more deeply the matters that were considered earlier. I stated that we welcome the policy of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy, and the policy of glasnost and restructuring. This, in fact, was what he discussed first.

[Announcer] What else did he say of interest?

[Pasko] I would like to note that the secretary of state did not conceal the divergences that exist between the sides. But in general, it seemed to me, he tried to show objectively what the sides had achieved on the level of drawing the positions closer together in the course of the talks, and this, as it seems to me, reflects an important tendency that now characterizes Soviet-U.S. relations. This was manifested in the secretary of state's answers to the many questions asked by the correspondents.

[Announcer] Vladimir, I would request that as soon as there is a report about the press conference by Comrade Shevardnadze you would be so kind as to tell us about it.

[Pasko] I will, of course.

[Announcer] Incidentally, I want to tell our radio listeners that today U.S. Secretary of State James Baker gave an interview to Valentin Zorin, political correspondent of Soviet television and radio. This interview will be broadcast on the first central television program at 2345 [1945 GMT]. Central television is planning to show the press conference by Comrade Shevardnadze immediately after the Vremya newscast.

Shevardnadze Meets Press on Baker Talks

PM1205094989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition pp 5,7

["E.A. Shevardnadze's News Conference"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] After the end of his talks with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, the USSR foreign minister held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. In his introductory address he said:

The visit to our country by U.S. Secretary of State Mr Baker, which ended today, was in our view of great importance. President Bush's administration has, as we know, spent 3 and ½ months analyzing its policy with regard to the Soviet Union and has been working out its approach to the problems on our mutual agenda. We adopted an understanding attitude to the administration's desire to gain a thorough understanding of its priorities and to prepare itself for a new stage in Soviet-U.S. relations. We, and others I think, of course awaited with understandable interest a completion of the analysis Washington has undertaken. We were awaiting it probably because the current U.S. Administration has inherited unique assets in relations with the Soviet Union, and an equally unique amount of groundwork facilitating even more crowning results to be achieved in new conditions.

Our mutual assets include: a fundamentally different and constructive general atmosphere throughout virtually all our mutual relations; active and intensive political dialogue at all levels, including the highest level; the Stockholm accords on measures of confidence-building in the military sphere, including pioneering forms of verification and on-site inspection. These would be barely possible without effective Soviet-U.S. cooperation. The treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles needs no epithets. There is the final document of the Vienna meeting of representatives of CSCE member-states, which has imbued the all-European process with fresh quality; an important place in drawing up this document belongs to Soviet-U.S. interaction. There are the Geneva accords on the Afghan settlement, of which the United States and Soviet Union are guarantors; fruitful cooperation in the humanitarian sphere; 10 new intergovernmental agreements encompassing a very wide range—from research and exploitation of space for peaceful ends, and cooperation in fundamental sciences, to the struggle against illegal narcotics trafficking.

There are also the human contacts in which tens and hundreds of thousands of Soviet and U.S. citizens are involved today. This unique joint asset is already working toward an improvement of the worldwide political climate, the strenghtening of general security, and the development of positive interaction between states. It is only part of the inheritance created by us. This inheritance is also made up of the great progress achieved in

areas such as the draft treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, and the accord on the mutual observance—a fundamental accord—during a certain period, of the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972; the convention banning chemical weapons; and the protocols that make it possible to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties on nuclear tests. Included in this inheritance are also new opportunities for the development of mutually advantageous cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, the settlement of regional conflict situations, trade, science, technology, education, sports, and many other areas. Why am I going over this again? To show where we stood and now stand, and how important the question of continuing the policy in Soviet-U.S. relations is.

This is important not solely for us, since how matters stand concerning the levels of military confrontation in the world depends largely on Soviet-U.S. relations. It is not, of course, a matter of imitating everything that happened yesterday. Continuity does not exclude totally innovative approaches, new emphases, or the formation of a new style of mutual relations. But one can only speak of continuity when movement continues in the same direction: If we were ascending, then we must continue the ascent and gain height. That is the way we understand the task and act accordingly. We submit new proposals, aimed at enriching the process of disarmament and cooperation and of ensuring stability and security in Europe and throughout the world.

A very important—I would say, a crucially important—conversation took place between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the secretary of state. The Soviet leader submitted a number of major proposals connected with the Soviet Union's position at the Vienna talks. He revealed the content of the Soviet approach to the three-stage reductions of troops and conventional weapons in Europe, and to the attainment of a level of defensive sufficiency by both military-political blocs.

A very important initiative concerning a unilateral reduction of Soviet tactical nuclear ammunition in Europe and a proposal for a comprehensive solution to the question were extended. Needless to say, our well-known proposal for an urgent start of separate talks on the problem of a third "zero" in this sphere remains in force. As for our proposals' specific numerical parameters, they will, by arrangement with the U.S. side, be made public tomorrow—published in the Soviet press. That's what we agreed with him.

Specific positive advances were also made on many of our other positions on disarmament matters. We attach very great importance to reaching an accord on the resumption of talks on nuclear and space weapons between 11 and 20 June. [v9 vtoroy dekade iyunya].

The U.S. side gave an assurance that they would conduct the talks on the basis of the joint drafts that have already been agreed to. A timetable has been defined for the resumption of bilateral consultations on matters concerning a ban on chemical weapons, for resumption of the work of the permanent consultative commission, and for resumption of negotiations on ending nuclear tests. Here I should like to return again to the question of continuity. The secretary of state told us that the United States has not yet worked out its specific positions for the negotiations, but he stressed that we shall see "a significant degree of continuity" in those new positions—specifically, in their negotiating positions.

Unfortunately, we cannot at the moment judge on the basis of that explanation in which direction the United States' positions at the negotiations—above all, those on nuclear and space weapons—are being transformed. Evidently, only after the start of the negotiations themselves will it become clear what kind of changes the U.S. side has made to its approaches. We hope that they will make the attainment of an accord easier. I am talking about this because it is precisely this which is the crux of the whole system of Soviet-U.S. relations, and of East-West relations, too. Its steadiness and stability depend above all on how dynamically the process of the reduction of military confrontation and a mutual transition to the principles of defensive sufficiency goes.

It would be extremely dangerous to be content with what has already been done. It must not be forgotten that the negotiations are at a standstill while at the same time the development [sozdaniye] and improvement of weapons is continuing. Experience tells us that in disarmament matters the pace of negotiations is of very great significance, for the forces of inertia and braking forces are great. This is why we would like to conclude as soon as possible the interval that has arisen in the negotiating process and move on more quickly to intensive discussion of the matters that remain unresolved.

A distinctive feature of the present meeting with the secretary of state was the fact that great attention was devoted to the discussion of regional problems. Both sides took as a point of departure the need to remove confrontational elements in the approach to these problems and agreed that efforts ought to be concentrated on the search for points of contact and on developing a constructive dialogue. It was in this tone that the exchange of views on Central America, Afghanistan, the Near East, and other regional problems took place. The situation in almost all regions was analysed at various degrees of depth, both at the ministerial level and in the corresponding working group participated in by our major specialists and experts.

I won't say that we have made firm progress. There are no fewer differences in our positions, but the striving to single out those elements in one another's methods of approach that can become the basis for continuing to speak bluntly was definitely revealed. We agreed on a schedule for subsequent consultations at the level of experts on the main regional problems.

The sides observed the successful and resulting development of dialogue on questions of humanitarian cooperation. They also mapped out an extensive working program of actions in the sphere of bilateral relations.

Under an accord reached at the meeting of ministers in Vienna, a discussion of the so-called transnational problems took place for the first time. This idea belongs to Mr Baker, and we supported it with great enthusiasm as a sensible proposal by the secretary of state. Included here were questions of environmental protection, interaction in combating natural calamities, transport security, fighting international terrorism, and cooperation in raising the efficiency of the United Nations.

The secretary of state and I agreed to regularly conduct meetings of ministers. They will take place three, four times a year, and even more frequently if the need arises.

Mr Baker's visit essentially offered for the first time an opportunity for an exchange of opinions with the new U.S. Administration on all issues on the Soviet-U.S. agenda. An important result is the confirmation of our mutual desire for the development of all-round dialogue, for seeking mutually acceptable solutions aimed at strengthening security and stability, at expanding mutual understanding and cooperation, and at increasing positive aspects.

The secretary of state conveyed to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev a personal message from President Bush that expounds his administration's fundamental approaches to relations with the Soviet Union. The question of a summit meeting was also raised. It was pointed out that such meetings are a key link in permanent dialogue between the two great powers. Both sides expressed the intention to make summit meetings a normal political occurrence and to remove the certain element of sensationalism from them. Meetings between the top leaders should be regarded as a logical step designed to impart the necessary political stimulus and bring the sides toward mutually acceptable accords when the necessary conditions for this have been created.

As to the possibility of holding another meeting between the top leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, this question will be discussed at the ministerial talks planned for September this year.

The talks were conducted in a good atmosphere, and were open, businesslike, and constructive. I feel that pretty good personal contacts are being established between leaders of the two great powers. The most important thing is that they ushered in a new stage of Soviet-U.S. relations. Time will tell what this stage will be like and what results it will bring. We are orienting ourselves toward a worthy continuation of what has been done.

Then E.A. Shevardnadze replied to questions from journalists.

Question: It is possible to conclude from your comments that you are not totally satisfied with the results of the talks. Do you believe that you have managed to maintain the momentum acquired with the Reagan administration?

Reply: In my opinion, in spirit, in tone, and I would even say in content we managed. True, we did not sign any major agreements. But this was a good start to a major path of serious and solid dialogue. It is precisely in this way that we assess the results of the visit by Mr. J. Baker to Moscow. It is given particular weightiness by the proposals submitted by M.S. Gorbachev in his conversation with the secretary of state.

Question: Mr. Baker said both sides achieved a certain amount of progress on the Near East. What is your attitude toward this assessment, and what are the differences between the two sides on this issue? And, if you will allow me, I would like to ask another question connected with how the discussion of the Afghan problem went.

Reply: I consider it important that the secretary of state and I agreed to have constant Soviet-U.S. consultations on the problems of the Near East settlement. Our special representatives on the Near East will systematically meet and hold consultations.

Both sides proceed from the premise that as a final aim it is necessary to strive for a genuinely all-embracing settlement of the Near Eastern conflict. Here, the secretary of state expressed himself in principle in favor of an international conference on a Near East settlement.

Another step forward is the mutual understanding with regard to a multi-option approach to preparations for such a conference.

Close attention should be given here to any viable ideas: The proposals of the Arab states, the initiatives by the leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the ideas forwarded recently by the prime minister of Israel, although to be frank, Shamir's proposals contain perhaps more vagueness than clear-cut statements.

Now, concerning Afghanistan, this, unfortunately, is something on which we still have very little mutual understanding. Admittedly, there was one, in my view, highly important pronouncement by the secretary of state that drew attention. He said the United States would like to see Afghanistan as a sovereign, neutral, and nonaligned state that would not be hostile to the Soviet Union. That, however, is a general statement, whereas our specific proposals on developing inter-Afghan dialogue and on convening an international conference involving Afghanistan's neighboring countries to settle the Afghan problem, unfortunately, failed to bring a constructive reaction from the U.S. side.

Since we are on the subject of regions, mention should definitely be made of the thorough discussion the secretary of state and I had on Central America. Here we discovered certain new elements in the U.S. approaches. In particular, it seems as if the U.S. Administration is now inclining toward a political settlement in Central America and realizing that the issues associated with the Central American conflict cannot be resolved by military means. If all this really is the case, then I think a reasonable basis is emerging for productive cooperation between us to help establish a stable and just peace in that region.

Question: Mr Baker didn't wish to answer this question, but perhaps you can tell us whether Mr Gorbachev put forward any unilateral initiatives on reducing tactical nuclear arms in Europe during his conversation with the secretary of state?

Answer: M.S. Gorbachev's proposals include, among other things, unilateral measures on reducing tactical nuclear arsenals in Europe. But don't ask me about the volumes and figures in question. That will all be publicized tomorrow, so you don't have to wait much longer.

Further on News Conference

LD1105185189 Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT 11 May 89

["Shevardnadze—News Conference—Summary"— TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—The visit of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to the USSR was of special importance, Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, told a news conference here on Thursday.

He said an arrangement had been achieved to hold regular meetings of ministers three or four times a year, and even more frequently, if needed. The question of a summit meeting was also raised. It was noted that such meetings are the key link of a permanent dialogue of the two great powers. Both sides expressed the intention to make summit meetings an ordinary political phenomenon, to rid them of a touch of sensationalism.

What is most important is that the negotiations in Moscow set the beginning to a new stage in Soviet-American relations, Shevardnadze said.

Answering questions, Shevardnadze said that even though no resounding agreements had been concluded during Baker's visit, the spirit and tone of negotiations attested to the existence of the continuity. The minister pointed to a fruitful dialogue on the theme of regional conflicts, specifically, as regards the Middle East situation. He said it had been decided to hold permanent Soviet- American consultations on this question for the purpose of achieving a comprehensive and fair settlement to the Middle East conflict. The elements of many versions appeared in the USSR and the U.S.A., Shevardnadze said. It has been decided not to reject out of hand the proposals from whatever party to the conflict.

As to the solution to the Afghan problem, there are very few points of contact in the stands of the USSR and the USA, the minister said.

Answering the question about the contents of the joint statement on Lebanon, Shevardnadze said that the very fact of its signing is of no small importance, though the Soviet side has a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, it was the maximum of what could be achieved at the given stage, he said. The minister expressed the hope that more effective methods of exerting positive influence of the USSR and the U.S.A. on the situation in Lebanon will appear in future.

Regarding the settlement of the situation in Central America Shevardnadze noted a new element in the stand of the U.S. Administration: the striving to settle matters by a political, not military, way.

Admitting the lack of real progress at the talks in Moscow on nuclear disarmament, Shevardnadze expressed the opinion that the new U.S. Administration has not yet formed its stand as regards talks on this matter.

Touching upon Gorbachev's meeting with Baker, the minister confirmed that at that meeting the Soviet leader had advanced initiatives in the area of unilatral reduction of tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. He did not give figures, noting that he is to hold meetings with foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries today and tomorrow and that Baker is to meet his colleagues in NATO.

Shevardnadze said that the new Soviet-American summit does not depend on the results of the talks on nuclear and space arms. But these results might influence the contents and time frame of the meeting, he said. Shevardnadze said that these questions will be discussed in a more specific way at a meeting of foreign ministers in September.

Comparison of Baker-Shevardnadze Talks

PM1205085189

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 12 May 1989 publishes in its Second Edition on page 5 a TASS report on the conclusion of the Baker-Shevardnadze talks in Moscow. The PRAVDA item, entitled "Talks Concluded," has been compared with the Moscow TASS International Russian version published in the 11 May Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 7-9, revealing the following significant variations:

page 8, column two, second paragraph, second sentence in PRAVDA reads: ...the view that, as conventional armed forces in Europe are reduced, the problem of... (retranslating)

page 9, column one, last paragraph, only sentence in PRAVDA reads: ...Soviet-American political dialogue.

J. Baker departed the USSR the same day.

At the airport he was seen off by A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister; Yu.V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador to the United States; and other officials.

U.S. Ambassador to the USSR J.F. Matlock was among the sendoff party. (adding passage)

Baker Interviewed by Soviet Journalists

Interviewed by Biryukov

LD1105201389 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 11 May 89

[Interview with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker by Vadim Biryukov, TASS diplomatic correspondent, in Moscow on 11 May]

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Follows an interview given by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to TASS diplomatic correspondent Vadim Biryukov:

Q. Mr. Secretary,

The first question is quite obvious. What are the results of your two-day talks in Moscow and what are your impressions about your meeting with the General Secretary Mr. Gorbachev?

A. Well, I, first, am very satisfied with the two-day talks with Minister Shevardnadze and his associates and my rather extensive meeting with the general secretary. I think our talks were constructive. I think they were helpful and useful. I believe that my interlocutors share that view.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact itself that you are in Moscow means that the new administration has completed or is completing the re-examination of your national and security policy. Can you elaborate in a few words what are the new outlines of this new policy of your administration.

A. Well, let me answer your question by saying we have indeed completed our foreign policy and national security review. We still have some work to do on some of the specific positions that of necessity will come up in the arms control negotiations, but as I told the general secretary and I told foreign minister we expect to be ready by the time those negotiations resume and of course one of the products of our talks here was the setting of dates for the resumption of all the arms control negotiations.

Q. What do you think is the chief element in the policy of continuity towards the Soviet Union proclaimed by President Bush?

A. Well, as I told Minister Shevardnadze there will be a considerable degree of continuity not just in the overall policies that had been pursued by the prior administration but in positions in the arms control negotiations as well. We hope that we can put a new emphasis on working cooperatively, the United States and the Soviet Union, to help solve the regional conflicts around the world that have real potential for erupting into war. Particularly in these days when we have the added danger of missile and chemical weapons proliferation.

So it's our view that if we can find a way to work together on some of these issues in a cooperative way, as we have too often in the past, it would be very, very good. [sentence as received]

Q. Mr. Secretary, the previous achievements in the Soviet-American relations were connected with such a tool as a summit. What do yo think about this mechanism of the summits in the Soviet-American relations in the future?

A. We agreed today in our discussions with the general secretary that summits are important. I told him that that was the view of President Bush, that President Bush wanted me to talk to him to ascertain, solicit his views of a possible summit, the appropriate timing for such a summit. We had a full discussion of this issue and we concluded that we should address the question further in my next ministerial meeting with Minister Shevardnadze.

Q. Mr Secretary, this is your first visit to this country and of course, it generated a lot of interest among the Soviet people. They would certainly like to know more about you as a person, about what ideas you want to bring into Soviet-American relations. Could you satisfy just a little their curiosity on the subject?

A. Well, I've just mentioned one of the ideas, and that is cooperation rather than competition and confrontation. I've also alluded to the fact that we think it would be useful to put a bit more emphasis on the problem of regional conflicts. I've suggested that we add a fifth category of issues to the usual basket of issues normally discussed in these meetings, that is transnational global issues, matters such as the environment, terrorism, drug trafficking, the reduction of natural distasters. Together I think we could work on some of these problems. I am struck by the fact that we have cooperated very well where disaster strikes. Your earthquake in Armenia—we were helpful. Our oil spill in Alaska—you were very

helpful. In fact I think you still have a Soviet ship assisting us. And these are examples, I think, of the way our two countries might better cooperate.

Q. Well, as you know, Mr Secretary, the American spaceship Apollo and the Soviet spaceship Soyuz have had quite different structures. But one detail they had almost one hundred percent similar. It's a mechanism of docking. What was your docking with Mr Shevardnadze? You know that your predecessor Mr Shultz met thirty-one times with our foreign minister. How this docking went? [sentence as received]

A. Well, at the conclusion of our meeting today, the minister said he characterized our discussions as very friendly and as having laid a good foundation for the establishment of fine personal relations between the two of us. I must say to you that I strongly share this view. The minister and his wife were kind enough to entertain my wife and me last night at a private dinner in their home and I thought that was very gracious and I thanked him for his hospitality and look forward to reciprocating when he next comes to the United States. But I found during my three and a half years as secretary of the treasury that personal relationships are very important in getting things accomplished and the minister and I talked about that last night and I know he shares my view.

Q. What specific steps should be taken, do you think, to raise trust between the USSR and the U.S.A. As part of the increasing Soviet-U.S. exchange would you agree to send a member of your family to permanently work in Moscow? If that's a good idea, who that could be? [sentence as received]

A. I don't have any members of my family that I can dictate to. That way we have something called freedom of choice in the United States but I would certainly encourage. I do have an 11-year-old daughter and when she gets a little bit older and if that was in any way a desire of hers, I would certainly be supportive, I would encourage her.

Q. You have several points of view in Washington and even in the administration about our perestroyka. I think that some people say perestroyka will fail. Some people say: Let's wait and see. Wouldn't it be more productive to say not wait and see but help and see because helping us you are helping yourself because of this new development in the world, because we are in the same boat.

A. Well, I've already said to you that we in the new administration, and this goes for all of us, even someone who might think that perestroyka is not going to succeed, we all, nevertheless, want it to succeed. And we do not want to do anything that would in any way obstruct that success or make it more difficult provided that it was in our national interests.

Interviewed by Zorin

LD1105223789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 11 May 89

[Video interview with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker by political observer Valentin Zorin at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow on 11 May—recorded; Baker answers questions in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades! I wish to introduce to you U.S. Secretary of State Mr James Baker, with whom we are having a conversation at the Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow. Mr Secretary of State, can we consider your visit to Moscow and the meeting and conversations held here as an end to the pause that has occurred in the Soviet-U.S. dialogue after the new administration came to power in Washington.

[Baker] The simple answer to that is yes. In fact I think one can go even further: We have already totally resumed our relations.

[Zorin] Today you had a prolonged meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Among us journalists its actual length aroused great interest. Could you tell us, at least briefly, what was discussed and in what spheres agreement was reached.

[Baker] Well, we talked about the problems you have just mentioned—that is, how the new U.S. Administration will be viewing its relations with the USSR. I said to the general secretary that the President, myself, and other people in our administration would like relations between our countries to be constructive, positive, active, and expanding. We also discussed a whole number of regional problems, among which were the Near East and Central America. We talked about the attitude of our administration toward your restructuring, and about the fact that we wish to see your restructuring continuing successfully. We discussed the questions we are to consider, including the ones on disarmament and control [kontrol].

[Zorin] Have you discussed the question of a meeting, another Soviet-U.S. meeting at summit level.

[Baker] We talked about this question and concluded that it is necessary for me and your Minister Shevardnadze to discuss it in detail. I am confident that a summit meeting between the general secretary and President Bush will definitely take place. At the same time, we stressed that we are aware of the importance of summit meetings and the role they can play in our relations.

[Zorin] Speaking the other day at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies—I have read the speech you made there, you enumerated a series of specific steps taken by the Soviet Union directed toward improvement of the global situation. In particular, you

named the signing of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, the destruction of the SS-20 missiles, the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Union's weapons in Europe, the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and steps toward democratization inside our country. I think I am quoting you accurately. In connection with this, I would like to ask you what specific steps have been taken or are being planned in the same direction by Washington.

[Baker] Washington does not have armed forces from other countries, so we cannot take any steps to withdraw our forces. [sentence as heard] Washington was your partner in securing the medium- and shorter-range missiles treaty and those on other nuclear weapons. I think I also spoke there about the fact that the Soviet Union has done a lot in the sphere of human rights and free emigration for those who wish to leave. Today the situation has improved a great deal. We have no need to take such steps because we have free emigration. I spoke about this in order to show that our relationship is moving in a positive and constructive direction.

[Zorin] But do I understand you to say that in the future steps should be taken only by the Soviet Union and not by the United States also?

[Baker] No, no, not at all. For our relations to move forward positively and constructively both sides must make efforts. I did not mean that we must not act.

[Zorin] Another question: How do you explain Washington's refusal to discuss simultaneously with the problem of reducing conventional arms the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? It would seem that this would be the logical next step after conclusion of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles.

[Baker] You know we had most protracted debates and discussions on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and whether it is necessary to incorporate them in the talks on conventional armaments. And, at the end of it all, we decided not to incorporate this issue. But if one is to speak frankly, I can say why NATO does not very much want to begin those talks. The point is that the Soviet Union possesses a large advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. You have approximately 1,400 launchers and NATO has only 88. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact has a large advantage in conventional weapons and armed forces. The very fact that tactical nuclear weapons exist has for many years now been promoting the maintenance of peace. And this deterrence is a NATO condition to avert war. As soon as you begin to touch these weapons, you will do damage to the cause of peace. This is, after all, a defensive strategy and not an offensive strategy.

[Zorin] As far as I know, the viewpoint you have expressed is not the only one in Washington. I know that such authoritative figures in the U.S. capital as Paul Nitze, Les Aspin, and even Admiral Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are expressing another viewpoint. So can one consider that another viewpoint exists? I am not mentioning that what you say is likewise contested by certain eminent Western European leaders.

[Baker] You are right, there are indeed other points of view, of course, and this is one of the healthy aspects of democracy. Therefore, we hear different viewpoints. It seems to me that what Admiral Crowe said would evidently not be acceptable to the Warsaw Pact either. He advanced a number of positions on which we could negotiate: I doubt whether the Warsaw Pact would accept these conditions. Admiral Crowe and some others, I think, say that negotiations can be considered after the existing imbalance is eliminated. We want to see concrete results from disarmament negotiations. To bring the Warsaw Pact closer to NATO, unilateral changes should be carried out in connection with a number of imbalances that exist between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Then we can conduct negotiations.

[Zorin] I hope you will not object to my asking the following question: Do you believe the assertions by some Washington politicians, among others, to the effect that the Soviet Union is working to split NATO. Do you believe the Soviet Union is trying to split NATO?

[Baker] No, I think the Soviet Union has its own national interests, security interests. They are perhaps not quite compatible with or acceptable to NATO, but permit me to reiterate that the very fact that NATO exists and that the Warsaw Pact exists, and that it has been possible to maintain peace for over 40 years, is very important. And one should be careful in regard to what has maintained that peace over the course of many years. No, of course I do not think the Soviet Union wants to split NATO. I am sure the Soviet Union acts like any sovereign state, as it should act in its own national interests and in the interests of its own security—as, of course, it sees that to be.

[Zorin] Well, it is very nice to hear that statement from your lips. As our time is running out, allow me to ask you this: We are talking here on the threshold of the 1990's. How do you envisage the last decade of the 20th century, in particular in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Baker] It seems to me that there are great opportunities for profound changes in relations between our countries particularly in connection with what is taking place in the Soviet Union. We see that the political and economic changes, which your leadership is now implementing, are truly revolutionary. We want them to be successfull, as this will lead to more openness, stability, and confidence in the Soviet Union. I think this is also a good thing for us, and for you; in general this is good for the entire world, too.

[Zorin] And the very last, a very brief personal question. You have recently arrived at the State Department, assuming leadership of it. Do you like this job, and are you not disappointed with it?

[Baker] No, I like this job very much. I have a portfolio full of issues that must be dealt with. Well, I have some experience. I was head of White House staff during Reagan's time, I was secretary of the treasury, and I was a member of the National Security Council. And now I am continuing this work.

[Zorin] Thank you, Mr Secretary of State, and permit me to express the hope that the tradition of interviews to Soviet Television by the U.S. secretary of state will be continued. Thank you.

Interviewed by Sturua

PM1205150989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker by Melor Sturua: "J. Baker: The Meetings Were Productive. U.S. Secretary of State Interviewed by IZVESTIYA"—date, place of interview not given]

[Text] [Sturua] Esteemed Secretary of State, first of all allow me to thank you for having found time in your fully booked schedule and for agreeing to give IZVESTIYA an interview. And so, my first question: What are the results of your talks in Moscow and your meetings with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium?

[Baker] I am highly satisfied with the 2 days of talks I have had with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and his associates. Of course, I was especially gratified by the quite lengthy and detailed conversation with Mr General Secretary. I consider our talks to have been constructive. I believe they were useful. And I believe my interlocutors share that view.

[Sturua] Your very visit to Moscow testifies that President Bush's new administration either has finalized or is in the processs of finalizing its foreign policy review. Briefly, what is its essence, and what are its new features?

[Baker] We have indeed completed our foreign policy and national security policy analysis. Of course, we still have some more work to do on certain specific positions that will no doubt emerge at the arms control talks. But, as I told the general secretary and the foreign minister, we expect the analysis to be finally completed by the time talks resume. Finally, I would like to emphasize that one of the results of our talks in Moscow was to agree to a schedule for the resumption of the entire range of talks on disarmament problems.

[Sturua] Does the principle of continuity in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations rank as a constituent element of your reassessment of the new administration's policy, as one of its most important components?

[Baker] As I told Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, a considerable degree of continuity will be seen not only as regards the general political line pursued by the previous administration, but also as regards the stance at the forthcoming arms control talks. We hope to be able to put a new emphasis on the joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to assist the settlement of regional conflicts that really could evolve into wars. This is especially important today, when mankind is threatened by the enhanced danger of the proliferation of missiles and chemical weapons. Therefore, we believe that it would be very good if we were to succeed in finding a method for joint actions in solving some of these questions based on principles of cooperation rather than of confrontation and rivalry, as happened only too often in the past.

[Sturua] It is well known that the significant positive developments achieved in the last few years, especially the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, became possible as a result of active use of the instrument of summit meetings. What is your attitude, the attitude of President Bush's administration, toward this instrument?

[Baker] During our conversations with the general secretary we reached agreement that summit meetings are of great importance. I told Mr Gorbachev that this opinion is also shared by President Bush. President Bush instructed me to talk with the general secretary to find out and amplify his opinion about a possible summit meeting and the most suitable time for holding such a meeting. We discussed this problem in detail and reached the conclusion that it is necessary to continue the discussion of this question at my next meeting with Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze.

[Sturua] Mr Secretary of State, this is your first visit to the Soviet Union in your new capacity as head of Washington's State Department. This has naturally aroused great Soviet public interest. Our readers would like to know more about you personally, to know what ideas you would like to bring to Soviet-U.S. relations. Could you satisfy, if only partially, their entirely understandable interest?

[Baker] I have just mentioned one of these ideas: cooperation instead of rivalry and confrontation. I have also mentioned that, in our opinion, it would be useful to place somewhat greater emphasis on the problem of regional conflicts. I have also proposed adding a new category of problems to the traditional range of issues normally discussed at Soviet-U.S. talks. These are transnational, global problems (the "fifth basket"). They relate to issues such as the environment, terrorism, the narcotics trade, work on combating the effects of natural

disasters, and certain other matters. I think that together we could cooperate to solve these problems. The facts confirm my hopes. Thus, when there was an earthquake in Armenia, we came to your assistance. When we had an oil spill in Alaska, you helped us. If I am not mistaken, a special Soviet vessel is still there and is continuing to help us. So, in my opinion, there are eloquent examples of how our two countries could improve mutual cooperation.

[Sturua] Mr Secretary of State, it is well known that the U.S. "Apollo" and Soviet "Soyuz" spacecraft differed considerably from each other in terms of technical design. But in one respect they were absolutely identical. I am thinking of the docking mechanism. Your current meeting with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze is your first. As you know, your predecessor, Mr Shultz, met with him 31 times. My question is: How did your first "docking" go, both professionally and personally?

[Baker] When our talks had ended my Soviet colleague said he viewed the results of the 2-day talks as very friendly and as laying a good foundation for the establishment of an excellent personal relationship between us. I certainly share that opinion. The foreign minister and his wife were kind enough to invite my wife and me to a private dinner at their home. I think they were very kind. I thanked them for their hospitality and eagerly look forward to the opportunity to host a similar function when Mr Shevardnadze comes to the United States. During my years as secretary of the treasury I came to the conclusion that personal relationships are very important for achieving businesslike results. The Soviet foreign minister and I also discussed this topic. And, as I understand it, he shares that view.

[Sturua] With literally every passing day our planet is becoming, figuratively speaking, smaller and smaller, and we are all increasingly becoming like the crew of the same ship. This dictates the need for mutual aid as an abiding condition of survival. My question, Mr Secretary of State, is: What is the Bush administration's attitude to the restructuring taking place in the Soviet Union? We know that there has been a certain amount of dissension in Washington on this subject, not least in official circles. Some people wish it success, others have their doubts and are even predicting its failure, while others are saying "let's wait and see." But wouldn't it be more constructive to say: "Let's help and see"? After all, philosophically and practically, support for our restructuring is objectively to the advantage of U.S. national interests.

[Baker] We representatives of the new administration—and this applies to all of us, even those who possibly think that restructuring will not be crowned with success—wish it well, nevertheless. We do not want to take any actions which would in any way hinder the success of restructuring or create problems for it, so long as this meets our national interests, of course. It is perfectly natural that we should go on showing concern for our national interests, as you do for yours. Yes, we are quite sure that we want restructuring to succeed. But at the same time we are equally sure that its success or failure depends chiefly on what happens in the Soviet Union itself, and that this depends primarily on your leadership and your people. Its end result will be determined not by what the West does or does not do. I take the position that we will cooperate for the good of restructuring in those areas where such cooperation serves our national interests, but in any event we will not take an obstructionist stance. I am not afraid to reiterate that the development of cooperation and the reduction of confrontation are among the paths which, I hope, will promote that.

[Sturua] We have already mentioned that another item, the "fifth basket," as it is called, has been added to the traditional agenda of Soviet-U.S. talks. Does it not seem to you that in essence the contents of the "fifth basket" belong to the realm of the new political thinking, as we understand it, because the solution of this package of problems requires the joint efforts of the states and the priority of common human interests over all others, the deideologization of interstate relations, and their demilitarization in favor of development toward peaceful cooperation and humanism?

[Baker] That idea occurred to me during the Senate hearings on my confirmation as secretary of state. In conversations with your foreign minister I stressed that I was very glad at his agreement to include the "fifth basket" in the framework of Soviet-U.S. talks. I am very glad that the general secretary also agreed to give extra emphasis to this by including the settlement of regional problems.

[Sturua] Finally, one last question: What concrete steps would you personally like to take, not just as secretary of state but also as a private individual, for the further strengthening of trust between our countries? Would you, for instance, agree to send a member of your family to Moscow for full-time work as part of the expansion of Soviet-U.S. exchanges? If that idea appeals to you, who would come?

[Baker] At present there is no one in my family to whom I could entrust such a mission. And I cannot order anyone to go. We have freedom of choice. But I would undoubtedly assist that. I have an 11-year old daughter. When she grows up, and if such a prospect coincides with her wishes, I would undoubtedly support such a move on her part and would even facilitate it.

[Sturua] Mr Secretary of State, thank you very much.

Joint USSR-U.S. Statement on Lebanon

PM1205091189 Moscow PRAVDA Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 5

[Joint Soviet-U.S. Statement on Lebanon"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Within the framework of the talks between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state, the following statement was agreed upon:

In the face of the mounting bloodshed in Lebanon, the Soviet Union and the United States appeal to all sides to accept and observe the cease-fire, which would be an important first step on the road to halting the civil war in that country.

The USSR and the United States support the Arab League proposal, first to consolidate the cease-fire, and then to create a basis for national dialogue and reconciliation in Lebanon. They are ready to use their good offices so that, jointly with other states, they can promote a political solution to the Lebanese problem, taking the interests of all sides into account. The USSR and the United States support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Soviet-U.S. Sea Pollution Accord Welcomed

PM1205110989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "An Example of Ecological Cooperation"]

[Text] Environmental protection is now objectively perceived as one of the most important priority international problems, in parallel with disarmament and the settlement of regional conflicts.

According to all forecasts and estimates, the state of the planetary environment is steadily deteriorating. The climate is changing, forest areas are diminishing, deserts are expanding, the ozone layer is being exhausted, and the atmosphere and the world ocean are being polluted. This ecological adversity persistently dictates the need to take urgent measures to save mankind's habitat.

The tasks of ecological rebirth transcend borders and can be solved only through efforts by the entire international community. Here there is no room for mistrust, efforts to cheat one's partners, or concealment of any achievement capable of offering a radical solution. Ecology is becoming an indicator of the level of a given country's civilized thinking, of its ability to think on a planetary scale.

The pooling of efforts by the USSR and the United States and of their scientific, material, and intellectual potentials is today an exceptionally important factor for the solution of global problems.

The agreement between the USSR Government and the U.S. Administration on emergency cooperation in combating pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, signed by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker on 11 May 1989, is one of those intergovernmental accords whose timeliness and topicality are obvious.

The new Soviet-U.S. intergovernmental agreement covers questions of conducting joint operations to combat pollution in emergencies and of notification on incidents that cause or could cause large-scale spillage of oil or other harmful substances. Under the accord the sides pledged to exchange relevant information, engage in scientific and technical cooperation in the sphere of developing means and methods to combat accidents at sea, implement personnel training, and conduct joint studies.

The USSR and U.S. governments also agreed to facilitate access to each other's territorial waters by their countries' national forces and means designed to combat pollution, and laid down procedures for reimbursing expenditures incurred in the conduct of joint operations to combat pollution of the sea.

One of the agreement's integral parts is the adopted plan for joint actions in the event of emergencies, which envisages a specific procedure for measures to be taken by the two states' relevant services in the event of accidents in the Bering or Chukchi seas.

The current participation by the Soviet vessel "Vaydagubskiy" in the cleanup of oil pollution off the Alaska coast as a result of the accident involving the U.S. tanker "Exxon Valdez" unambiguously indicates the major practical importance attached to international, and specifically to Soviet-U.S., ecological cooperation.

Practice proves that such incidents often result in large-scale spillage of harmful substances into the sea, affecting the interests of littoral states. The existing response system in the United States proved inadequate for effective and efficient elimination of the consequences of an accident on such a scale. According to Soviet experts' estimates, a similar accident off the USSR coast would also create major cleanup difficulties. The application of effective measures in emergencies, as a rule, demands collaboration between the several countries in the region affected by the disaster.

The agreement signed expands the range and scope of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection. At the same time, it offers graphic proof that USSR-U.S. scientific and technical cooperation is beginning to extend beyond the framework of purely bilateral interests and is being increasingly targeted toward the solution of global problems as well.

Much attention was given during the 10-11 May talks between the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers in Moscow to a discussion of transnational problems which, by mutual agreement, have been given a permanent status within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue. The main outcome of these discussions was the unanimous opinion that cooperation along this avenue is fully in line with both sides' interests and is necessary to deepen and develop it by all possible means.

In this context, the conclusion of the agreement on emergency cooperation in combating pollution in the Bering and Chukchi seas is a weighty specific result of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue on problems of global importance for mankind.

Baker's Helsinki Comments on Soviet Ties Noted

PM1105104389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy: "Stopover Before Moscow"]

[Text] Helsinki—A brief visit to Helsinki before meetings and talks in Moscow has become a ritual for American politicians. Secretary of State James Baker has not been unfaithful to this tradition.

While in Helsinki James Baker told reporters, in particular, that the aim of his visit to Moscow is to "make it clearly understood that we are working for more active, constructive, positive, increasingly developing relations with the Soviet Union."

The U.S. secretary of state has had meetings with Finnish President M. Koivisto, Prime Minister H. Holkeri, and Foreign Minister P. Paasio. He presented Mauno Koivisto with a book just published in the United States, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland.

Baker's 10 May Arrival in Moscow Reported

PM1005190589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "J. Baker's Arrival in the USSR"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker arrived in Moscow 10 May on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

He was greeted at the airport by A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and by other officials.

Among the welcoming party was J.F. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR.

On the same day talks began between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and J. Baker.

Fitzwater Explains U.S. 'Commitments' in Panama

LD1105210589 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Washington May 11 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

President Bush has ordered U.S. military forces to be ready for possible deployment in Panama, President's press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said at a White House briefing on Thursday. He offered no details but indicated that Bush was to announce later on Thursday his decision on action against Panama.

"Our military forces that are involved are being readied for any possible changes in their status," Fitzwater said. According to the White House spokesman, President with his close national security advisers will be examining the situation throughout the day.

The United States has commitments to democracy, Panama Canal maintenance and the integrity of agreements on the Panama Canal, he said. "We have an obligation to the safety and security of the U.S. citizens in Panama, and we have substantial military commitments in that country. We intend to meet our obligations," the White House press secretary said.

Bush's Panama Actions Aimed at Toppling Noriega

LD1105230289 Moscow TASS in English 2230 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Washington May 12 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

President Bush decided to increase U.S. military presence in the zone of the Panama Canal. Speaking in Washington on Thursday, he said he would send one more U.S. brigade (2,000 or 3,000 soldiers) to Panama in addition to more than 10,000 American troops stationed there.

Bush explained his move by the need to protect the security of American citizens in Panama which has come under threat as a result of the tense situation which developed in Panama after the recent presidential elections.

Fifty-one thousand Americans are staying in Panama. Thirty thousand are servicemen and their families. The Bush administration does not conceal the fact that the current demonstration of U.S. "military missiles" [as received] is aimed at removing General Manuel Antonio Noriega.

Bush said that the United States would not recognise a regime which keeps itself in power by force and cruelty. He accused Noriega of stealing the presidential elections and enmphasised that Noriega's conflict with the people was the root cause of the Panamanian crisis.

Bush decided to recall the U.S. ambassador from Panama and reduce to the minimum the American diplomatic staff. He announced that the United States would preserve economic sanctions against Panama.

Bush said he would take further steps, if necessary, without specifying what concrete steps he meant. He also emphasised that the United States would use "regional diplomacy" to exert pressure on Noriega.

The President confirmed the U.S. commitment to the Panama Canal treaties and its intention to protect America's rights under those treaties.

U.S. 'Interference' Worsening Panama Situation

PM1205093789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 7

[Pavel Bogomolov "Observer's Opinion" under the general heading "Situation in Panama"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] So there has been yet another very dramatic turn of events in Panama. The Panamanian National Electoral Tribunal has declared the results of the 7 May elections null and void owing to "crude violations of the electoral code by representatives of the opposition alliance." News agencies and radio stations are reporting that a date for new elections will be announced later. One gets the impression that the country has been pushed into another period of political instability.

The decision to annul the election results was made against the backdrop of an unprecedented, large-scale campaign to discredit the election procedure itself, when outside pressure on Panama's patriotic forces and its legitimate government has reached a peak. Washington has used a whole arsenal of sanctions against this small Latin American country of 2 million—from financial and economic sanctions to diplomatic sanctions. As has already been reported, things have reached the point where the U.S. special services have been secretly allocated millions of dollars for subversive action against the country's government and the Coalition for National Liberation.

Under these circumstances, as Yolanda Pulise de Rodriguez [second element as transliterated], chairman of the electoral tribunal, noted 10 May on national television, there were serious violations of the voting procedure in a number of districts. And these violations were carried out by right-wing forces which incited pogroms at voting stations.

The brief and sometimes fragmented reports from Panama do not as yet allow us to make a comprehensive assessment of the situation. But it is quite possible to assume that the republic's patriotic forces have displayed in their actions a certain disjointedness, a lack of readiness to utilize the various forms and methods of political struggle, and an insufficiently broad social base. In other words, the road to independence and full sovereignty in this developing country has become rockier and harder for Panamanians than it was before.

The current situation in the republic is complicated still further by the anti-Panamanian blackmail by the White House, which has intensified since the voting. The entire weight of U.S. influence in the region has now been brought to bear in order to create a hostile atmosphere around the republic.

That is the subtext of events. In order to restore calm and order to the country, the Coalition for National Liberation, which secured a mandate last Sunday to govern the republic, has expressed a willingness to hold repeat elections. But it is obvious that peace and equilibrium in Panama cannot prevail until the shameless interference in that country's internal affairs ceases.

U.S. Congressmen Urge Nuclear Test Ban

LD1205092789 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Washington May 12 TASS—One hundred and sixty five members of the U.S. Congress have sent a letter to President Bush calling for the mutual, verifiable and gradual elimination of nuclear tests leading to the signing of an agreement on a total ban on nuclear tests in 1995.

They proposed international talks to establish effective means of verification.

Military Experts' Meeting on Disarmament Viewed

LD1005165489 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 10 May 89

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—"The main aim of the meeting of military experts was to discuss the problems of peace and disarmament, reducing international tensions and removing the danger of war," said a retired Soviet admiral.

Rear Admiral Aleksandr Astafyev is a member of the group "Retired Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament", which took part in the 3rd Soviet-U.S. Conference of Retired Generals and Admirals in the United States. Held under the keynote of preventing the war through understanding and cooperation, the conference was sponsored by the Center for Defense Information, headed by Retired U.S. Rear Admiral Gene Larocque. The delegation returned home today from the United States.

Astafyev said the meeting focused on arms control issues, defense spending and military production in the USSR and U.S. and compliance with the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty.

"In particular, we told the American colleagues about our concern over U.S. actions seem to be at variance with the policy of preventing the threat of nuclear war," the rear admiral told TASS. [sentence as received] "The naval confrontation, which has worsened recently, is the cause of special alarm. The United States is building up its navy, whose level of equipment and combat preparedness are increasing. This cannot but put the Soviet Union and its allies on guard."

During keen discussions, Astafyev continued, the Soviet side declared that the activity of the fleets should pursue purely defensive purposes. It should be limited by the bounds of sensible sufficiency for defense.

"We told the Americans that the time had come to start talks on scaling down the naval activity and reducing naval armaments," he pointed out.

In the final document, the Soviet and U.S. veterans urged an immediate end to all nuclear tests, a complete ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons, continued talks in Geneva on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons, talks on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and sizeable cuts in conventional armaments. The participants in the meeting pledged to submit to the governments of the two countries all specific proposals for implementation.

Fulbright 'Embarrassed' by U.S. Soviet Policy

PM1205101189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: " 'I Feel Embarrassed for America'"]

[Text] New York, 10 May—William Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of America's most senior and authoritative foreign policy specialists, has criticized the Washington administration's approach to relations with the Soviet Union in an interview for ABC-TV. Our reaction to the Russians' initiatives disheartens me somewhat, he stated. As far as I can judge, the Soviet leadership has taken many highly promising steps that accord with the interests not only of the Soviet Union but also of the United States and the whole world.

Take the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, for example, Fulbright continued. In my view that was a very significant move. It should have provided grounds for a show of reciprocity from the United States. I even feel embarrassed for America. We all love our country but, painful though it is to admit it, I cannot name a single initiative put forward by us. We do not even respond to other people's initiatives. Our answers are entirely negative: "We'll think about it. We'll look into it. We'll study it." But we are dealing here with proposals to ease tension and reduce armaments.

Fulbright was asked to comment on George Bush's words at his inauguration ceremony, when essentially he said that events in the world are developing in favor of democracy as it is understood in the West. "I believe that democracy is the right path," the U.S. politician stated. "But the opinion that this is the only way to go seems wrong to me. Our example may be unacceptable to or unsuitable for countries with a completely different history."

U.S. Businessmen of Latvian Origin Seek Ties

PM1105102989 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Apr 89 p 3

[LATINFORM correspondent Ye. Kovalenko report: "American Compatriots in Latvia"]

[Text] Not just to make money but also to help the development of the Latvian economy—this is how some American businessmen of Latvian origin described the aim of their visit to Latvia. For 2 weeks the presidents of firms and directors of companies have studied the fine print of proposals by the republic's economic leaders for the establishment of trade and economic cooperation with traditional American efficiency.

It is hard to doubt this statement. For every one of these businessmen, Latvia is their home, with which they associate memories of their childhood and the lives of their parents, so dear to their hearts. Now the Soviet Union and Latvia are trying to interpret their history in a new way and map out the prospects of developing their economy in a world context. Consequently, the competence and commercial experience of their compatriots, the establishment of joint enterprises with their firms, and loans from the transatlantic guests could help to really restructure the republic's economic mechanism.

The businessmen have discussed these matters with A.V. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, V.G. Bresis, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, the leaders of various sectors and departments, cultural figures, and representatives of 100 state and cooperative associations in the Latvian SSR. The most diverse spheres for the establishment of business relations have been suggested: The production of computers and plastics, the construction of hotels and agricultural units, research into and development of fabrics and paint and varnish products, the development of trade, and the publicizing of Latvian fine art abroad.

"So far," Peteris Yuryans, lawyer and group coordinator, said, "we can say that we intend to establish, develop, and maintain trade and economic cooperation with Latvia. There is a very great deal of information to consider on this score. But the signing of real contracts

lies ahead. In order to achieve the desired results for the good of Latvia, we, for our part, must have the maximum information on how you live and work and what is meant by the socialist system of economic management. For example, how does a state farm differ from a collective farm? Why will the results of contracts with them be different? In short, both sides have some learning to do in order to think on the same wavelength."

At a news conference the American businessmen endeavored to express their opinion on immediate measures to establish economic relations.

The success of any businessman, they believe, is in his desire to think, work, and experiment, without procrastinating. So they will be coming back to Latvia at the end of September. But the team of businessmen, Peteris Yuryans believes, will be bigger next time.

China

Article Previews Gorbachev Visit to China

PM1105151889 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 89 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Bovin article under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "Hopes and Realism"]

[Text] In both Moscow and Beijing preparations are in full swing for M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the PRC. The visit is called upon to open a new chapter in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations—to complete the normalization of interstate relations and restore interparty relations. In view of the two countries' role and significance in world politics, the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting will undoubtedly be the most important event in the political annals of 1989.

The emergence of severe disagreements between the CPSU and the CPC, which later led to the crisis in USSR-PRC relations, was due, as I understand it, mainly to subjective factors. Radical changes in the Chinese leadership opened up the path leading away from confrontation and toward good-neighborly contacts, a path that has continued for more than 10 years now. Particularly marked results were achieved in the second half of the eighties, when the wind of change blew into Moscow and the new political thinking began to transform the USSR's foreign policy. The national and state interests that became paramount—from both Moscow's viewpoint and Beijing's viewpoint—urgently required the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. And the normalization gathered speed.

The "great obstacles" that had so worried the Chinese began gradually to be eroded by the current of events. The Soviet troops left Afghanistan. The Vietnamese are leaving Cambodia. The number of Soviet troops in Mongolia has been reduced.

The world policy spheres in which the positions of the USSR and the PRC coincided or were comparatively close began gradually to widen. Both sides uphold peaceful coexistence, advocate disarmament and the peaceful resolution of international disputes, support the struggle for a new economic order in the world arena, and condemn militarism and neocolonialism. At the same time there are still spheres and problems where it can be observed that interests and assessments do not coincide. But both we and our Chinese neighbors have learned not to dramatize differences of views, we have learned not to abuse each other, but to conduct a constructive discussion, not allowing particularities to spoil and distort the overall picture.

Great significance for the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations was and is attached to the common principles of the processes that are developing in both the USSR and the PRC. Both countries are departing from the model of "early socialism," which was burdened down by authoritarianism, the deification of leaders, the dominance of the bureaucratic apparatus, economic inefficiency, and the working people's low living standard. Both countries have set a course toward diversity of forms of ownership, the combination of the plan and the market, and the democratization of society.

The modernization of the economy began in China a few years earlier than in our country. And the reforms—particularly in the countryside—were more radical. The results are impressive. Unfortunately, one cannot fail to see that the wave of inflation and the growth of retail prices are arousing the masses' dissatisfaction and making it necessary to take up the administrative levers again. Strong inflationary pressure can be observed in the USSR, too. One hopes that Soviet and Chinese economists will find an answer that will stop price rises without deviation from the principles of reform.

An exchange of experience in the sphere of the restructuring of political life could also be of great significance. Here, perhaps, we are in front, encountering both the pros and the cons of democracy, glasnost, and the awakening of social activeness. China is also following a crash course in improving political awareness. The mass demonstrations by students have shown how tense the atmosphere is and how hard it is to establish normal dialogue between the authorities and the "street" and the "squares," which have now begun to speak out in a loud voice.

Generally speaking, there are things we can learn from one another. And M.S. Gorbachev's visit will enable us to do this on a regular basis. So let us learn—and learn, while singling out what we have in common, the similarities, not in any way to forget each country's singular features, not to erase the differences, not to seek such a monumental "monolithic unity."

Incidentally, both Moscow and Beijing are insisting on "cleansing" foreign policy as far as possible of ideological accretions. Obviously, this would mean reducing the proportion of interparty contacts in the general range of Soviet-Chinese relations. After a long period of ideological skirmishes it appears that healthy pragmatism will create a sounder basis for mutually advantageous cooperation. This "deideologizing" approach explains why the principle of socialist internationalism is stepping into the shadows, yielding to the principle of peaceful coexistence as the universal norm of state relations.

The meetings and conversations in Beijing will certainly attract—and have already attracted in advance—keen attention from the world public, specialists in international relations, and journalists. The main topic of analysis will be the influence of the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations on the disposition of world forces and, therefore, on the general tenor of world politics. Attention will be focused on the PRC-USSR-United States "triangle."

In itself this "triangle," XINHUA foreign policy observer Peng Di believes, has objective historical roots and—like other geopolitical "figures"—is constantly changing. What does the triangle mean? It means that "whether it be military security, the geopolitical situation, economic interests, or the cultural and ideological sphere—when two states are tackling any problem they are bound to take into account the existence of the third power." A perfectly reasonable consideration. So when two meet, the third is also invisibly present.

The better relations are all around the perimeter of the "triangle," the more stable and balanced it will be. And the greater the chance of a deepening of detente and of disarmament. On the other hand, the establishment of a "special" relationship between any two points could break up the "triangle" and disrupt the whole system of international relations. This is present-day reality.

Finally, the issue of collective security in Asia, of building a "common Asian home," if you like, is far more difficult, more complex, and more intricate an issue than the European versions of this idea to which we are accustomed. But the issue is there, albeit in the long term. And the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and strengthening, mutually advantageous contacts between the PRC and the USSR can be seen as an essential, although far from sufficient condition of the gradual stabilization of the political situation and growth of the potential for peace and security in Asia.

Deng Tells Iran's Khamene'i of Upcoming Summit

LD1105124589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1159 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Beijing, 11 May (TASS)—"In a few days, I will meet M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and we will try to resolve the disputes that have arisen between us over the past 30 years so as to normalize Sino-Soviet relations," declared Deng Xiaoping during a meeting with [Iranian President] Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, who is here on an official visit.

The Chinese leader said that China and the Soviet Union should live in peace and harmony. According to XINHUA, Deng Xiaoping noted that China is striving to create a stable situation in the world and inside the country in the name of development. "This is the most important thing occupying us at the present time," he stressed.

Soviet-Chinese Ties, Gorbachev Visit Discussed

PM1105112789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by special correspondent Captain First Rank V. Kuzar: "Thoughts at the Temple of Heaven. Our Special Correspondent Reports From Beijing"]

[Excerpt] 10 May—[passage omitted] At this decisive time for mankind the USSR and China—two great neighbors—are called upon to play an enormous role. We recall M.S. Gorbachev's words that history has given the Soviet and Chinese peoples an extremely crucial mission. A great deal in international development depends on the two biggest socialist states. Our countries can and must make their own joint contribution to building a fundamentally new system of international relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Not everything is straightforward, of course. There was alienation in USSR-PRC relations for quite a long time. However, our countries have now set their sights on improving the atmosphere of trust and cooperation. The feelings of friendship, sympathy, and mutual attraction between the Soviet and Chinese peoples—feelings which are deeply rooted in history—have been of considerable importance in this respect. We are linked by common socioeconomic systems and restructuring and modernization processes, which are in acute need of mutual exchanges of experience and practice.

I think that a number of Soviet peace initiatives have had a favorable effect in shaping a new image of the Soviet Union in the PRC. These include the USSR's decision to scrap all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Asia, the announcement of Soviet troop cuts of 200,000 and 60,000 in the eastern and southern part of the country respectively, the withdrawal of three-quarters of the Soviet troops deployed in Mongolia, the reorganization of our formations and units sited near the Soviet-Chinese border into a defensive structure, the readiness to abandon the naval material and technical supply center at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, and other things.

At the same time we are well aware that China, too, has done a great deal in the disarmament sphere. For instance, the PRC has pledged itself to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China advocates the nonproliferation

of nuclear weapons, even though it has not signed the corresponding international treaty in favor of the creation of nuclear-free zones, not least in the South Pacific and the Korean peninsula. The PRC has cut its Armed Forces by 1 million men, reduced defense spending, and is converting some of its military industry. There have also been substantial changes in China's military doctrine—it is no longer based on the prospect of a "major war." Our countries are also brought closer together by their common approaches to many other international issues.

Naturally, all this could not fail to have an impact on bilateral relations. In recent years business ties have been strengthened, as have contacts between the Soviet and Chinese public, and direct cooperation is being organized between individual regions, cities, and enterprises. A Soviet-Chinese economic, trade, scientific, and technical cooperation commission headed by deputy heads of government has been set up and is working actively.

The level of political dialogue between our countries has noticeably increased. There has been an obvious expansion of the zone of mutual understanding, which encompasses virtually all spheres of interstate discourse. Nonetheless, there are still many difficulties. That is why, talking about relations with the USSR, Deng Xiaoping, the prominent Chinese leader, called for an end to the past and the opening of the future. We should strive to fully normalize bilateral relations, basing them on the principles of peaceful coexistence, good-neighborliness, and equal and mutually advantageous cooperation. In such a way they will benefit both our peoples and the cause of world peace and security.

This is the aim of the forthcoming visit to the PRC by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Here in Beijing final preparations are under way to receive the lofty guest. Representatives of the mass media, who will cover the Soviet-Chinese summit, are descending on the Chinese capital. [passage omitted]

PRC Situation Before Gorbachev Visit Assessed
LD1205073189 Moscow TASS in English 0725 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Beijing May 12 TASS—By TASS special correspondents Askold Birkov and Gennady Shishkin:

Preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese summit meeting have started in the Chinese capital. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has said that during the meeting both sides will make efforts to settle the disputes of the last 30 years and normalise bilateral relations.

Practically all members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Politburo are expected to meet their Soviet guest. This illustrates the great importance attached to the forthcoming talks by the Chinese leadership.

The programme of Gorbachev's visit is very extensive and diverse. Apart from official meetings and meetings with the people, Gorbachev will spend much time acqainting himself with China's history, culture and arts. This is regarded here as a sign of the Soviet people's profound respect for the people of China.

China is watching the development of new political thinking in the Soviet Union with keen interest. The real manifestations of this thinking in Soviet foreign policy and in Soviet initiatives toward disarmament, relaxation of tension and settlement of regional conflicts are welcomed in Beijing.

The Chinese leadership, in turn, set forth the concept of a new international political order proposing to put international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

A prominent Chinese Marxist, the president of the Guandong Academy of Social Sciences, who is working on the "one-world two-systems" concept, wrote:

"Differences between socialism and capitalism cannot, and must not be solved by military means. This is why peaceful coexistence should be considered a long-term, rather than temporary, measure.

"Peaceful competition and growing cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries would be an alternative scenario in a future world."

Beijing has expressed satisfaction with the fact that the two great socialist powers are following the policy of far-reaching internal transformations. Of course, both countries have specific features of their own, but it is apparent that the economic reforms have helped overcome ideological differences.

Now the countries are faced with the task of building on each other's experience.

China embarked on the road of economic reforms earlier than the Soviet Union. Over the ten years that have passed since then, the country has achieved impressive results.

Its gross national product has grown 2.5 times, heavy industry production 2.8 times, light industry production 4 times, and gross agricultural production 1.8 times.

However, the fast rate of reform has brought about negative phenomena in the Chinese economy. The rate of growth of the building and processing industries does not match the rate of growth of the raw materials industries. Besides, the country is short of energy and is facing a transport problem.

Summing up the results of the decade of economic reform, Chinese Communist party leader Zhao Ziyang said that "the problems have arisen mainly because of an excess of demand over supply".

The aggravation of such neative phenomena as inflation, the decline in the living standards caused by it, soaring unemployment, and agricultural production's lagging behind population growth are creating social tension in Chinese society.

This is reflected, specifically, in the demonstrations of students, which were recently held in Beijing and which called for more democracy and for efforts to combat inflation and corruption.

The Chinese leadership is paying attention to the problems raised by the student movement, is conducting a dialogue with this movement and taking measures to overcome the negative consequences of the economic reforms. Zhao Ziyang said a few days ago that many difficulties which have cropped up in the process of the economic reform "may not be solved without political reform", adding that "a political reform in such a large developing country as China must be carried out gradually".

Wu Xueqian on Soviet Withdrawal From Mongolia
LD1205074889 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Beijing May 11 TASS—China welcomes the recent Soviet statement to withdraw three fourths of its troops stationed in Mongolia. China hopes that the rest of the Soviet troops will leave Mongolia as early as possible. The Soviet Union has also agreed in principle to radically reduce its troops on the Soviet-Chinese border, Vice-Premier of the Chinese State Council Wu Xueqian told editor-in-chief of the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI SHIMBUN Hirohsio Kato during their meeting in Beijing today.

Xuequian said that China and the Soviet Union would continue discussing the Kampuchean issue at the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese summit.

Both sides believe that a political settlement should be found. However, they are still having differences on the quesiton of the conflict's political solution. China suggests that a quadripartite coalition government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk be formed in Kampuchea after the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. The Soviet Union thinks differently, Xueqian said.

Official Praises Economic Cooperation With PRC
LD1205085889 Moscow World Service in English 1800 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] The Soviet Union's deputy minister for foreign economic relations, Yevgeniy Osadchuk, has said Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation is marked by stable development on a large scale. He told Radio Moscow that the two countries' trade turnover had grown over three and half fold since 1983. This year it would be a record high in the entire history of two-way relations at over R2 billion.

Expanding Intercity Cooperation With PRC Viewed
OW1105043989 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 5 May 89

[Vasilyev commentary]

[Text] Listeners, there has been great progress of late in cooperation between our two nations in the fields of economics, trade, science, technology, culture, and sports. New forms of cooperation, such as direct friendly contacts between cities of our two nations, have also emerged one after another. Our station observer Vasilyev writes:

Direct ties have been established between Moscow and Beijing, Leningrad and Shanghai, and Kiev and Wuhan, and they have exchanged visits. The mayors of Beijing and Shanghai have visited Moscow and Leningrad, respectively; mayors of the two Soviet cities have also visited Beijing and Shanghai. This exchange of visits has greatly promoted such ties. During the course of these visits and the visit by the delegation of Hubei Province and Wuhan city to the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, they discussed measures for further promoting friendly exchanges. The scope of such friendship and cooperation has been expanding continuously. Not long ago, a delegation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society met with leaders of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society. The two sides expressed the hope of expanding the scope of Soviet-Chinese friendship. During a Soviet delegation's visit to Dalian, they discussed the issue of establishing long-term, direct ties between the Soviet coastal city of Nakhodka and Dalian. The two cities have already had close ties. A Soviet economist in Nakhodka is very interested in Dalian's experience in establishing and developing an economic zone.

The delegation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society also visited Suzhou city and, during its stay there, discussed the issue of developing friendly ties with Riga, the Soviet city along the coast of the Baltic sea. Comrade Belov, a member of the delegation and secretary of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, said: A delegation from Suzhou City will visit Riga in June 1989 to discuss the possibility of establishing friendly ties between the two cities. Comrade Belov said: Chinese comrades have told us that they want to establish such ties. Members of our delegation told the Chinese friends: The Soviet side welcomes an expansion of ties between Soviet and Chinese cities.

East Europe

Hungarian Socialist Party Plenum Results Reported

PM1105135189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Hungary: Path to Dialogue"]

[Text] Budapest—The results of the recent May plenum of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee represent another step on the way to national dialogue, a rule-of-law state, and representative democracy. The decision to hold a party conference this autumn, which has the same status as a party congress in terms of its significance, can be considered the main outcome of this plenum.

The year that has passed since the previous conference has brought so many changes in the life of Hungarian society that the party is having to revise the directives of many party documents, including those adopted at last year's conference, and cardinally restructure the style and methods of its work.

The Central Committee plenums which have been held recently at intervals of several weeks have discussed the various aspects of questions connected with the country's transition to a multiparty system—a central theme in present-day Hungarian political life. As G. Fejti, secretary of the Central Committee, said at the end of the May plenum, the forthcoming party conference (a number of party committees have been insisting that an extraordinary congress be held) is being convened not least to discuss the complex of problems connected with the transition to a multiparty system. The conference has the task of adopting the MSZMP election program for the parliamentary elections, followed by the presidential elections, which are going to be held at some stage in 1990 on a multiparty basis. It also has to review the principles of the party's organizational activity on the basis of the new law on parties, the draft of which—already discussed by the MSZMP Central Committee—will soon be submitted for discussion to the National Assembly.

It must be said that the attitude of alternative organizations and parties to the draft law is, to say the least, cautious. Some of their representatives believe that a law on parties is not needed at all—that it would be enough to add to the existing law on associations. They feel that, in its present form, the draft law contains a considerable number of additional restrictions in comparison to the law on associations.

It seems that the draft law on parties is becoming yet another stumbling block in the way of the MSZMP's dialogue with alternative organizations and parties—a dialogue that has already ground to a halt recently. This is despite the fact that both sides appear to recognize the urgent need to hold a national "roundtable" as soon as possible, which, following the Polish example, would discuss the conditions of the transition to a multiparty system.

The plenum reaffirmed the MSZMP's proposal to all social and political organizations to sit down at the negotiating table as soon as possible to discuss not only political issues but also the country's most important economic problems.

There can be no doubt that the plenum decisions to abandon the nomenklatura system and to transfer control of the worker militia from the MSZMP to the Hungarian Council of Ministers will be a serious step toward bringing the positions of the MSZMP and the opposition closer together. The existence of the MSZMP's own armed party militia, established in 1957 and numbering 60,000 members, has always aroused protest from the alternative organizations, because, in their opinion, this placed them on an unequal footing with the MSZMP.

Regard to the nomenklatura institution, whereby until recently any appointment to 1,000 or more high-ranking positions could not be made without the approval of the MSZMP Central Committee, the plenum decided that this privilege was characteristic of the party's past monopoly position and that, in conditions of competition with other parties, it had lost all meaning. As was pointed out in the proposals of the capital's MSZMP municipal committee, which is responsible for initiating the abolition of nomenklatura privileges, all important posts, including those within the party itself, must be filled exclusively on an elective basis, with the opinions of lower-ranking organizations definitely taken into account. After a detailed discussion, the plenum took the decision to reject nomenklatura rights, while leaving party bodies the right to nominate candidates for leading posts. It is felt that the opposition will now find it harder to accuse the MSZMP of being uncompromising and of trying to retain its monopoly on power. The plenum once again demonstrated that the MSZMP is prepared to go its part of the way toward national dialogue.

In conclusion the plenum discussed an organizational issue. After hearing a report on the state of health of Comrade J. Kadar, who has said more than once recently that illness does not allow him to take part in the work of the party's leading bodies, the plenum released him from his duties as chairman of the MSZMP and member of the Central Committee. A Central Committee commission will discuss nominations for the post of party chairman. In its letter to J. Kadar, who will celebrate his 77th birthday in a few days time, the MSZMP Central Committee stressed his great services to the Hungarian people, party, and state, while also pointing out that the period of his leadership of the party was not free of shortcomings and mistakes.

Effects of Czechoslovak Export Curbs Weighed

18070632 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 18, 6-12 May 89 p 4

[Article by V. Frolov, candidate of geographical sciences, under the rubric "Returning to the Subject": "CSSR: Do Customs Restrictions Help?"]

[Text] On 15 November of last year, Czechoslovakia was the first among the CEMA countries to introduce new customs regulations for foreign tourists. They also applied to more than a half million Soviet citizens.

Immediately after this, the GDR, the Polish People's Republic, and the People's Republic of Bulgaria made export regulations more stringent, and since 1 February of this year, the USSR as well.

After an outburst of emotions by journalists, who described the sudden changes at the border, one can now try to analyze the situation that arose more calmly, and to answer—and now what?

The first question—did the measures undertaken by the CSSR achieve the intended result, and what real consequences did they have?

Judging by the newspapers, they were undertaken "to strengthen the domestic market." What does the January and February market show? Even by Czechoslovak yardsticks the counters were very bare. There was a chronic absence of the most usual shoe sizes and clothing, there were interruptions in the supply of toothpaste, and lines began to form at electrical equipment stores.

Consequently, customs measures did not achieve the first objective—to restore the market. Indeed, this could not have happened. Statistical reference books show that from 1985 to 1987 the production of many of the commodities that are banned from export (electric stoves, tape recorders, knitted linens, and everyday chinaware) was reduced significantly.

Indeed, about 5,000 "Volga" automobiles were exported by Soviet tourists [from Czechoslovakia]. But this was not a loss, but a windfall for the CSSR. After the increase in gasoline prices to R1 per liter, you will almost not see "Volgas" in the CSSR that are privately owned. Commission shops were jammed with them, and suddenly they were all bought up in half a year, and at a price that is 40-60 percent higher than the normal price. Isn't this advantageous to the CSSR state budget?

And overall the question arises—why is it unprofitable for the CSSR to have an additional more than R100 from the development of tourism with the USSR? If it is not possible to buy commodities in the USSR for this sum then, perhaps, it would be worthwhile to grant us credit for 3-5 years.

Isn't the indicated customs measure specifically connected with the fact that the USSR reduced imports first and foremost of machines and equipment (which is profitable for CSSR enterprises), and not of consumer goods, which the CSSR insists on (and whose export is unprofitable for enterprises)?

But the most important thing in the situation that has arisen is something else. The USSR and the CSSR are for the development of modern forms of cooperation. By the end of 1988, 360 contracts on direct ties between enterprises were signed, and several joint enterprises were created. And what does a Soviet specialist now do who came to the CSSR to work for 3-5 weeks, who earns 4,000-5,000 korunas a month (R400-500) but who can only import commodities to the USSR in the sum of R50?

What kind of a way out of the complicated situation that has developed can be proposed? Of course, first and foremost, it is necessary to increase the production of commodities, to strengthen the monetary system, to provide convertible national currencies, and to bring the principles of domestic price formulation closer together. But, unfortunately, this is a very remote prospect.

We have to try to treat with understanding the desire of the CSSR to strengthen and to diversify the domestic market. From these positions, the ban on the export from the country of commodities which are being imported to the CSSR from other countries is natural.

An understanding is needed on the part of Czechoslovakia that Soviet people, like any tourists, want to bring back world-famous Czechoslovakian articles made of crystal, porcelain and glass, etc., for relatives and friends. This can be achieved through an approval for the export of a broader selection of articles (let it be only one of each), and an increase in the export quota, for example, from 50 to R150.

Permission to export commodities in single units will also make pointless the humiliating suspicion of customs agents—is the tourist carrying commodities on himself that have been banned from export? The need to prove to customs agents that the jeans being worn were purchased in Moscow will vanish.

The question of sums received by those on assignments and specialists who arrive through direct communications channels, and also honorariums received in the CSSR, deserve special attention. A quota has to be established (for example, 30-40 percent) for which it would be possible to export commodities from Czechoslovakia without any restrictions (with the exception of imported commodities). Because this money was not brought into the country, but earned on the territory of the CSSR, and it should be convertible into commodities without any discrimination, whether it is a Czechoslovak or a Soviet worker.

It seems that the aforementioned proposals would in a short time correct the impasse that has arisen in the field of tourism between our countries and restore a climate of trust between Soviet and Czechoslovak citizens.

West Europe

Correspondent on Purpose of Shevardnadze's FRG Visit

LD1205093389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0838 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow, 12 May—TASS diplomatic correspondent Viktor Chistyakov writes:

USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, which begins today, continues the tradition of regular consultations between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the two countries. And yet, Eduard Shevardnadze's present trip to Bonn has a specific character: It is devoted to preparing the Soviet-FRG summit scheduled for mid-June.

During FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl's stay in Moscow last October it was agreed that a document containing the fundamental concept for the development of relations between the two countries would be signed during the return visit to Bonn by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. So, the Soviet minister and his FRG counterpart will be discussing the draft of this important political document which has been prepared. It is expected that issues connected with the preparation of new interstate agreements aimed at expanding and deepening bilateral cooperation in various fields will also be examined at the meeting. It is expected in Soviet diplomatic circles that the talks which are beginning will give a new impetus to the stepping-up of trade and economic ties, the level of which still does not correspond to the two states' potential.

The development of Soviet-FRG relations is assessed in Moscow not only in a bilateral context, but also in a pan-European one (and even wider—in a world context). Thanks in many respects to the efforts of the two countries, it has been possible to achieve a perceptible warming of the political climate on the continent: The all-European meeting in Vienna has ended successfully, negotiations on reducing conventional weapons have begun, and a number of other multilateral projects are being implemented. The responsible position of Helmut Kohl's government on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and Bonn's readiness to hold negotiations on reducing this class of arms have met with a positive response in Europe.

FRG Indignant Over U.S. 'Blackmail' on Arms

PM1105105789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Ye. Grishin dispatch under the rubric "Abroad": "Will Bonn Give In?"]

[Text] Bonn—The "missile theme" is still the main issue in FRG political life. Everyone is concerned by the issue of whether Bonn will stand up to pressure from Washington and London, which favor adopting a decision on the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles at the jubilee NATO summit meeting at the end of May. According to the local press, U.S. President G. Bush has spoken on the telephone with Chancellor H. Kohl twice in a short space of time, demanding a change in the FRG Government stand. However, apart from general assurances of willingness to seek a compromise solution, he has not managed to achieve anything.

Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher has stressed that Bonn's views on security, set out on 27 April in a government statement by the chancellor, remain unchanged. The FRG Government believes that a decision on modernization should not be made before 1992. It is in favor of talks with the Warsaw Pact countries on reducing short-range missiles to equal limits, at a lower level than the present one.

Irritated by the obstinacy of its Rhine ally, the U.S. Administration has set its most drastic remedy in motion. U.S. Ambassador to the FRG Walters has threatened that if Bonn does not show "solidarity," Washington will raise the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops from West German territory.

This obvious blackmail has prompted a storm of indignation in FRG political and social circles. In an interview with the newspaper HAMBURGER MORGENPOST, former Chancellor H. Schmidt said that threats like these have been made from across the ocean for more than 30 years now. "Some people there still believe that they can intimidate us with withdrawal. But Europe can manage without the U.S. military presence," H. Schmidt stressed.

E. Bahr, a prominent politician in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), has described the U.S. and British actions as irresponsible. In his opinion, if the U.S. Administration opposes talks on short-range missiles, "NATO will find itself in the most serious crisis in its entire existence."

Austria's Mock Meets European, CPSU Delegations

LD1005212789 Moscow TASS in English 2021 GMT 10 May 89

[Text] Vienna May 10 TASS—At the initiative of the European Democratic Union (EDU), a meeting was held in Vienna today between a delegation of this community of 23 Christian-Democratic and Conservative parties of Europe and a CPSU delegation composed of V. Falin, chief of CPSU Central Committee [CC] International Department, V. Rykin, a ranking official of that department, and G. Shikin, Soviet ambassador to Austria.

On the EDU side, the talks were attended by Bernhard Vogel, EDU deputy chairman and chairman of the EDU "European Structure and European Politics" Committee, Margaretha af Ugglas, deputy of Swedish Rikstag, and Andreas Kohl, EDU executive secretary, deputy of Austria's National Council.

The two delegations met with Alois Mock, EDU chairman and Austrian foreign minister.

They discussed the political, economic, social and cultural developments in Europe and their possible reflection in the practical activities of the corresponding state and party institutions.

The understanding is that contacts between the CPSU and EDU will be continued. A next meeting will be held in Moscow this year, the exact date to be decided later. It has been agreed that the next meeting will be devoted to exchanging opinions on political reforms in Europe and to economic and ecological matters.

Austria's Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky received V. Falin, chief of the CPSU CC International Department, on May 10. In a conversation held in a friendly atmosphere they touched upon some of the topical international problems.

The day before the CPSU delegation met with Franz Muhri, chairman of the Communist Party of Austria [CPA], W. Silbermayr, a Politburo member and CPA CC secretary, and J. Steiner, a member of the CPA CC secretariat.

The representatives of the CPSU and the CPA exchanged information on the political activities of the two parties and on their assessments of the present situation.

Falin Interviewed on Iron Curtain, Other Issues

AU1105142689 Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG in German 11 May 89 p 2

[Kurt Seinitz report: "NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG Interview With the CPSU Foreign Policy Chief; Austria-EC: Kremlin Remains Skeptical Despite 'Neutrality Clause'"; date of interview not given]

[Text] Vienna—Valentin Falin, chief of the CPSU International Department, is in Austria for the first official contacts between the CPSU, the Austrian People's Party, and the European Democratic Union. In an interview for NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG he discussed topical issues.

Concerning Austria, the Kremlin maintains its skeptical attitude regarding Austria's potential EC membership despite the decision of the Austrian Government to include a "neutrality clause" in its application for membership.

Falin: "The formula alone does not say anything. It has to be fleshed out first, and in this respect Austria is facing the complicated task of bringing fire and water together. I remember that about at the time when Austria declared its neutrality, Kennedy and Adenauer stated that the EC is the economic basis of the military NATO alliance. If Austria is able to make neutrality and NATO policy compatible, you Austrians will have reached a special level of political magic. At the moment, however, I do not see any hope-inspiring prospects to bring the two factors to a common denominator, unless Austria has such a power of conviction that it can win over the EC alliance to a neutral course. But, as I said, this would be a miracle."

NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG: "However, it has also been said that it was a miracle that Austria achieved the State Treaty."

Falin: "Yes, this was indeed an extraordinary achievement by Mr Raab [Austrian chancellor in 1955] and his colleagues...."

Rejection of the New U.S. Course

The Kremlin leadership is irritated about the more rigid attitude of the new U.S. Administration.

Falin: "I hope that the Americans will arrive at a conclusion that comes close to that of President Kennedy in June 1963, when he said something like: The world has changed and the Americans should no longer try to adjust the world to themselves but to find a common language with the world."

Falin clearly rejected President Bush's alleged intention to propose to the Soviet Union at the NATO summit at the end of May to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe in exchange for some sort of "East European security guarantee" to the Soviet Union.

Falin: "If the issue were the withdrawal of troops of both powers, okay, then we would be ready to discuss this. But if it is again only a unilateral measure and the Americans were the 'guarantors of our security,' then experience has taught us that it is not a worse method to defend our security and that of our friends better without NATO."

Ifs and Buts Concerning Hungary

The top CPSU politician reacted with restraint to the question of whether he follows the decisions in Hungary with concern or with sympathetic feelings. "I would say that we observe the development calmly and with interest. If decisions are made in line with the interests of the Hungarian people, we accept them as the free choice of the Hungarian people. I repeat: This country's leadership is responsible for the events in Hungary."

Iron Curtain

NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG: "Is the Iron Curtain being dismantled with the Soviet Union's agreement?"

Falin: "It is the free decision of the Hungarian Government. It has come to the realization that the circumstances and, in particular, the high level of relations with Austria permit the improvement of the situation at the border. If the government is correct, we are able to note this decision and welcome it."

Deputy Adamishin, Madame Mitterrand Meet
PM1005174189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 89 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] D. Mitterrand, wife of the president of France and president of the "France Liberte" Humanitarian Foundation, met USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.L. Adamishin 6 May. Their conversation touched upon matters of developing contacts and cooperation between Soviet and French organizations in the sphere of culture, the humanitarian sphere, and the protection of human rights, specifically in view of the forthcoming Paris and Moscow humanitarian conferences within the framework of the all-European process.

Political & Social

Central Committee Discusses Upcoming Plenum

LD1105205889 Moscow TASS in English 2039 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee held on May 10 and 11 a meeting to discuss draft working materials for the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on perfecting inter-ethnic relations.

Remarks and proposals for renewing the party's nationality policy under present conditions were aired by secretaries and heads of departments of the republican Communist Party Central Committees, secretaries of party committees of autonomous republics and regions, secretaries of some territorial party committees, local Soviets executives and scholars.

The speeches at the meeting were motivated by the central concern for the necessity to work out proposals for the plenum that would serve to promote an all-round social, economic and cultural development of every nation and nationality within the single family of socialist nations and the consolidation of friendship and fraternity of all the Soviet people.

The conference was addressed by Viktor Chebrikov, Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Medvedev Speaks With USSR Gosteleradio Officials

LD1005221689 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 89 Second Edition p 2

[Text] The contribution of Soviet television and radio to restructuring and to the development of the processes of glasnost and democratization and the consolidation of all of society's healthy forces on a constructive, socialist basis—these and other questions were discussed thoroughly during meetings which took place on 10 May between Comrade Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the party aktiv and creative collectives of various editorial offices of USSR Gosteleradio.

Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev visited the main news editorial office of Central Television. He acquainted himself with the organization of news bulletin preparation, with the editorial office's technical equipment and its apparatus and studio complex, and talked with journalists, producers and engineers. During this the main attention was devoted to the preparation of the "Vremya," "120 Minutes" and "Novosti" news programs. Ways of increasing the news content of the broadcasts, of "making them more human," of seeking, without being trivial, through individuals and through the new attitudes which are arising, approaches to dealing with economic and social themes and new expressive forms for social and political journalism were discussed with interest. Taking part in the conversation were O.V. Kakuchaya, S.K. Bestuzheva, and L.Ye. Elin, and other creative staff from the editorial office.

These same problems are also topical for the news programs of All-Union Radio, in particular for the well known station "Mayak". The development of television is not putting the radio, and especially its news broadcasts, in the shade. It is not losing its popularity. Television and radio are called upon to complement each other organically in the country's news system. Chief Editor A.P. Bolgarev, party bureau secretary Ye. T. Grachev and commentator Kasparov noted increased interest of the public and party bodies in the developemnt of radio broadcasting and at the same time posed a number of key problems connected with the prospects of increasing the immediacy, efficiency and authority of All-Union Radio. The question of fuller utilization of information technology and computer equipment in radio and television was touched on.

V.A. Medvedev's meeting with the creative collective of the main editorial office for youth television programs lasted more than 1 and ½ hours. It took place right in the studio where the youth program "View" is made. An animated discussion started, in which chief editor Ponomarev, program presenters A.A. Lyubimov, V.N. Listyev and D.V. Zahkarov, commentator Maslyakov and others took part.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary, having positively appraised the youth programs' search for a sincere intonation, sharpness and a critical attitude, drew attention to the need for topics, especially youth topics, to be explored more deeply, for a considered approach and for the avoidance of excess. He spoke of the importance of social and political journalism revealing the spiritual values of socialism, the themes of young people's labor and social creativity and the search for a moral ideal.

In conclusion there was a meeting between the CPSU Central Committee secretary and party activists and leaders of creative sections at USSR Gosteleradio. Comrade Medvedev spoke about certain aspects of the situation in the country and on the results of the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum. The recent elections of USSR people's deputies showed that the whole people's support for the policy of restructuring is of a most exacting nature and at times has a sharply critical tendency. People rightly want restructuring to yield a tangible and practical return sooner. Party organizations and party committees, which are currently experiencing a period of decisive renewal, are called upon to play an increasing role in deepening the restructuring processes and in increasing the efficiency of the economic and political reforms in the country.

Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev spoke of the need to strengthen relations between party committees and the mass media which are constructive, mutually respectful,

and subordinated to the interests of the common cause and the people's good. In his speech, he stressed that it is difficult today to overestimate the role and significance of television and radio. On the one hand they reflect life in all its difficulties and contradictions, public opinion, and the mood of people, and on the other hand they in large measure also form them. It is necessary to find the optimal correlation of these two dialectically linked processes. Television and radio broadcasting have started to devote more attention to highlighting the most topical and acute problems of the day, to the revolutionary transformation of all spheres of the country's economic and spiritual life, and to the critical examination of unresolved issues.

The nature of broadcasting has changed. It has become more discussion-based and issue-related, and there has been a significant increase in the proportion of live broadcasting. The contribution of television and radio journalists is weighty toward the development of democracy and glasnost and to the elimination of blank spots in history and in the present day.

Speaking about the reserves for the development of television and radio broadcasting, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee drew attention to increasing the competitiveness of programs and channels, which would enrich their palette with variety and would accord with the general trends of democratization of all spheres of our life. He noted that television and radio broadcasts, especially those on socioeconomic topics, frequently lack depth and competence. The topics of leasing and collective contracts and the fight against thriftlessness in particular are handled in a monotonous way. Radio and television broadcasts still do not always find the right key, convincing argument, and precise approaches for the topic of international relations. The circle of authors and participants in many broadcasts is still narrow. Television viewers and radio listeners rightly criticize some programs for a lowering of taste and express their dissatisfaction with the practice of film showings.

In conclusion Comrade Medvedev wished the participants in the meeting and the whole collective of USSR Gosteleradio creative successes and more active participation in restructuring.

Ligachev Attends Tashkent Economic Conference

LD1105101289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Two regional conferences on problems with the comprehensive development of the country's economy are taking place today in Tashkent and Dushanbe. In Tashkent, the discussion is about ways to implement the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum and the establishment of direct long-term ties between (?farm economies) of the republics of Central Asia and enterprises of the Urals and Siberia. Comrade Ligachev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is taking part in the conference. On the eve of the conference, he visited Surkhan-Darya oblast where he familiarized himself with the life and affairs of farmers in that oblast.

In Dushanbe, scientists from all the Union Republics and the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences are taking part in the work of a session of the Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences on problems of the regional economy. Put forward for discussion are such subjects as territorial planning in new conditions of management, interrepublican economic relations, efficiency, justice, and equivalence. Members of the council's bureau will also be meeting republican specialists and scholars and will discuss problems of Tajikistan's economic and social development.

Talks With Transport Workers

LD1205090189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 11 May 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A conference on ways of implementing the decisions of the March CPSU Central Committee plenum and establishing long-term direct ties between farms and enterprises in Moscow and the oblasts of the Urals and Siberia opened in Tashkent today.

[Correspondent I. Abdukhalikov] Our republic already sends fruit and vegetables to various regions of the country. It is in order to strengthen these old ties and to start up new ones that representatives of the two sides, the republics of Central Asia and, as has already been mentioned, Moscow, the Urals, and Siberia, have gathered for this conference. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev and Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, spoke at the conference. [Video shows correspondent outside hall; view of presidium at conference, with Nishanov looking on as Ligachev speaks from rostrum] [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Ye. Sinitsyn] We started recording this report yesterday, when Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev visited Surkhan-Darya Oblast. Contracts are most prevalent here. The most efffective methods of vegetable production have also been worked out. For example, 34 families have joined together and created a large team on the basis of equality.

[Begin Ligachev recording] You see, beginning in 1990 prices for vegetables, fruit, and grapes will be by agreement. To ensure that our people who go into the shops to buy vegetables there do not suffer, the local bodies in the places where that output is to be sold have the right to fix the maximum, the top, the highest prices—retail prices—for the produce because, at the end of the day, we are talking about the people, all those who go into the

shops. We want to very actively develop and to expand these direct economic ties. [video shows Ligachev at a farm addressing farmers] [end recording], [passage omitted]

[Sinitsyn] But who, all the same, should be responsible for keeping production or freight completely undamaged?

[Begin recording] [Ligachev] Every year we send 350,000 to 400,000 [units not specified] to the dump because we transport bad produce and do not store it very well there.

[Unidentified railway worker] But why do we not do it so that we (?receive) [words indistinct] (?bonuses), according to quantity and quality? There is splendid experience, after all.

[Ligachev] No, not money. That is not the point, [word indistinct]. Look, when I hand over my luggage, do you take responsibility for the luggage?

[Worker] I do.

[Ligachev] Right then. Please take responsibility for this produce. Well, perhaps, let the agro-industrial committee and the Railways Ministry sit down at a table and work out some temporary instructions.

[Unidentified male voice, off screen] They ought to give material [words indistinct].

[Ligachev] Yes, yes, quite right.

[Nishanov] We will tighten up the demands made of each other.

[Ligachev] Yes, they think that the peasant is not doing anything at all.

[Unidentified man] I do not say that the peasant is not doing anything.

[Ligachev] Many people have turned up here who believe that the kolkhoz farmers do not know how to work and the peasants do not know how to work. We must put an end to this.

Sometimes they feed us... They work in conditions in which not a single individual farmer works. They have five times less technical equipment, but produce more than anybody. [sentence as heard] [video shows Ligachev outside a railway terminal addressing workers] [end recording] [passage omitted]

Addresses Conference 11 May

PM1205120089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Mutual Advantage"]

[Text] Many cities and other settlements in the country are poorly supplied with vegetables and fruit. In a number of places potatoes are also in short supply. In effect every inhabitant has a shortfall of 40 kg of vegetables and 20 kg of fruit a year. Yet Central Asia and other southern regions are lands of abundance for growing this vitamin-rich produce.

There are many examples of oblasts in the European part of the USSR, the Urals, and Siberia concluding contracts with the southern republics. For instance, cities in the Urals and Siberia receive fruit and vegetables, and Central Asia receives potatoes correspondingly. These objectives are served by direct contacts between Uzbekistan's Fergana Oblast and Khakassia, between the Tyumen oilmen and the farms of Tajikistan, and between the power workers of Krasnoyarsk Kray and the vegetable growers of Kirghizia.

There are many examples, but as yet they are only isolated cases. Their influence on the resolution of the general task is all the same insignificant.

In the current year the country's enterprises have gone over to economic accountability and self-financing, and many of them express the desire to invest their own funds and material resources in southern farms receive in exchange for guaranteed supply of early vegetables, and fruit in the fall. This is also in accordance with the vital interests of local collectives. The production and social base will be strengthened, volumes of output will increase, and there will be more employment for the population.

In recent days leaders of a number of industrial enterprises, chairmen of their labor collective councils, and party and soviet workers from Moscow and many oblasts of the Urals and Siberia have been visiting Central Asian farms. Various options for direct ties were studied in detail and there was a quest for mutually advantageous terms on a purely economic, or, more precisely, economically accountable, basis.

There were interesting talks in the fields of collective farms [kolkhozes] and state farms [sovkhozes] in Uzbekistan's Surkhan-Darya Oblast. Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, came here. He was accompanied by R.N. Nishanov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, G.Kh. Kadyrov, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, and leaders and specialists from the agro-industrial complex.

Surkhan-Darya Oblast is the country's real fruit and vegetable jewel. By mid-April cabbages are ready here, carrots a little later, then cucumbers and tomatoes, and radishes grow all year round. And, of course, there is an abundance of fruit and grapes in the fall.

S.M. Mamarasulov, first secretary of the oblast party committee [obkom], explained with concern and distress that much of this wealth is spoiled, because packaging, refrigeration, and delivery are poor. Capacities for fruit and vegetable processing are negligible. But the main thing is that considerably more of the produce that is in short supply could be grown. This would benefit the oblast, the local population, and, of course, working people in oblasts with a severe climate.

Here is an astonishing still life for the beginning of May: On a table at the edge of the field are fresh cabbages, strawberries, cucumbers, carrots, various kinds of greens. This is now a common spectacle here in southern Uzbekistan, but elsewhere people can only dream of it. Ye.K. Ligachev talked with K.V. Gromnitskiy, vegetable growers' team leader on the "40 Let Oktyabrya" Kolkhoz in Termezskiy Rayon. The team includes 34 families who are masters of their trade.

"Our fields are a real production line for vegetables," the team leader said. "We harvest the early cabbage, we immediately plant cucumbers, then another crop. In effect we receive three harvests a year from each field. We are lease operators, and therefore we look for opportunities to increase the volume of production. We now have a good guarantee, a contract with the oilmen."

Enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, in particular the Main Administration of Petroleum and Gas for the Tyumen Region and the "Bashneft," "Tatneft," "Tomskneft," and "Permneft" associations, have concluded long-term (up to 10 years) contracts for economic collaboration with the Surkhan-Darya farms. The oilmen supply resources and materials for the construction of storehouses and allocate lumber, metals, transport, and various kinds of equipment for the development of Uzbek kolkhozes and sovkhozes. They will receive early vegetables, and then grapes and fruit, worth equivalent sums. And deliveries of cabbages, carrots, and strawberries to Siberia will begin in the near future.

A conference was held in Tashkent on 11 May, at which questions connected with resolving the task of improving the supply of fruit and vegetable produce to the country's population in light of the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum were discussed.

Addressing the conference, Ye.K. Ligachev said that zonal conference in Omsk, Brest, Stavropol, and Kaluga has examined questions of economic accountability and lease relations, the expansion of cooperation among industrial and agricultural enterprises, and the development of family farms and fruit and vegetable cooperatives. We attach great significance also to today's meeting, which is devoted to the further development of direct ties between oblasts and republics, industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and the consumer cooperative system in the Russian Federation, and in particular Moscow, the Urals, and Siberia, on the one hand, and Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia on the other, on a long-term, mutually advantageous economic basis.

Specifically, it is a question of pooling the efforts of labor collectives of enterprises in industry and agriculture and the consumer cooperative system, with a view to increasing the production of food, in particular vegetables, fruit, and potatoes, and of further developing the interrepublican division of labor and production sharing.

We have experience in this sphere. But it is more important now to make all these processes more systematic in nature, on a larger scale. And the main thing is that direct ties should be based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage, on the basis of equivalent value and commodity-money relations. This approach is entirely in accordance with the restructuring that has begun in the leadership of the economic and social sphere in the union republics on the basis of self-management and self-financing.

The social aspect of the matter is very important. Growth in the volume of production of output and the wide exchange of this output between regions offer the opportunity to improve food supplies and enhance the population's living standards, strengthen the economy and financial position of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and extend sources of income. Moreover more rational use can be made of material resources and the problem of employment of the rural population can be tackled more easily. After all, it is well known that there is a manpower surplus in Central Asia.

Great political significance is also attached to production sharing among oblasts, krays, and republics, as well as economic ties between industrial and agricultural enterprises. This extends and strengthens the economic foundations for the harmonization of ethnic relations, the development of fraternal relations between regions, the exchange of experience and spiritual assets, and the international education of working people.

Thus interrepublican economic cooperation and the development of direct ties between industrial and agricultural enterprises forms an organic part of the radical economic reform and the restructuring of the country's political system. This is an important component of the large-scale program of renewal of all aspects of Soviet society's life.

Cotton growing remains very important in the Central Asian republics' agro-industrial complex. The high quality of cotton and the maximum output of fiber must be ensured. Moreover it is necessary to increase the production of livestock products here and seek to increase per capita consumption of meat and milk, as well as vegetables and fruit.

Let me say frankly that the production of fruit and vegetable produce has until recently been developing only feebly in the Central Asian republics too. The consumer cooperative system was not involved in the setting up of a procurement and processing base. The Uzbek and Tajik republican consumer cooperative unions built monumental administrative buildings in the capitals for the management apparatus, but did little to develop a network of modern enterprises for the reception, storage, and processing of fruit and vegetable produce. And if you add to that the fact that the trains move too slowly, it is easy to understand why a significant proportion of fruit and vegetables from the Central Asian republics arrives in Moscow, the Urals, Siberia, and other regions of the country in poor condition or even spoiled. In addition, much produce that has been delivered from thousands of kilometers away is spoiled in the course of storage.

The republics of this region have recently drawn up a program for the development of the fruit and vegetable complexes. It is proposed considerably to increase output and to create the necessary infrastructure. Important measures are being adopted by the USSR Ministry of Railways, Aeroflot, and Motor Transport. It is planned to bring in military transport planes to transport fruit. The question of the prices of potatoes, fruit, vegetables, and grapes is being resolved in a new way. In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum decisions, from next year the purchasing of fruit and vegetable produce at agreed prices will be developed, which will give the farms a material interest in increasing the production of high quality produce and delivering it promptly to the consumer.

It is important for kolkhozes and sovkhozes specializing in growing fruit, vegetables, and potatoes to have processing shops and modern storehouses for storing produce.

Family farms and fruit and vegetable cooperatives are a major reserve for the production of potatoes, vegetables, and fruit. Every rayon should have a system for giving them assistance and for the reception and processing of produce sold by the population.

It is the task of party, soviet, and trade union organizations and labor collective councils, Ye.K. Ligachev noted, to support in every way the movement that has begun to develop direct, long-term ties between industry and agriculture, and on that basis to increase food supplies in the country.

R.N. Nishanov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, noted that the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum not only mean a radical restructuring of the party's agrarian policy, but also illuminate from a new angle the problems of the further integration of the country's industrial and agro-industrial complexes. In this respect the establishment of direct, mutually advantageous, long-term ties between oblasts, rayons, agro-industrial associations and firms, and farms in the republic and industrial enterprises in other parts of the country is an effective measure aimed at improving food supplies to the population.

Uzbekistan, like the other Central Asian republics, along with its cotton specialization, is a major producer and supplier of fruit, vegetables, and melons. This produce which, by virtue of our natural and climatic conditions, has particularly valuable, one could say unique, nutritional qualities. We therefore regard its production as our main contribution to the resolution of the food problem. The first experience of direct interregional ties shows how promising this path is. The main principle and the main advantage here is direct, mutually advantageous exchanges of the resources available to our enterprises and farms, bypassing the cumbersome barriers and confused labyrinths of planning and supply organizations.

L.A. Gorshkov, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, expressed the view that direct ties—and this is indeed a useful and promising avenue—require the support of serious organizational work. Contract discipline should be particularly strong. The transport system must be well organized. Oblasts in Siberia and the Urals supply considerable quantities of potatoes to Central Asia, but there are many shortcomings here, for which we are rightly criticized. We will eliminate the shortcomings, and the contract relations that are developing will help us to eradicate them.

The TASS correspondent interviewed some participants in the conference.

A.F. Temnikov, chairman of the labor collective council of the "Khimprom" Association, Irkutsk Oblast:

"We are in favor of direct ties between industry and agriculture. This too is a manifestation of the country's current restructuring, and a collective can dispose of the funds it earns. We will make an effort, our interest is becoming increasingly real."

Yu.M. Luzhkov, first deputy chairman of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee:

"It is a good thing we came here, we will know in more detail about the specific situation, the potential of the southern regions for supplying vegetables and fruit to a city of many millions like Moscow. I can see that there is great potential, but additional mutual efforts must be made to realize it."

A.I. Fedorov, general director of the "Uralchermet" Association:

"We have had contacts with the southerners before, too. Nowadays, in the conditions of economic accountability, we can obtain a guaranteed supply of vitamin-rich produce. We are in favor of a serious approach, that is, a system, a long-term contract."

All aspects of our life are undergoing renewal. The situation is changing substantially in the countryside too. The major socioeconomic, organizational, and political measures formulated at the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum create favorable conditions for efficient work by kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and all enterprises in the agro-industrial complex and for accelerating the increase in food production. The main thing now is to use these conditions skillfully, enlist various sources of food resources, and seek the active participation of all labor collectives in resolving the food problem.

The conference was addressed by B.Ye. Panyukov, first deputy minsiter of civil aviation; G.M. Fadeyev, first deputy minister of railways; A.S. Kruglyak, chairman of the labor collective council of the "Prokopyevskgidrougol" Association, Kemerovo Oblast; V.F. Movrin, deputy chief engineer at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant; A.D. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers; I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; Yu. K. Mogilevets, first deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers; V.I. Sergiyenko, chairman of Krasnoyarsk Krayispolkom; S.M. Kuzmichev, first deputy chairman of the Central Union of Consumer Societies Board; Ye. I. Sizenko, USSR minister; F.T. Morgun, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature Conservation; and others.

The participants in the Tashkent discussion came to the conclusion that certain principles are emerging in these matters. For instance, a cooperation contract for vegetable and fruit growing should make provision for the participation of industrial enterprises in the form of financial and material resources within the framework of the rights granted to them. Naturally, the use of material and technical resources that go toward the fulfillment of the state order or contractual commitments for deliveries of their main output cannot be permitted.

An essential condition is that the contract should be long-term, since by virtue of its initial and ongoing investments the industrial enterprise has an interest in a guarantee of receiving produce over a lengthy period, for the entire term of amortization of the funds created, as the economists say.

Economic ties between enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes should be on a strictly voluntary basis. It is best for contracts to be direct, without a great many intermediaries or an inflated apparatus. Naturally, this does not preclude the sensible mediation of agro-industrial trade and purchasing associations and the consumer cooperative system.

In developing direct ties it must be borne in mind that this should take place through an additional increase in the production of fruit and vegetable produce and potatoes, and not at the expense of unionwide stocks.

I.I. Skiba, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Department, took part in the conference.

Zaykov Visits Moscow Enterprises, Food Stores

PM1005154189 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 89 p 1

[MOSTASS correspondent report: "Restructuring Requires Concrete Actions"]

[Excerpts] An old house on Shchusev Street in the very center of Moscow. The USSR Union of Architects, comprising 22,000 representatives of this wonderful creative profession, can be found here. It is on these people that the appearance of our cities, the comfort of modern apartment blocks and public buildings, and, thus, to a considerable extent, the mood of Soviet people depend.

L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee [Gorkom], visited the Central House of Architects on 28 April. [passage omitted]

On the same day L.N. Zaykov visited a number of Moscow's rayons and inspected the city's political artwork and publicity displays and the state of streets and backyards.

This year the capital's holiday decorations have become more austere and laconic: There are no bombastic billboards or lurid banners. This underlines the businesslike mood of Muscovites, who are greeting May Day in a working atmosphere.

The first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom visited a number of the city's trading enterprises. The capital has been allocated the requisite commodity stocks for the holiday and has sufficient vegetables, potatoes, and meat and dairy products.

A discussion took place with customers at Krasnopresnenskiy ORPO [expansion unknown] No 5 "Fruit and Vegetables" Store and Frunzenskiy "Prodtovary" Association's "Produce" Store on the work of the capital's trading outlets. Whereas the former constitutes an example of successful organization, the latter, which is located in quite a complex residential district on Begovaya Street, displays many of the shortcomings characteristic of the city's trading establishments. These include, above all, irregular deliveries of commodities and food lines in

which people are forced to wait after work in order to obtain necessities. There are cases where customers are cheated and deceived and assistants and cashiers are rude.

As well as the objective difficulties, a great deal of the problems are the result of sluggishness on the part of Moscow Gorispolkom Trade Department (V.A. Karnaukhov) and the Moscow City Main Administration for the Fruit and Vegetable Industry (O.V. Virichev). The rayon soviet executive committees (S.I. Sholokhov and A.I. Fetisov) are deficient in their work and there is no strict permanent supervision by the CPSU rayon committees (Yu.P. Prudnikov and G.I. Kutnyakov).

Customers pointed out that the problems in the work of trading establishments are aggravated by current distortions in the cooperative movement whereby, instead of filling the market with goods and services, cooperative workers buy up and resell goods in short supply, thus acquiring an illegal profit. Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation organs are passive in acting against such cases and worker and party control organs have not mounted the requisite struggle.

During sharp conversations with Muscovites in which hundreds of citizens took part L.N. Zaykov stressed that the party gorkom today intends to resolutely change the situation. There have been enough promises and fine words from individual leaders, the party must step up accountability for the true state of affairs and ensure concrete changes for the better in Moscow's social sphere.

At the same time Muscovites themselves must also involve themselves in the work of restoring order. It is time the inhabitants themselves and the whole community improved their backyards themselves without just waiting for the present bad municipal services to do it. This was mentioned during a conversation with the residents of block No 4 on Begovaya Street, where the yard is extremely neglected, and also during examination of the ground around the Botkin Hospital.

Nor can the extremely complex law enforcement situation within the city be eliminated without the participation of the broad public, although internal affairs organ forces are now taking serious measures to reinforce law and order.

It was stressed that the "Progress-95" comprehensive territorial-sectoral program for the intensification of Moscow's economy will be the basis for solving many priority social tasks.

Muscovites cited specific instances of manifestations of bureaucratism, heartlessness, and passivity on the part of certain workers in party, soviet, and economic organs. Serious steps will be taken with regard to all such cases. Such cases are inadmissible today since they harm people's trust in the triumph of justice and in restructuring.

The Moscow City party organization has declared a resolute war on everyone whose actions retard renewal. Restructuring requires that every Communist leader make contact with people, know their sentiments and opinion, and take into consideration Muscovites' needs in their daily work.

Zaykov Attends Victory Day Ceremony in Moscow
LD0905141289 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT 9 May 89

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—Today, on the Victory Day, wreaths were laid at the tomb of the unknown soldier on behalf of the Moscow city and regional party committees, the Moscow City Soviet and the Moscow Regional Trade Union Council.

Lev Zaykov, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, as well as other leaders of the city and regional party organisations took part in the ceremony.

Shcherbitskiy Addresses Ukraine People's Deputies
LD1105143889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] A meeting of USSR people's deputies elected from the territorial and national-territorial districts of the republic and from republic organizations has been held in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. They discussed certain questions connected with preparations for the forthcoming Congress of USSR people's deputies. The meeting was opened by Shcherbitskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. He described the political situation in the republic, spoke about the progress of restructuring, and dwelled on the state of affairs in the national economy and on short-term tasks.

Fokin, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers and chairman of the republican Gosplan, dwelled on certain questions connected with the exection of orders and proposals by the electorate. He noted, among other things, that of 11,000 orders from the electorate, the Gosplan had analyzed about 1,000. Half of them came within the competence of the republic. Were they to be implemented, capital investments alone amounting to R27,000 million would be required, and this is practically the republic's annual budget.

Yes, the candidates who now have been elected deputies were not always correct and moderate in their promises.

Economist Interviewed on Import Policy Options

LD1105205689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 10 May 89

[Interview with O.R. Latsis, doctor of economics and first deputy editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST, by commentator Dmitriy Kiselev, in the studio in Moscow; from the "Vremya" newscast--recorded]

[Text] [Kiselev] In order to improve the situation in the Soviet market, many economists are proposing taking major credit abroad. Some want to use it for the purchase of consumer goods and others to import new technology. What do you think about this?

[Latsis] Yes, such proposals are being made by people whom I respect and with whom I am friendly, but I do not agree with them on this matter—that is, about increasing our external debt. The point is that we already owe certain sums, and they are large. True, those figures are not published in our country for some reason but Western creditors know how much they have loaned us, and the Western press publishes those figures. They speak of our debt coming close to generally recognized safety limits. It has not exceeded such limits, and it should not go beyond them. If we are to take, as some comrades suggest, tens of billions of dollars—they talk of $30-50 billion—then we will go beyond those limits. The debt will become such that we will be unable to administer it. It will grow independent of our will. That is very dangerous.

Moreover, it is clear that just as we will receive this credit now, it will begin to deduct exactly the same amount from our income in a few years' time when the payment is due. But I agree that imports must definitely be attracted to solve our current problems, first and foremost because this is a very mobile thing. One needs money to increase one's own production, and one can more quickly purchase things which are available on the world market. I favor purchasing industrial goods now, not using credit, but by using in a somewhat different way the money we currently have, the currency resources that we spend every year. We spend very much on grain. I am sure that we do not need to spend so much. We buy approximately as much grain as we lose, and it has transpired that we are not buying all that is required. It is said that we do not have enough meat. We need high-protein feed crops. KOMMUNIST magazine cited some statements by one economist. We still import less protein feed crops than we produce domestically. Thus, we are buying the same wheat, and quite often of not very high quality, for which our country occupies first place in terms of world production volume. This means not only that we have few currency resources but that we are not rationally using those fairly substantial currency resources that we do possess.

[Kiselev] You favor changing the import structure?

[Latsis] Quite correct. I also take a critical view of imported equipment. Of course, it is generally needed, but the question is not being resolved in general, but rather specifically. Recently the Leningrad Oblast newspaper SMENA reported that Vyborg rayon soviet had banned the construction of a formic acid factory. More likely than not, there will be no such factory in Vyborg. But the equipment has already been bought and is already lying on the construction site of a factory which does not and will not exist. This represents millions of dollars which could have been used to cram Vyborg with goods. I think that these are issues that must, first and foremost, be resolved in an open manner and the issue of major expenditures on imports, the issue of the purpose of imports and their structure, must be discussed by a legislative body, should be discussed by the Supreme Soviet.

[Kiselev] That means that it should be added to the agenda, maybe even at the Congress of People's Deputies?

[Latsis] Without a doubt. I think that the congress must solve this current matter, and that the Supreme Soviet should take our entire import policy under its supervision.

Officials Assess Electoral Reform Progress

PM1105121589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences G. Barabashev and Doctor of Juridical Sciences V. Vasilyev under the rubric "We Study Democracy": "Stages of Reform"]

[Text] We are all under the impression of the 26 March elections of USSR people's deputies. But it was not only the election of deputies which took place. We took a major step in reforming the political system, as outlined and defined by the USSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

The reform also includes the election of people's deputies of the union and autonomous republics and the election of people's representatives to local organs of power. They are separated from the present stage by a very short period of time. Of greater importance is an objective analysis of the experience which has been accumulated, otherwise not only the positive aspects of the past political campaign but also its shortcomings may be reproduced at the forthcoming elections.

The main aim of the change to the electoral system, as sufficiently clearly defined by the party, consists primarily in returning to the people's hands a very important lever for the state's subordination to society and its interests. That is possible only on the paths of the maximum liberation of voters' initiative, the freedom to nominate and elect deputies, and citizens' enhanced interest in the elections.

The first stage of the reform made it possible to make substantial headway in resolving this task. Even at an early stage of the election campaign 7,531 deputies had been nominated for 1,500 deputies' seats for the okrugs—an average of 5 nominations for each seat. At the plenums of public organizations 880 of the 2,049 candidacies were nominated and registered for 750 deputy seats after a discussion considered the ideas of the grass-roots subdivisions. Ultimately more than one candidate was registered in over three quarters of the electoral okrugs. This gave voters the opportunity for a real and conscious choice.

For the first time the candidate deputies submitted their programs to be judged by the people. And the change in the idea of what a USSR people's deputy should be was an important phenomenon of public awareness. Let us recall that formerly the most suitable person was considered to be the one who had given a good account of himself in production, who had received awards for his labor valor. Although even now a lazy, idle person could not count on success, the voters' sympathies inclined primarily toward the person who had shown himself to be a vigorous fighter for restructuring and capable of promoting it in the state sphere.

For the first time the elections began to turn into a real form of direct democracy. The voters began to join into action groups to take part in various electoral procedures. Their self-organization was also manifested in the electoral activity of all-union public formations which through their central organs had received the right to nominate and elect deputies independently.

All these positive advances cannot be assessed outside the new electoral legislation. It was the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies that ensured the legal basis for the new practice. That is why we can in no way agree with the opinion of those critics, few in number it is true, who believe that the reform of electoral legislation has failed to add any democracy to the elections.

But it is not worth denying either that far from all the opportunities provided by the new legislation have been implemented. If, for instance, a genuine breakthrough in electoral activity can be noted for Moscow or Leningrad, reports from some other regions attest that the former peace and quiet of stagnation prevail there. The inertia of the old apparatus thinking and the former directive-based methods of regulating the electoral process been not been successfully and fully overcome either. In local areas the party and soviet organs frequently seized the helm of the election campaign from the electoral commissions. In some cases the electoral commissions themselves were no model for democracy. Even the idea of ensuring competition and assuming the organizational burdens connected with it was unacceptable to some local apparatus workers. Hence the result: a large number (399) of electoral okrugs in which only one candidate was registered.

Often the fireworks of the population's political activeness shed light on the rather poor political standard of leaders of various ranks and their inability to wage a principled but democratic electoral struggle. On the other hand the voters themselves and the candidate deputies did not always conduct the election campaign skillfully and also used far from "parliamentary" methods.

Practice has also subjected the norms of the electoral law to a strict test, revealing many legal problems. For instance, direct elections of deputies from all-union public organizations became a target for critical arrows. But in practice they were a powerful incentive to the development of social activeness.

The direct elections from public organizations were of no less importance in another respect. Let's take the figures for the nomination of candidates for the electoral okrugs received before the okrug electoral meetings were held. It turned out that the candidates included 1,193 women, or 15.8 percent, yet at the 1984 elections 32.8 percent of the candidates were women. Among the candidates there were 1,783 workers, or 23.7 percent compared with 35.2 percent at the 1984 elections. There were 679 collective farm [kolkhoz] members, or 9 percent, compared with 16.1 percent in 1984. Corresponding changes are also characteristic of the deputies' final composition.

How should we assess the picture that has taken shape? On the one hand, the percentages cited express the voters' real attitudes toward deputies and their desire to see people in the supreme organs of power who will really fulfill their state commitments. On the other hand, the figures attest to the need for a kind of compensatory mechanism which to a certain extent makes up for the renunciation of "quotas." If the Committee of Soviet Women nominates candidates who are women, the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] nominates young people, Komsomol members, and the veterans' organization nominates people with experience of life, that helps to preserve the adequate representation of corresponding groups of the population among the overall numbers of deputies.

Practice has thus shown the predominance of the arguments in favor of retaining direct representation for public organizations in supreme organs of power and the expediency of reproducing this system, as envisaged by the USSR Constitution, in the legislation of the union and autonomous republics on elections of these republic's people's deputies. At the same time we cannot agree with the proposal to reduce the electoral rights of public organizations merely to direct elections from them and to deprive them of the right to nominate candidates for territorial electoral okrugs.

The point is that direct elections from public organizations are envisaged and are expedient at the level of the USSR and the republics but not at the local level. It is there that not only the conservation but also the active

implementation by public organizations, in the shape of their local organs, of the right to nominate candidates for the relevant territorial okrugs remains topical. In additional, the more of these organizations there are, the fewer real opportunities they will have to receive a specific number of seats. Naturally, the nomination of candidates for territorial okrugs will be a way out for these organizations.

Skeptical assessments were also voiced quite widely on the new institution that the okrug electoral meetings have become. People have seen in them a kind of barrier to sift out "inconvenient" candidates. In practice these fears have been justified in a number of cases. But these have not been mass instances. As a whole the meetings provided voters with a unique opportunity to see all the candidates, to listen to and compare their programs, and to discuss their human qualities. I think that renouncing the meetings would harm the principle of competitiveness.

We could obviously talk not of abandoning okrug meetings but of improving that institution. Inasmuch as every collective which has nominated a candidate can, in accordance with the law, send delegates to the meetings, often the candidates themselves and their supporters have sought nomination from as many labor collectives as possible. As a result, they gained a marked advantage at the okrug electoral meetings. In addition the same number of delegates from a plant with many thousands of workers and from a small office would be nominated for the okrug meetings. There were instances of delegates being appointed by the enterprise or institution administration. As a result the Central Electoral Commission received several hundred complaints that the meetings were reminiscent of party and economic aktivs.

An important lesson of the past electoral campaign is that in a number of cases the new law has been unable to defend the principle of competition among the candidates which it itself established. Back when the draft law was being discussed, many people suggested establishing a rule whereby at least two candidates should be nominated for the ballot. That rule failed to meet with support. It was pointed out that it could fetter the voters' will if they wanted to settle on one candidate. In fact thanks to the approved norm of the law on any number of candidates running, a possible exception has become a quite widespread rule. So is there not a return to the procedure proposed in the first place?

To guarantee the plurality of candidates, it is necessary to form a more balanced and positive attitude toward holding citizens' meetings to nominate candidates at their place of residence. Experience has shown that, as a whole, people locally view these meetings unfavorably because their organization requires considerable efforts and the results cannot be predicted. Cases are known where, counter to the public's insistent demands, the okrug commissions and local soviet executive committees have refused to hold meetings on far-fetched pretexts or have set blatantly unacceptable conditions for convening them.

Several legislative provisions concerning the organization of meetings are in need of further amplification. If we have in mind the elections to the supreme organs of state power of the republics and to the local soviets, then the quorum of 500 voters set for meetings during elections of USSR people's deputies is blatantly unsuitable. It does not accord with the real numbers of voters in territorial okrugs and should therefore be substantially reduced. In elections to local soviets it would be expedient to establish a sliding scale for this quorum. The lower the level of the soviet then the fewer voters required to hold a meeting to nominate a candidate.

Generally speaking, the executive committee as an organ of state management is hardly adapted to resolve matters connected with meetings of this kind. There is a real danger of administrative pressure. It is better that the public itself engage in preparing meetings under the control of the okrug electoral commissions.

The organizational practice of the recent elections revealed the shortage of procedures established by legislation. The desire to create a compact law did a disservice and those who had to apply it felt the need for more detailed instructions. But the time of instructions has passed and we should not count on forms of legal settlement other than legislative forms. All the more reason for the procedural questions of the elections to be treated with the utmost attention.

In particular we should think thoroughly about the procedure for voters' implementation of the right to nominate candidates. By tradition the labor collectives have the leading position in nominating candidates. But often the result has been that many large-scale enterprises, inasmuch as they are a component of a production association, even if they have thousands of workers, have been deprived of the right to nominate a candidate while some small rural school or cooperative of just a few members can, as independent subdivisions, nominate and have in fact nominated their own candidates.

But what is a "corporate body?" It is a category in civil law and economic law. Can it serve as an adequate criterion for determining the political opportunities of labor collectives directly linked with their opportunities for nominating candidate deputies? Hardly. In our view we should proceed from a different criterion—the numerical strength of a labor collective.

At the recent elections there was quite a large number of "multitasking" candidates—those who because of their popularity were nominated for a whole series of electoral okrugs or simultaneously for territorial okrugs and in public organizations. If a candidate nominated in several electoral okrugs withdrew his candidacy too late he

thereby promoted the emergence of a situation in which only one candidate remained to run for the specific okrug. It might be possible to establish in law that a candidate cannot consent to be nominated for more than two electoral okrugs or in one public organization and in one territorial electoral okrug. It is also worth setting a deadline for a candidate's final decision to run in a particular electoral okrug. This decision should probably be taken no later than a few days before the okrug electoral meeting is held.

During elections to local soviets the nomination of candidates can be for multiseat electoral okrugs. The experiment which was once performed showed the expediency of this approach. But here is the question: In which links of the local soviets should multiseat electoral okrugs be created? Should we not establish in legislation the possibility of an alternative choice in deciding this question, providing for the right of okrug territorial electoral commissions, upon representations from executive committees or presidiums of the relevant local soviets, to form both multiseat and single seat electoral okrugs depending on local conditions? The main thing is that the practice of multiseat okrugs should direct people toward ensuring competition between candidates.

The recent elections were the first broad political campaign in many years during which the masses of the voters and the candidates themselves learned about the election struggle. Having established general demands for competitiveness, the law opened up a broad scope for public initiative in seeking the forms and methods of this competitiveness. But far from everything worked well from the outset. Intolerable, extremist forms of agitation emerged characterized by speculation on nationalist and chauvinist slogans and prejudices and the desire to rally voters against candidates merely because they belonged to specific groups of the population—irrespective of their professional and personal qualities. Some candidates came out with programs which unconditionally contradicted the principles of internationalism and humanism enshrined by the Soviet Constitution.

The lack of legal rulings regulating election agitation was made up by explanations and recommendations from the electoral commissions which helped to put the election struggle on the necessary footing. It is essential to make it a duty for the prosecutor's office to appeal against the illegal actions of the state and public organs connected with performing agitation work and also to bring to book the people who speak from anti-Soviet positions and to raise the question of refusing to register candidates whose programs contain elements of chauvinism, nationalism, and racism and calls to overthrow the socialist system.

On the other hand, the aim of the amplification and supplementing of laws should be to step up glasnost in the election campaign. In particular it is necessary to provide for the responsibility of individuals and citizens who hinder representatives of the mass media from attending various election events. Unfortunately, the electoral commissions which, as public organs, have been assigned by the law the task of organizing and holding the elections, have in far from all cases been up to their position. And to a considerably degree this has been because of the weakness of their personnel, which in turn has been explained by the public's inadequate attention toward the formation of the commissions and the underestimation of their new role. Nominations for the commissions must be thoroughly discussed at meetings of labor collectives and meetings at citizens' places of residence, at plenums, conferences, and other forums of public organizations' territorial organs.

There should probably be a discussion of the possibility of publishing independent provisions on the electoral commissions which give detailed rulings on their functions, rights, and working procedure and which in particular provide for their right to give explanations whose execution is binding on questions connected with the application of election legislation. It is expedient to establish that it is the commissions' duty to resolve collegially the questions raised in appeals from voters and their right to take steps to halt the actions of various state and public organs and officials violating the requirements of electoral law. Ultimately the commissions must operate as organs of public control over election legislation, as voters' organizations in their own right, and in no way as state structures supplementing existing organs of power and management.

If you consider that the elections are a school of democracy and the formation of political culture for the broadest strata of the population, then the next stage of the electoral reform should serve their transfer to the senior grades of this school. If during the elections of the supreme organ of power the main thing is the deputy's ability to be a statesman, for the local soviet deputies it is particularly necessary to have a good knowledge of the requirements of the population and the ability to do practical work among the voters.

Communists Urged To Boost CPSU's Authority

PM1005151589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 89 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Communists and Restructuring: Referring to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum Documents"]

[Text] Arkadiy Pavlovich Aydak, chairman of a Chuvash collective farm; Nina Mikhaylovna Piryazeva, an electrician from Novosibirsk; Bektur Sydykovich Isakov, a Kirghiz teacher; Leonid Leonovich Dyusov, a lathe operator from Minsk; Olga Pavlovna Yarovaya, a dairymaid from Saratov; Alim Ivanovich Chabanov, general director of a science and production association in Cherkassy.... These people have different biographies and their lives have turned out in different ways. But, like the majority of our elected representatives, these USSR people's deputies have something in common that unites them with firm bonds—their membership in the

CPSU. They did not win the voters' confidence by pulling rank or giving fine speeches but by their authority and the stand they have taken in restructuring.

Soviet people believe in the party and regard it as the only organizing force that can and ultimately will ensure the fundamental renewal of society and its consolidation on the platform of restructuring. At the same time, as the tasks to be resolved become more complicated, something else has also become apparent: While ardently supporting the party in its innovative endeavors, people now expect Communists to take more vigorous action and produce practical results—primarily regarding improvements in the people's wellbeing. It was frankly said at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum: We will act, leading the process of the people's growing social activeness; restructuring will advance further along the planned course and the party will secure even greater support from the working people. Losing the initiative is fraught with the danger of serious, even irreparable damage to restructuring and the appearance of additional moral, social, political, and economic disorders. This cannot be allowed under any circumstances.

Party organizations are now working in very complex conditions. Long established stereotypes are in the process of being smashed, and the administrative-edict style is being eradicated. These efforts are being made in order to more successfully resolve vital tasks: to further develop democracy and glasnost, carry out economic reform, and provide people with food, goods, and housing.... Restructuring has galvanized the masses, and Communists cannot stand aloof from the processes taking place: They must primarily make greater demands of themselves and be at the center of every event.

It is from this standpoint and this standpoint alone that we must now approach the task of determining Communists' measure of responsibility for the fate of restructuring. It is their duty and obligation to set the tone of general work. "In the past," V. Samoylov from Kemerovo wrote to PRAVDA, "resounding appeals were made to enhance the vanguard role of party members. But, in my opinion, many regarded these appeals as something abstract, a kind of ritual cry. Those who did respond sincerely to them often lost interest on encountering the indifference of their comrades in the party organization to any display of initiative and all that was going on around them. I think the time has come to sternly ask every Communist: How do you demonstrate your party spirit—by making the maximum possible contribution to the common cause or merely by paying your membership fees and attending meetings?"

Long before the October Revolution V.I. Lenin demanded the "strictest guarantees that party spirit be not merely words but action." Whose concern is this today? It goes without saying that it is first and foremost the concern of the primary party organizations, on whose atmosphere and level of efficiency the formation and maturity of political fighters and champions of the collectively evolved policy depend. It is here that Communists must constantly keep account of how they live and work, how they observe party discipline, and what they are really doing in practice for restructuring. Primary party organizations have a considerable number of reliable methods at their disposal for checking the extent to which the actions and conduct of party members and candidate members correspond to the requirements of the CPSU Statute and Program. A careful look should be taken everywhere to see whether this "arsenal" is being fully used.

Here is one illuminating fact. In Azerbaijan interviews are now being held with Communists, which help them to become more actively involved in restructuring and help the party committees to efficiently amend their activity and strengthen their ties with the masses. During these interviews, Communists frankly say: This is the first time we have been invited to the party committee, the first time they have spoken with us so frankly and wanted to know our opinions and take them into consideration. The first time? You could hardly find a more eloquent explanation for the recent uncertain, shaky position of many party organizations here and their passivity.

The opinion was expressed from the rostrum of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that party committees are still not armed with an effective "instrument" for working with primary party organizations and that problems connected with Communists' image, their party essence, their actions, and their responsibility for the party deserve a separate, detailed discussion. It seems that this approach has been prompted by real life and by an analysis of the present situation. However, in the opinion of those who took part in the discussion at the Central Committee plenum, it is not becoming for Communists to sit with their arms folded in expectation of some additional instructions and recommendations, just as it is not becoming for them to panic on encountering difficulties or to be led by demagogues and unhealthy sentiments. They must act. And act more boldly, more forcefully! While sweeping aside any attempts to slow down progress along our chosen path and once again cast our society into the abyss of stagnation, Communists must act with equal determination against excessive haste, ambition, leftist extremes, and extremism. Wherever a Communist works, or whatever organizations and social movements he is a member of, he must act with principle and implement the party line, basing his actions on the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th party conference.

It must be borne in mind that the party is responsible for its every member, while they, in turn, are responsible for it. It is very important in this respect to strictly follow the Leninist principle: All Communists are responsible for all party affairs, with equal rights, and with no exceptions. The guarantee of success lies in collective efforts. But, as experience shows, a Communist's contribution to restructuring and to the renewal of all spheres of life is

the more considerable, the more exacting he is toward himself and the more independent he is in his deeds and actions. Constant interest, dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, and self-criticism coupled with the ability to find ways and means to solve the tasks that arise and lead others—this is the guarantee that his example will be effective.

Communists cannot look on indifferently as some comrades leave the CPSU or others refuse to join. They must act with conviction and cultivate in others a most respectful attitude to the party—mainly through personal example. In this respect they should remember the younger generation, as constant concern for the new generation, for those who will be working for the good of the country in the future, has been and still is a most important communist tradition.

The Congress of People's Deputies will soon take place. The majority of its participants are members of the CPSU. Together with other deputies, they will have to discuss urgent tasks concerning the country's further development, and the success of this congress will largely depend on Communists' responsibility and adherence to principle, the degree to which they weigh their decisions, and their unity on the party platform. The party, it was noted at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, has won enormous authority in the first stage of restructuring. Now the main point of its activity lies in its implementation of the restructuring policy and in the practical actions of every party organization and every Communist.

Labor Colony for Former Officials Described

PM1105151189

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 1989 Morning Edition carries on page 6 under the headline "Colony of Yesterday's Men" a "photoreportage" by special correspondents A. Pashkov and V. Svartsevich. The text of the reportage is as follows:

"Look at these people. At first glance they are ordinary prisoners differing in no way from the inmates of other corrective labor institutions. But only recently they considered themselves the 'masters of life' and the prospect of ending up in an 'institution' like a colony probably only occurred to them in a terrible dream. Although they undoubtedly knew their sins, faith in their invulnerability, in being 'above the law,' was stronger than fear....

"Here, in the Nizhniy Tagil intensified-regime colony number 13, those who committed crimes while in high office are undergoing punishment.

"You often hear it said that the former 'bosses,' even behind bars, contrive to obtain preferential conditions of maintainance for themselves. As you can see, that is not so: Colony number 13 is an ordinary institution of this type, the same watch towers, German Shepherd dogs, barbed wire, territory divided into zones, a very strict pass procedure, and there are no special privileges here.

"Why then has a special colony been created for these 'exalted' criminals? The colony's chief, I. Zharkov, believes that it is only to ensure the prisoners' personal safety. After all, it is no secret that ordinary criminals have no particular compassion for convicts of this category."

The four photographs accompanying the text show convicts walking past a fence on their way to work; G. Brovin, "former secretary to L. Brezhnev," leaning against a tree; V. Vyshku, "former deputy chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers," standing in the dormitory; and V. Korostyshevskiy, "former deputy chief of an intensified-regime colony," sitting at what appears to be a refectory table.

Industrial Accident Poisons Rivers in Chelyabinsk

LD1105111389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1033 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 11 May (TASS)—The threat to people's health has been eliminated. This was made possible only after a number of emergency measures were taken by the authorities of the town of Yuzhno-Uralsk toward eliminating the consequences of a leak of industrial waste containing cyanic compounds into the Chernaya and Kabanka Rivers and thence into the Yuzhno-Uralsk reservoir.

The local authorities mobilized all the necessary services and informed residents of the danger. Water tests were carried out continually in the reservoir where the presence of cyanide was discovered. Owing to the measures taken, there so far have been no cases of poisoning or any victims. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against those responsible for the accident.

The leak came from the industrial waste reservoir of the "Yuzhuralzoloto" Association, where more than 10 million tonnes of poison liquids, left over from operations to extract precious metal from ore, lie in an enormous bowl behind an artificial dam.

According to experts preliminary conclusion, the Polyanovskoye Reservoir, in which the concentration of poisons was diluted, prevented a tragedy. The flow of water from this reservoir has now been blocked by a dam.

Armenian Central Committee Examines Infant Deaths

PM1005123589 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 30 Apr 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] At a 29 April session the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau examined the question of cases of large-scale illness and death among newborns

at the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Ministry of Health Scientific Institute of Midwifery and Gynecology and Yerevan's No 4 maternity home.

It was noted that in January through March 1989 there were instances of group infectious diseases and the death of 24 newborn infants at these medical Institutions. The reason for the outbreak in the period 1 through 15 March of group toxic and septic infections and pyoinflammatory diseases among newborns with 13 fatal outcomes at the Scientific Research Institute of Midwifery and Gynecology lay in the gross violations of the organization of work and antiepidemic procedure and the irresponsible attitude of workers of the relevant services toward the fulfillment of their duties.

The institute leadership (the director is G. Okoyev, chief doctor is L. Israyelyan, the party organization secretary is S. Kirakosyan), displaying negligence and carelessness, failed to analyze and assess, promptly and in full, instances of group disease and death among newborns; committed grave shortcomings and omissions in organizing the obstetric service; and failed to take the necessary steps to prevent the spread of infection, to ensure the proper sanitary and antiepidemic procedures, and to enhance the responsibility of staffers and medical personnel.

Because of the incorrect organization of work in the midwifery departments and newborn infants' departments, when pregnant women were hospitalized those belonging to high risk groups from the viewpoint of fetal infection were not identified, and the necessary package of bacteriological and biochemical studies was not carried out to promptly identify infected children.

The procedure for placing sick children and the rules for the decontamination of medical apparatus were seriously violated. Some newborns were infected with various causative agents of disease. During a control investigation at the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology, bacillus pyocyaneus, staphylococcus aureus, and other microbes were discovered on an operating table, in the maternity department, in incubators, in a child's bed, on oxygen masks, breathing tubes, teats, forceps, a bactericidal lamp, and a wall panel. The number of carriers of bacteria has doubled among institute employees in the past year, their decontamination has been carried out inefficiently, and where necessary they have not been transferred to other work sectors.

As a result of insufficient professional competence and the lack of proper responsibility among staffers in the newborn autopsy room, while there was a sharply increased incidence of deaths the reason was not promptly studied, and the main specialists of the republic's health ministry were not notified. Having lost their sense of responsibility, institute director G. Okoyev and chief doctor L. Israyelyan notified the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Health Ministry only very belatedly, on the 11th day, and did not promptly close the maternity department, even with a large number of sick children and taking into account the gravity of their state. In an interview with an ARMENPRESS correspondent G. Okoyev gave the public incorrect information about the incident.

The situation which took shape in the institute was the result of the atmosphere of complacency and the lack of strict professional exactingness. For a long time the institution remained uncriticized, and serious shortcomings in scientific research work, violations of the principles for selecting and placing cadres, and the low level of efficiency in the use of modern medical equipment remained in the shadows, behind its modest achievements.

As a result of the lack of monitoring of sanitary-epidemic procedures and the gross violation of the rules for infusion therapy in Yerevan's No 4 maternity home (the chief doctor is E. Avakyan, the party organization secretary E. Poladyan), the state of health of five newborns deteriorated drastically, and three died after the intravenous administration of medicines.

The facts cited above attest to grave shortcomings and omissions in the republic's obstetric institutions and to unsatisfactory monitoring by the republican (P. Dilbaryan), city (R. Adamyan), and rayon (A. Oganesyan) sanitary epidemic stations.

The Armenian SSR Ministry of Health (the minister is E. Gabriyelyan, former deputy minister is L. Muradyan) failed to draw the proper conclusions from criticism at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee September (1988) Plenum; failed to take the necessary steps to eliminate shortcomings in the protection of mother and child health, and to fulfill party and government resolutions on the question; is exercising only feeble leadership and control over the work of obstetric institutions; is failing to pay proper attention to enhancing the responsibility and professional qualifications of medical workers and to the consolidation of executive discipline; and has reduced the demands on leading cadres.

The ministry leadership adopted an unprincipled stance in assessing the cases of death which occurred among newborns, and reacted to them only after the intervention of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has noted that these cases attest to the slack control exercised by the primary organizations of the republic's health ministry, the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology, and the No 4 maternity home over the activity of the ministry apparatus and the administration in enhancing Communists' responsibility for the matter in hand and for the consolidation of labor and executive discipline.

The Yerevan Armenian Communist Party City Committee [Gorkom] and the Spandaryanskiy and Sovetskiy rayon party committees [raykoms] remained aloof and adopted a temporizing, conciliatory stance on these questions, failed to give a principled assessment of instances of group illness and death among newborns, and failed to impose strict party sanctions on the culprits. All this generated a broad response and righteous indignation among the republic's public.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has expelled G. Okoyev, director of the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology, from the ranks of the CPSU, and has relieved him of his post for serious shortcomings in organizing treatment for newborns, for gross violations in observing sanitary and epidemiological procedure, leading to disease and death among newborns, for his irresponsible attitude toward the prevention of infection, and for his belated and unobjective notification of higher ranking organs.

L. Israyelyan, chief doctor at the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology, and E. Avakyan, chief doctor at the No 4 maternity home, have been expelled from the ranks of the CPSU for serious shortcomings and omissions in the activity of clinical subdepartments and for failure to ensure an appropriate state of sanitation and hygiene in departments, which led to disease and death among newborns. Their further stay in the posts they hold was deemed inexpedient.

S. Kirakosyan and E. Poladyan, secretaries of the primary party organizations of, respectively, the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology and Yerevan's No 4 maternity home, have been strictly sanctioned and given report cards endorsed for failing to ensure proper control of the activity of the administration and clinical subdepartments and for failing to take steps to strengthen discipline and enhance the exactingness toward cadres.

The Yerevan Armenian Communist Party Gorkom has been instructed to examine the question of the party responsibility of Communists employed at the obstetrics and sanitary and epidemiological service institutions guilty of the violations perpetrated.

It has been deemed inexpedient for E. Gabriyelyan to continue in the post of Armenian SSR minister of health because of his failure to ensure proper leadership and control over the activity of obstetric institutions and for the lack of principle he displayed in failing to promptly reveal and assess instances of group disease and death among newborns.

Considering that L. Muradyan, Armenian SSR deputy minister of health, has been relieved of her post, the Spandaryanskiy Armenian Communist Party Raykom has been instructed to examine the question of her party liability.

Note was taken of the unsatisfactory work of U. Pogosyan, Armenian SSR deputy health minister, and of A. Mayrapetyan, chief of the sanitary and epidemiological administration of the republic's health ministry, in backing up the activity of the sanitary and epidemiological services. They have been warned that unless they rectify the state of affairs stricter measures will be taken against them.

CPSU member P. Dilbaryan, chief doctor of the republican sanitary epidemic station, has been sanctioned and his report card has been endorsed for his unsatisfactory control over the state of sanitation and hygiene at obstetric institutions and for his failure to take adequate measures to halt instance of the violation of the sanitation and anti-epidemic procedure.

The Spandaryanskiy Armenian Communist Party Raykom has been instructed to examine the question of the party responsibility of CPSU member A. Khachatryan, chief of the Armenian SSR Health Ministry administration for therapeutic and prophylactic aid for mothers and children, after his return from a trip abroad.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has instructed the Armenian SSR Health Ministry to take urgent steps to eliminate the serious shortcomings and omissions in the work of obstetric institutions and the sanitary-epidemiological service, to introduce exemplary order there, and to ensure the daily leadership of the activity of medical institutions to protect the health of mothers and children and a high standard of medical services. There must be tougher monitoring of the work of midwifery and gynecological institutions and their observance of the proper sanitary-epidemiological regime, and before 1 June a check on the state of the sanitary-epidemiological and anti-epidemic regime in maternity homes must be organized throughout the republic. There must be an increase in the effectiveness of the sanitary-epidemiological services' monitoring of the activity of obstetric institutions, and there must be an improvement in the scientific and methodological leadership of obstetric and children's therapeutic and prophylactic institutions.

The Armenian SSR Council of Ministers has been instructed to elaborate and submit to the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee proposals for the fundamental restructuring of health care in the republic, the consolidation of its material and technical base, and the creation of a republican mother and child protection center.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has obliged the Armenian Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms and the city and rayon soviet of people's deputies executive committees to step up control over the work of obstetric institutions and to pay

special attention to the selection of skilled cadres and to the enhancement of their responsibility for fulfilling their professional duty and consolidating executive discipline.

It has been taken into account that the Armenian SSR Prosecutor's Office has instituted criminal proceedings and is conducting an investigation into the cases of group disease and death among newborns in the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology and the No 4 maternity home.

It has been taken into account that by a decision of the Armenian SSR Health Ministry N. Manukyan, A. Arakelyan, and L. Kalantarova, department chiefs at the scientific research institute of midwifery and gynecology, and R. Oganesyan, chief doctor at Yerevan's Spandaryanskiy Rayon sanitary-epidemiological station, have been dismissed from the posts they hold. A number of leaders of the relevant services and subdepartments have been strictly disciplined.

The republic's health ministry has been instructed to examine the case of the personal official responsibility of the leaders of Yerevan's No 4 maternity home and of the leaders and staffers of the ministry apparatus responsible for the obstetric and sanitary-epidemiological service.

Leaders Ask Karabakh Armenians To Show Restraint
NC1105113489 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1600 GMT 10 May 89

[Text] A declaration addressed to the workers of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and signed by NKAO and USSR people's deputies, party rayon committee [raykom] secretaries, and chairmen of rayon soviets and executive committees [rayispolkom] has been published in the newspaper KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH. We are now relaying that declaration:

Esteemed compatriots, the events of recent days have shown that the situation in the region has become exceedingly acute. The fundamental causes of the serious situation and the evaluation of the situation were revealed in the open letter addressed to Comrade Gorbachev which has already been published in the press.

We expect understanding and assistance in resolving the problems we have raised. In the present situation patience and perseverance are required from all. We are convinced that the people of Artsakh will display wisdom and will not resort to any step which might denigrate our movement which is aimed at the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Armenian Republic. We appeal to you with the [word indistinct] request not to give way to any provocation no matter from what quarter it comes. Any illegal action and disorderliness may cause unacceptable harm to the lives and health of our children and relatives.

The present situation requires orderliness and dedicated work from all the services that cater to the population and the normal functioning of the educational institutions. it is impermissable to hurt our children, the future of the nation. The defense of the Karabakh movement within the framework of peaceful searches and democratic procedures is the only way that can lead to the realization of our people's aspirations and will.

The declaration has been signed by (?Dakvoryan), first secretary of the Mardakertskiy party raykom and USSR people's deputy; Krikoryan, first secretary of the Marduninskiy party raykom and USSR people's deputy; Badamyan, senior director of the transportation-production association of Stepanakert and USSR people's deputy; Babayan, USSR people's deputy and member of the NKAO special administration committee; Tovmasyan, member of the NKAO special administration committee; (?Aghachanyan), first secretary of the Stepanakert party city committee; Kocharyan, first secretary of the Askeran party raykom; Babyan, first secretary of the Hadrut party raykom; Mirzoyan, chairman of the Stepanakert City executive committee; (?Cheradyan), first secretary of Mardagertskiy rayispolkom; Seyranyan, chairman of the Marduninskiy rayispolkom; Navbasartyan, chairman of the Hadrut rayispolkom; and Aghababyan, acting chairman of the Askeran rayispolkom.

Yerevan Rally Staged Over Nagorno-Karabakh 11 May
AU1205073289 Paris AFP in English 2332 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (AFP)—Some 200,000 Armenians took part in an authorised rally Thursday in the republic's capital Yerevan to press demands for Armenian control over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, witnesses said. Protesters called for the convening of a special session of the republic's parliament ahead of the May 25 opening of Soviet Union's new assembly, the Congress of People's Deputies. The local parliament should frame resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh to put to the congress, protesters demanded.

Nagorno-Karabakh is part of the neighbouring republic of Azerbaijan, whose culture is Islamic, even though 75 per cent of its population are Armenians with a Christian heritage.

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh have been on strike since May 3 to renew their demands for the province's assimilation into the republic of Armenia.

Tens of thousands of Armenians turned out for demonstrations in Yerevan on May 1 and May 6, defying government bans. The army, which has enforced a night curfew for the past five months in the enclave, did not intervene. Representatives of the military commanders and of the national legislature, the Supreme Soviet, addressed Thursday's five-hour rally, held outside the Matanaderan archives building.

Karen Simonyan, an Armenian deputy to the new Congress, said the authorities should stop arresting activists and lift the curfew before any dialogue with the protesters. Journalist Samvel Shakhnazaryan, who was at the rally, said he saw no soldiers throughout the rally, "the first for many months to allow the citizens of Yerevan to renew discussion of all their problems."

Protesters waving Armenian flags called for the release of the 10 members of the Karabakh Committee, who have been held without trial for five months on suspicion of orchestrating civil disturbance. They also criticised plans to rebuild areas devasted by the earthquake of last December 7, which left some 40,000 dead, according to official figures. But the rally rejected calls for a strike to back the protesters' demands, the witnesses said.

Youths Stage Riots in Turkmen Oil Town 9 May

PM1205101789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 89 Second Edition p 8

[PRAVDA correspondent M. Volkov report: "Incident in Nebit-Dag"]

[Text] Turkmen SSR—Up-to-the-minute reports have provided information about a disgraceful onslaught by hooligans. Late in the evening on Victory Day [9 May] several hundred hooligans staged a pogrom in Nebit-Dag, the oilmen's city. They set fire to 19 cooperative posts and damaged 6 fire trucks responding to the alarm. The hooligans showered militia detachments on their arrival with piles of cobblestones. Two staffers were hospitalized and 15 militiamen were given first aid.

I spoke to Ye. Akentyev, first secretary of the Nebit-Dag Turkmen Communist Party City Committee, and asked him to comment on the situation. This is what he said:

"On the eve of these events rumors began to sweep the city that there might by riots on the festive days... We held a series of meetings with young students and the tension appeared to have been relieved. However, it is now clear that these meetings did not manage to avert excesses. There were many drunken young people in the crowd of hooligans and 47 people were arrested. The situation in the city is now calm. Competent organs are conducting an investigation."

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced that militia subunits have been reinforced in Nebit-Dag and K. Tachmamedov, the republic's first deputy internal affairs minister, has flown to the scene. The people arrested attribute their behavior to dissatisfaction with the work of local cooperatives. An investigation is under way.

Niyazov Addresses Turkmen Media Forum

PM1105152589 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 29 Apr 89 p 1

[Unattributed report on 28 April Turkmen Republic conference: "Journalists' Important Duty and Responsibility"]

[Excerpts] The tasks of the mass media at the crucial stage of restructuring are being discussed at a republic conference which opened in Ashkhabad 28 April. It is being attended by senior party officials, representatives of republic ministries and departments, journalists from republic, oblast, city, and rayon newspapers, radio, and television, and publishing house workers.

The conference was addresed by S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Speech by S.A. Niyazov, First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, at the Republic Conference

Comrades!
We are taking part today in a somewhat unusual event.

As you know, a CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held in Moscow 25 April. Its materials were widely covered in the press. The plenum's decisions were clear-cut—to continue restructuring and to work hard to achieve the aims outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee has deemed it necessary to consult you, to express its observations and wishes, and to hear your proposals on how the work of the republic mass media could be improved.

The participation in our discussion today of senior party officials and leaders of republic ministries and departments emphasizes the special significance and topicality of the question which we are discussing.

This is all the more important since certain differences, a lack of understanding, and mutual recriminations have arisen between you during the period of glasnost.

The activities of the mass media within the restructuring processes concern not just the journalists themselves but touch upon the interests of all spheres of society's sociopolitical life. Consequently they concern in equal measure workers at all ideological institutions and party committee, ministry, and department leaders.

The range of problems which we are about to discuss concerns the day-to-day practical work of editorial teams of publications from the rayon to republic level, the state of the printing industry base, the training of journalist cadres, their working and leisure conditions, and much else. We need to discuss the standards of journalists'

professional ethics and find out how conscientiously republic mass media workers approach the implementation of their professional and civic duties. In my opinion, the activities of the coordinating and directing professional organ—the republic Union of Journalists—will not go unmentioned either. And, of course, one of the main questions is that of party leadership of the mass media and the quest for new forms and methods of work in this important sphere.

The representative character of our meeting makes it possible to discuss in depth and comprehensively our vital problems and to identify various and possibly contradictory viewpoints. We very much want our debate to be utterly democratic and frank, both in form and in spirit. This is because, despite the various approaches to particular questions and individual differences of opinion, we must preserve a consensus on the main point—our attitude to restructuring and the democratic transformations which are taking place in society. Because today the main yardstick for measuring the activity of each one of us is the degree to which it serves restructuring and helps to advance it.

The republic's economic indicators are graphic evidence of the steady progress of restructuring processes in its life.

Positive changes have been registered in all the economic sectors and the social sphere. During the first 3 years of the 5-year plan the volume of produced national income has increased by more than 13 percent, and real per capita incomes have increased by 7.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous 5-year plan. The gross social product growth rate in the current 5-year plan has substantially outstripped the growth rates achieved during the 11th 5-Year Plan. Labor productivity is increasing steadily, and deceleration has been registered in the decline of returns on capital.

The performance of industrial enterprises has become more stable in general. The production of agricultural produce has increased noticeably. The situation in capital construction is improving. Considerably more funds are being channeled into the social sphere, and this has made it possible to commission about 230,000 square meters of housing in excess of the plan over the said period, and to overfulfill targets for the construction of schools, preschool establishments, hospitals, polyclinics, and clubs. The situation with the provision of various goods and services for the consumer market is improving. Food supplies to the republic's population are stable.

Having touched upon this topic, I have to mention the following. Of late, all kind of rumors and fabrications abound on the introduction of ration coupons on certain essential goods—sugar, butter, and also soap and washing powder, to be specific. These rumors are being spread by irresponsible people acting out of mercenary motives. Today I want to impress on you, and all the working people, that these rumors are unfounded. It is true that coupons on individual food products have been introduced in certain parts of the country. However, we are able to meet the population's food requirements. And those who are spreading the rumors must be rebuffed because all rumors serve to destabilize the situation.

The achievements of restructuring in socioeconomic areas are inseparably linked with democratic transformations in the life of society, the enhancement of the political and civic self-awareness of the masses, and the strengthening of positions on new thinking and glasnost as the fundamental principle of the party's policy.

The style and methods of the leadership at all levels of party and economic work are changing. We have established the practice of selecting cadres on a democratic basis which offers an alternative.

However, it must also be admitted that there are people in our republic who yearn for the times of stagnation. They would like the atmosphere of total license to return because it favors abuses and narrow local interests. Under the guise of democratization and glasnost these people try to defend their selfish interests. By exploiting the facts they are openly exposing shortcomings and refashioning them to suit themselves. They are trying to cast aspersions on the healthy processes under way in the republic. There are not many such people here, but they do exist. We will combat them, but we will combat them in an atmosphere of glasnost. I believe that the decisive say here belongs to labor collectives and primary party organizations. They must rebut people who like to slander, write anonymous letters, and behave dishonestly.

We will keep a close watch on anything that has any bearing on the moral and psychological climate, the political situation, and interethnic relations.

Today we can take pride in the fact that the situation in the republic is healthy and normal. Considerable credit for this belongs to the mass media.

The press is indeed one of the most important levers of restructuring. The activity of the mass media is an important manifestation and an instrument of glasnost and democracy.

The party has entrusted the the mass media with implementing the policy of glasnost. It was emphasized at the 19th All-Union Party Conference that the consistent expansion of glasnost is an indispensable condition of the renewal of socialism and the development of the process of democratization in all spheres of social life. Guided by the Leninist precept that the masses must know everything, be able to judge everything, and tackle everything consciously, the party regards the activity of the mass media as the exercise of the people's inalienable right to know the truth, be able to obtain full and objective information about everything that is happening in society, and openly to express their opinion.

The work of the press, radio, and television is not just a way of implementing the policy of glasnost, not just a means of elucidating the processes of restructuring, but also a kind of indicator of the progress of restructuring itself. By the state of affairs in the press it is possible to judge the style and methods of work of party committees and measure the unity of views in the ranks of the participants of restructuring. Now let us together take a look at how fully the work of the mass media matches the demands of the times and serves the aims of consolidating all the social forces surrounding the ideas and principles of restructuring.

I believe that not one of you will question the need for the mass media to be a forum for debate. It is necessary to air different opinions, but this must happen before decisions are adopted. After decisions have been adopted, there must be ideological unity. Without the ideological unity of Communists the party will get nowhere. Once a decision has been adopted, all efforts must be channeled into its implementation. This is a statutory demand of the party. V.I. Lenin reminded us of this more than once. This demand also rang out in the speeches of the participants in the latest CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

In the work of party committees paramount importance is being attached to the skill of using political methods, the ability to communicate with the masses, to persuade people, and to demonstrate ideological convictions and devotion to socialism by personal example.

Recently a small group of people made an attempt to set up a so-called people's movement in Mary. At the moment the most unlikely rumors are circulating in the republic. What can I say in this context? The group is made up of a number of teachers, artists, and one lawyer. At first glance it appears that these people are expressing concern at the situation in the economy, in interethnic relations, and the ecology. It must be noted that all their aspirations coincide with the aims of the republic party organizations and the work of the soviets, trade unions, and the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]. So why create a new sociopolitical structure? It is no more than pandering to fashion, it is blind and absurd imitation. After all, their program is a carbon copy of the program of a movement established in one of the Baltic republics, where the sociopolitical situation is totally different.

These people were invited to the oblast soviet executive committee. A frank conversation took place with the participation of workers, kolkhoz members, representatives of the intelligentsia, and leaders of party and soviet organs. It was proposed to them: Work together with us, the party, the soviets, and trade unions. Become involved in solving the problems which in your opinion have yet to be tackled in the republic. Who is stopping you? Every participant in that meeting had the opportunity to express his opinion, his viewpoint concerning the social development of the republic.

It emerged that the initiators themselves had nothing specific to propose. They had nothing to offer apart from their ambition, their desire to draw attention to themselves, to posture as leaders with the help of demagoguery rather than actions. It must be noted that the attitude of the rank and file kolkhoz members, workers, and employees who took part in the discussion had an impact on those who wanted to establish a people's movement. In the process of a thorough discussion they were persuaded that the development of the republic does not require the establishment of any new sociopolitical structures. In the end they themselves, without any pressure having been exerted, decided to give up the idea.

The irresponsibility of certain citizens and the thoughtlessness of their actions are also reflected in the dissemination of different rumors and unlikely stories, which is what happened recently on the eve of the "Ashkhabad Spring Festival" holiday. Rumors were rife in the city that clashes between people of different nationalities would take place during the festivities. Nothing like that happened, nor could it have happened. The holiday went well, it demonstrated the cohesion and friendship between our people. However, even after this some people found it necessary to stir up rumors that there would be disturbances during the May Day festivities. What can be said about all this? It would be wrong not to mention all these phenomena and rumors.

These rumors are being spread by the enemies of restructuring, opponents of the republic's chosen course toward tranquillity, businesslike conduct, cohesion, and unity among the representatives of the various nations and ethnic groups inhabiting sunny Turkmenistan. We, party officials and Communists, must be able to conduct a dialogue with all strata of society, we must be able to persuade people, to mobilize them for restructruing and for the renewal of life. And we must be assisted in this work by the news media. They must not sidestep these problems, they must assess them correctly and produce answers to the questions which perturb the working people.

The republic Communist Party Central Committee will continue to wage a struggle against these elements. It is the duty of every Communist, of all honest workers, and especially workers in the news media to keep explaining the essence of the processes taking place in the republic and to rebut rumors and fabrications aimed at destabilizing the situation.

It is true that there are difficulties and shortcomings in our republic. The Central Committee is aware of them. Literally a few days ago a special resolution on the development of the socioeconomic potential of Tashauz Oblast was adopted. It is necessary to tackle these questions rather than indulge in expatiation and speculate on our shortcomings.

It is important at this conference not just to acquaint ourselves with the various viewpoints but also to try to elaborate opinions capable of serving as a stimulus in getting rid of the many sins which, unfortunately, are still quite frequent in the work of our press.

With respect to the participation of the mass media in the process of restructuring in general it can be said that it is determined above all by the nature and the worth of the articles. It is necessary to define clearly which articles work in favor of restructuring and which articles do not.

The wealth of analytical, thematic, and critical articles in the press and statements on radio and television is only to be welcomed. However, in itself the abundance of critical articles and statements which have appeared of late is by no means synonymous with the new high standard of work required of journalists. I would like you all to help us. It is important not to drive a wedge between leaders and primary party orgnizations, between the Central Committee and the population. Nothing is easier than subjecting party apparatus officials to wholesale criticism. It is true that there are also unworthy leaders who abuse their position, and they must, of course, be subjected to criticism. However, it is impermissible to identify individuals with the party as a whole.

A patronizing tone often predominates in our critical articles, and there is a tendency toward stridency and cheap sensationalism, and toward exploiting so-called "unsavory facts." At the same time there is a lack of intelligent, well-reasoned polemizing and constructive ideas, and the effectiveness of some of the articles is low. Many rubrics and sections have been introduced in the press for the purpose of the elucidation of restructuring processes, but frequently their content does not correspondend to the original intention. They do little to explain the essence of the new methods of management and the workings of the economic mechanism.

The problem today lies in ensuring a better knowledge of the new forms of economic work. [passage omitted]

We are living in crucial, revolutionary times. Life itself is presenting us with many problems and demanding their profound interpretation and rapid solution. In the national economy, in social life, wherever you care to look there are complex questions assimilating the new thinking, mastering progressive methods of management, combatting bureaucratic flaws, upholding the spiritual purity of society, laying the foundations of the rule-of-law state... Wherever you look, whether questions of interethnic relations, the ecology, the utilization of natural resources, health care, or public education—everywhere there are problems which are demanding a prompt solution. It is here that true journalistic skill can come into its own.

When focusing on the causes of the flaws and miscalculations in the work of the mass media in our republic it must, obviously, be admitted that our journalist corps still lacks the appropriate theoretical, organizational, and material and technical backup for its work. There is little evidence of purposefulness in the system of training journalist cadres and enhancing their professional skills. A unity of views and aspirations between journalists and party committee officials is often lacking.

We have gathered such a representative forum of the republic journalist council here today in order to identify the weak links in the mechanisms of your activity, to find the correct organizational basis, exchange positive experience, and outline the thrust of collective efforts. I believe that those gathered here are fully capable of making a competent and exacting analysis of the work of the mass media in the period of restructuring, concretizing the tasks of the press in conditions of democratization and glasnost, and contributing to the consolidation of the efforts of party committees and creative collectives in solving the tasks of revolutionary renewal.

The effectiveness of the work of the mass news and propaganda media is the common concern of a wide circle of interested parties and first and foremost of party committees. And therefore we have invited both professional journalists and party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol, and economic organ officials to take part in our debate today. Together we will ponder the problems confronting journalism.

Let us consult, work, and decide...

The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee is firmly convinced that the republic journalist corps will make its contribution to the nationwide cause—the elimination of shortcomings and the solution of overdue problems.

Allow me to avail myself of this opportunity on behalf of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, the Turkmen Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the government of the republic to congratulate you and, through you, the large detachment of the republic's journalists on upcoming holidays which also include your own professional holidays—Press Day and Radio Day—and to wish you good health, great happiness, and new creative successes in your difficult and responsible work.

Soldier Recounts Tbilisi Military Action

LD1105145089 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 18, 4-10 May 89 p 7

[Letter from unnamed Lithuanian soldier to unnamed friend entitled: "A Soldier's Letter From Tbilisi"]

[Text] Hello (...) I don't have any stationery, so don't mind my cramped writing style. On Sunday 9 April, our unit was roused at 11 o'clock, under "alert" [preceding word in latinized Russian] conditions. By 1500 we were

already airborne, but no one knew our destination. We deplaned about 1800 at Tbilisi Airport. Following some quick preparations, we were deployed into the city. We looked pretty good. We had changed into camouflage clothing, bulletproof vests, helmets; we were armed with automatics, clubs in hand and spades strung across our backs. We were issued berets. This makes you feel 10 times better than wearing a hat.

Now listen, between 9 and 10 o'clock at night, just as the commandant's orders went into effect, a huge demonstration approached our location. They started throwing rocks, wounding several of our men, but that's nothing yet. An order was given to advance with spades in hand. Imagine how we must have felt, especially since... I don't know why I am so terribly **ashamed**, just like a bunch of barbarians!

They were shouting: Russians, get out. The crowd was well-dressed, made up of people who appeared cultured. Here, they dress better than in Lithuania. Their footwear is especially nice. I've become distracted by trivia. Several of them started fighting, and an order was issued to disperse them.

There were only 100 of us, but thousands of them. It was a night filled with terror, which I shall not forget as long as I live. How would you feel standing in one spot, in formation with friends who began to hack everyone with their spades. Our spades were not large, but one could impale them into a tree, from a distance of 10 meters. All this blood, screams, cries, groans, and you can't do anything, but go along, and that's all. But to hack people up with shovels! Right in front of my eyes, a woman was struck across the head with a spade and, all covered with blood. She fell at my feet. No one paid any attention to see whether it was a child, a woman, or an elderly man. The fact is (...) are dead, 120 are wounded; 27 of us were taken to the hospital.

I wanted to escape. It would have taken just a little more. Many of the Lithuanians controlled themselves, but as for these others.... Some of them were joking, and talking about how they struck the demonstrators. I can't bear to look at my former friends. I feel like I could strike them in a similar fashion. We attempted to explain some things to them, but they told us: If you jump around a lot, we will do the same at your home place. They are not human beings.

We had to stand [guard] all day. Every other car in the city carried a black band, a sign of mourning. But we, like some sort of the perverts, stopped the cars, tore off the bands, and searched each vehicle. People approached us with questions: You came here to kill us. Why were you hacking at us with spades? Have you no heart? It would have been better if you had shot at us, instead of attacking us with spades. I cried out to them that I did not do any hacking and showed them my sandy spade. I told them where I come from things are the same. Later, they brought some food and envelopes for me, right up to my post. I then wrote a short message while standing guard as I didn't have much time to write. It's such a beautiful city and I like it a lot.

The people urged me to escape, but I told them I would be caught and considered a wartime deserter since the unit was on military alert. We lived in tents at the edge of the city. There were 100 of us. We ate outdoors, using water jars and kettles. There were no toilets. Mornings, they brought us a barrel of water. We had not slept yet.

We only managed to set everything up by 11 April. Now we are going to start alternating 24-hour duty shifts between the post and camp. During those 24 hours on duty one can't even feel one's feet. Such exhaustion; our clothing weighs 12 kg, and yet, we have those heavy boots on our feet. It was hot.

Tonight, the night of 11 to 12 April, we could hear shots from behind corners. What will happen next? Our nerves were constantly on edge. We had invited those shots with our spades. If a car failed to stop, we were permitted to shoot.

I have not written a letter to mother yet, but I did send her a brief message to let her know I am in Tbilisi. Please tell her about this since I won't have time to write. I have no return address for the time being and have to give the letter to other people to mail. I may wind up in prison for writing this to you.

Situation in Moldavia Featured on Moscow TV

LD1105224889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 May 89

[I. Petkov video report from Moldavia; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The sociopolitical situation in Moldavia and the tasks of party organizations in implementing the directives of the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum were discussed at today's plenum in Kishinev by the republic's Communist Party Central Committee.

[Petkov] At the present time social, cultural, economic, and ecological problems and disorders are assuming a nationalist color in the republic. Meetings attended by many thousands of people, which are being held every Sunday in Kishinev, show that there is no let-up to either the antidepartmental or the antinational egoism, which is tending moreover toward an unpredictable deformation. [video shows street scenes]

Here is some footage of the first such meetings that we have photographed, where there are altogether understandable slogans about the revival of the national language and the Latin script. Now here is the latest meeting

with placards proclaiming: "Down with the government!" and "Down with the colonialists!" and with the waving of the tricolor flag. [video shows large open air meeting with slogans and flags; speaker shown on stage with flag]

Extremist restructurers are intensifying passions and, it cannot be denied, are driving a wedge between the various peoples that have since time immemorial lived in Moldavia. In this disturbed situation the Gagauz people, who reside compactly in the south of the republic, have already met and demanded autonomy for their region. This is happening in what is already tiny Moldavia. [Video shows Petkov speaking with a group of four people]

[Petkov] Members of the Central Committee [as heard], how have we come to this in the republic?

[I.Z. Kotorobay, worker, identified by screen caption] It seems to me that all these problems that are now arising—I mean the meetings and demonstrations and all the organizations, the informal organizations—have simply been left to go their own way and have been let out of sight.

[Petkov] How then can one get out of this situation and rectify the situation in the republic?.

[L.P. Shutka, teacher, identified by screen caption] I think that first of all one needs to consolidate all forces to tackle the posed problems on the same social issues. There is an ideological commission attached to the party Central Committee which should not so much increase its work as begin it. This work has not been carried out.

'Yedinstvo' Group Replies to Moldavian Prosecutor

PM1005152989 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIA in Russian 28 Apr 89 p 3

["Yedinstvo" International Movement Action Group's "Open Letter to Moldavian SSR Prosecutor Comrade N.K. Demidenko"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Prosecutor!

On 29 March this year, MOLDOVA SOCHIALISTE and SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA published your letter to the leaders, members, and supporters of the informal associations operating within the republic. Your appeal urged the latter to put an end to the manifestations of extremism, chauvinism, and nationalism, eliminate the confrontation that has arisen out of this, and stop breaches of law and public order in Kishinev. You instructed the leaders of the informal associations to publicly condemn such phenomena and actions. We ardently support all your ideas and proposals and at the same time we want to clarify certain points.

The members and supporters of the "Yedinstvo" International Movement have not held a single unsanctioned rally or demonstration, they have not urged people to come out onto the streets and squares of the city, and have not written or published articles and literary works containing any chauvinist or nationalist ideas or words to offend anyone's national honor and dignity.

Since its formation the "Yedinstvo" International Movement has proclaimed the basic principle of its activity to be internationalism and its main aim to be to strengthen the friendship and fraternity between the peoples of our republic and the entire Soviet Union. We advocated and still do advocate equality for all nations and ethnic groups and all languages and dialects without any privileges. We have pledged and urge all the republic's citizens to piously maintain this principle, which we were bequeathed by the great Lenin. We favor restructuring, unity, solidarity, the development of democracy, the transformation of the economy, and a prosperous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] as part of a united, great, and powerful USSR.

We welcome the process of developing national self-awareness that is now taking its course in Moldavia and fully share the Moldavian people's concern over the future of their language and culture. We are prepared to make every effort to help the Moldavian people solve these problems.

However, the "Yedinstvo" International Movement cannot accept the fact that all the misfortunes that have now afflicted our economy, sphere of culture, science, education, and so on are sometimes ascribed to one nation and blamed on one people.

Attempts to make any nation bear responsibility for the fact that the culture of the Gagauz and Bulgarians and the economy in the south of the republic are still at their former level would not serve to consolidate all the forces within society. We are in favor of Moldavia's Ukrainian population speaking the language called "Surzhik" in common parlance. We do not wholly reproach any one people or any one nation for the fact that the Yiddish language is still in a lamentable state.

Last, we do not reproach anyone for the fact that no one now knows the names of the dozens of Russian medics who saved Moldavians from the plague, cholera, trachoma, and typhus epidemics and died performing their civic duty; or the names of the hundreds of Russian engineers and specialists who helped restore and develop Moldavia's totally shattered economy in the postwar years. We do not blame anyone for the fact that there is still no memorial, plaque, or cross over the tomb of the 2,000 Soviet soldiers whom the fascists incinerated in Kishinev...

No one people and no one nation are to blame for this!

The responsibility for all our common misfortunes should rest with the Stalinist system of the past, which has still not been fully extirpated from many people's consciousness. With the thoughtless economic voluntarists. With the men of the "era of stagnation" who endeavored to drive all the problems deep into our public organism. The people who are today making an all-out attempt to preserve the notorious administrative-edict system—officials and bureaucrats who are prepared to sell and betray the people's interests for the sake of their jobs—are to blame for our common misfortunes.

The recent tragic events in Tbilisi have once again convinced us that disregard for the demands of conscious discipline, organization, and strict observance of legality can entail extremely grave consequences. All the problems we are facing must be resolved together in an atmosphere of friendship, cooperation, and mutual understanding. That is why we fully support the conclusions you drew in your letter regarding the inadmissibility of extremism, violations of public order, and the kindling of interethnic confrontation.

We urge all members and supporters of the "Yedinstvo" International Movement, along with the members and supporters of all other informal associations, to strengthen internationalism in word and deed and deal a sharp rebuff to chauvinists and nationalists of every stamp and hue.

We categorically oppose the supplanting of democracy by total permissiveness. We will never allow anyone to put our Red Banner—the banner under which the revolution was accomplished and under which our fathers and grandfathers went to battle during the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars—in a museum.

Our banner symbolizes the international fraternity between the peoples—the sacred fraternity whose strength will overcome all the obstacles to prosperity, happiness, and peace.

Estonian Police Confront Armored Vehicles Convoy
LD1105094689 Tallinn HOMELAND in English 26 Apr 89 p 1

[By Tarmu Tammerk]

[Excerpt] The presence of armoured caterpillar vehicles on the streets of Tallinn in mid-April was unauthorized, and the Estonian traffic police had to let the war machines enter the city under threat of force.

This was revealed in an article in the Estonian Communist party daily RAHVA HAAL (Voice of the People) on April 19.

In the article Harri Lumi, the mayor of Tallinn, bluntly states that the military had no permission from the Tallinn city authorities to come to the streets of Tallinn with crawler vehicles.

In the same story Hellat Rumvolt, head of the Estonian traffic police, describes a foiled attempt of his agency to stop the column of vehicles from entering Tallinn.

After learning of armoured vehicles approaching Tallinn a traffic police squad rushed to meet them. Sighting the vehicles in a suburb of Tallinn the police blocked the road with their car. The column stopped, and a colonel told the police to clear the road immdiately or else "we'll run over your car."

"Since our car was brand-new we vacated the road," Hellat Rumvolt says in the article. The column of seven armored personnel carries and several heavy-duty vehicles continued their journey to the Estonian capital, followed by the police car.

Qualifying the incident as a severe breach of traffic regulations Hellatt Rumvolt says, "this once again shows that for the military nothing is sacred, and that their arbitrariness is tremendous."

According to a transport industry official the damage done to Estonian roads by the combat vehicles in the second week of April is considerable but hard to estimate at present.

For the large part of their journey the armoured vehicles used the M-12 international motorway that enables foreigners who travel by boat from Finland to Estonia, to continue by car through the Baltic states and Belorussia to Poland and vice versa.

The rather unexpected sight of armoured vehicles on the streets was witnessed not only by Tallinners but also by residents of several other towns of Estonia.

Thus, for instance, on April 13 many people in the Estonian university town of Tartu awoke not to the sound of their alarm clocks but the noises made by a group of military vehicles. Later in the day a preplanned student demonstraton took place in the town, condemning the present situation in the Soviet Army and calling for setting up national-territorial army units.

Despite assertions from the military authorities that the troops activity is but part of "routine exercises" the military numbers performed on the peaceful streets of Estonian towns in mid-April have widedly been seen here as an attempt to intimidate popular movements. Similar appearances of armoured vehicles are reported to have been occurred also in the neighbouring Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania.

In its resolution on the political situation the Popular Front organization of Tartu University, for example, declares it is "unacceptable to use the army for a public show of strength." [passage omitted]

Latvian Party Commission Reviews Cadre Work

PM1105101189 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[LATINFORM correspondent V. Ter-Oganesov report under the rubric "At the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee": "The Main Thing Is Unity and Discipline"]

[Text] The first session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Commission on Party Organizational and Cadre Work has been held under the chairmanship of V.P. Sobolev, second secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. The commission's terms of reference were discussed, duties allocated among its members, and a work plan for 1989 was ratified.

Among the priority issues the session examined the tasks of boosting the ranks of the republic party organization under present-day conditions and strengthening party discipline.

What is the idea of the commission? This became immediately clear as soon as the session participants embarked on examining the statute which will regulate its activities. Hardly any of the Central Committee members and candidate members in attendance stayed silent or failed to make a businesslike proposal. As a result the basic tasks and avenues of the work were formulated.

It is no secret that in the past Central Committee members sometimes only learned about the agenda for a plenum shortly before the plenum itself, that they were essentially unable to look in depth at the range of problems under discussion, and that the lion's share of the preparatory work fell to the apparatus. With the setting up of the commission it is planned to make the leadership of party organizational and cadre work genuinely collective, and to make it possible to resolve strategic and operational matters on a fundamentally new and higher basis.

"We will have to make a serious study of political work among the masses in order to rally and unite all social formations in the struggle for restructuring and social renewal," V.P. Sobolev said. "It will be necessary to study the main problems of party organization and cadre work. Having revealed shortcomings and the reasons behind them, we will inform the Central Committee Bureau and strive to eradicate the shortcomings."

The commission is meant to study and systematize proposals from party organizations and Communists on party building issues, to formulate its own recommendations on that basis, and to provide conclusions on draft documents submitted for discussion by the entire party and people.

Bearing in mind the quite extensive range of the commission's activity, the session participants resolved to organize its work in sections. The first section will monitor fulfillment of adopted party decisions and will study, generalize, and disseminate experience of the democratization of intraparty life. The second section will tackle the problems of boosting party ranks and strengthening party discipline. The third section will study the features of cadre work. Finally, the fourth section will be tasked with keeping its finger on the pulse of public opinion, forecasting the development of the masses' sociopolitical activeness, and providing assistance to rayon and city party organizations. The opportunity for commission members to attend any conference or party city committee and rayon committee [raykom] plenum, and to monitor the work of Central Committee apparatus staffers is a condition of considerable importance for the commission's activity.

All this will ultimately promote the commission's elaboration of practical recommendations for city and rayon party organizations regarding the forms and methods of the work to fulfill the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference and to provide organizational and political backup for the fulfillment of other party provisions. It was in this constructive atmosphere that both topic-related questions—reports on which were delivered by G.N. Loskutov, chief of a Central Committee department; and S.S. Palora, chairman of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Commission—were examined at the first commission session.

It was noted that during the period of restructuring the ranks of the republic's Communist Party have been replenished with convinced advocates of the radical renewal of all aspects of society's life. These are people who assess the situation soberly and do not lose their heads over information about the repressions under the Stalin regime or various kinds of negative phenomena during the years of stagnation. They do not forget that it was the party that revealed all these abuses of power, and the party that initiated restructuring.

At the same time, those present expressed justifiable alarm in connection with the following points. Despite the fact that the party has recently rejected the strict regulation of new members, as a whole their numbers throughout the republic are falling. At the same time, the number of people being expelled from the CPSU "at their own request" is growing.

The session participants focused on the cause of this situation. One of the main causes—and this was frankly stated—is the decline in the prestige of the republic party organization, which to all intents and purposes has been passively sitting on the fence on a number of topical issues of the domestic political situation.

"At the same time," Kh.E. Plauks, first secretary of Liyepaya Party City Committee, stressed in his speech, "party prestige as a whole is based on the actions of specific Communists. We are adopting many good resolutions, but all of us are by no means doing as much as we could to carry them out. Consequently our prestige is declining. One other point. Sometimes the republic's mass media cover the same events—such as events in prewar history or the February demonstrations by the International Front—in different ways. This means that Communists, particularly in outlying districts, are unable to get a clear idea of events or a correct handle on the situation."

I would note that the Liyepaya Communist leader's last idea prompted the following objection: How are we supposed to get along without pluralism of opinions—is it not arguments that bring the truth to light? Incidentally, the sharp polemics of the discussion were also a feature of the commission session itself. You could see for yourself just how right it was to set up this and other Central Committee commissions.

Talking about the reasons for the reduction in the growth of party ranks and for Communists leaving the CPSU, the session participants particularly noted the fact that party leaders of city and rayon components are not very frequent visitors to labor collectives, and that proposals to make Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenums and bureau sessions open to the press have been on the table for a long time. Yet Central TV had an opportunity to cover the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum. Judging by the agreement reached at the meeting between Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau members and USSR people's deputies elected from the republic, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will now be following suit.

"Many Communist leaders," L.V. Petrov, Central Committee member and controller at the "Sarkanays Kvadrats" Association, said, "have still not restructured their own work and yet are demanding that their subordinates embrace restructuring. I think they should start with themselves first. That would be an example not only to Communists but also to those who will join the party in the future."

G.V. Yane, candidate member of the Central Committee and tractor driver at the "Antse" collective farm [kolkhoz] in Ventspilsskiy Rayon, dwelt on the problem of the size of Communists' membership dues.

"I am convinced," he said, "that for many of those who have recently been leaving party ranks, this plays a definite role. I am particularly thinking of rural people. Prices are going up, but the dues are as much as they ever were."

V.P. Varnas, first secretary of Balvskiy party raykom, proposed immediately resolving a number of ideological problems. For instance, in his opinion there has long been a need to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's" in the assessment of the events of 1939-1940.

"The main thing is unity and discipline," P.B. Patenko, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic People's Control Committee. "The lack of unity in our ranks was the reason why not a single [party] worker was elected in the republic's territorial and national-territorial okrugs in the USSR people's deputy elections. The working class is the foundation stone of our party. Yet at enterprises, kolkhozes, and state farms [sovkhozes] the role of the National Front of Latvia and the International Front is more evident than that of party organizations. Can people fail to notice this?"

"We should pay serious attention to the selection and training of secretaries in primary and shop party organizations," V.Ya. Brokan, candidate member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and chief editor of the journal KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII, said. "Right now our part-time party leaders include many inexperienced people with a poor grasp of the basics of party work."

Many specific proposals aimed at enhancing the prestige of the party and strengthening its ranks were made by session participants A.M. Maksimkina, member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and regulator at the "Radiotekhnika" Association; V.S. Teyvans, first secretary of Leningradskiy party raykom, and others:

"I propose getting away from doing things behind closed doors and presenting party cards to people entering CPSU ranks at their labor collectives rather than at the party raykom";

"I propose setting up an institute of honored party members. We will show genuine compassion and be concerned for every one of comrades who is sick or frail, leaving nobody in trouble—least of all when Communists need protection";

"I propose increasing demandingness toward would-be candidate members of the CPSU. But what is happening? Last year we accepted everyone who wanted to be a candidate, yet more than 300 of them were rejected as CPSU members. We must reestablish a school for young Communists";

"I propose not allowing those who decide to break with the party to leave so easily. There is no need to persuade people, of course, but we should make investigations and help people in their difficult situation. In short, we need an individual approach to each case."

These and other proposals expressed during the commission will be generalized. Recommendations on their implementation will be sent to the republic's party organizations.

Constitutionality of Latvian Party Questioned

18000855 Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 24 Mar 89 p 3

[Letter from A. Paul, CPSU member since 1966, under the rubric "The Reader Asks": "Constitution and Party"]

[Text] Dear Editor:

Recently a very large amount has been written about the constitutional rights of sociopolitical and other organizations. I decided to familiarize myself more thoroughly with the USSR and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] constitutions.

Article 6 in both constitutions read completely identically: "The guiding and directing force in Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of state and social organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the nation and serves the nation."

On my party record card it is stated that I am a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

But the words on the building of our Central Committee in Riga read, "Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia." On the building of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Party Committee [raykom] (I live in that rayon and am listed on the rolls there) the words read, "Oktyabrskiy Rayon Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia." And yet in absolutely no constitution is there any mention of the existence of the Communist Party of Latvia, and consequently no rights have been given to that party. In the USSR Constitution it is stipulated that the makeup of the Soviet Union includes the Latvian SSR, but in the Constitution of Latvian SSR there is not even any stipulation of the existence of the Communist Party of Latvia. It may be that this matter is explained in certain instruction guides or official acts, but it does not exist in the basic laws of the union or of Latvia.

Thus, it turns out that all the apparatuses of the rayon and city committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia are unconstitutional, or, as people now say, informal organizations.

Could you please dispel my doubts?

[Signed] A. Paul, member of the CPSU since 1966

Latvian Jewish Culture Society Pickets in Riga

18000911 Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 24 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by Andrey Dozortsev: "LOYeK Pickets City Executive Committee"]

[Text] For exactly 50 minutes a group of representatives of the Latvian Society for Jewish Culture [LOYeK] staged a demonstration expressing its attitude to a sore question in front of the city hall. That measure, which was undertaken by the society on 22 March, became a new twist in LOYeK's struggle for the building that is known in Riga by the name of Jewish House. I recall that the house was built in 1913, using money provided by Riga's Jewish community and was nationalized in 1940 by the Soviet authority. The issue of tranferring the building arose immediately after the constituent congress of LOYeK last autumn and has not yet been resolved.

A brief chronology of the dialogue between the society and the authorities looks like this.

December—thousands of signatures in favor of transferring the building to the society. Signature of the new chairman of the committee for culture, R. Paul: approved.

Somewhat later—at a meeting between the republic leadership and students, Ya. Vagris and I. Kezbers express their support of LOYeK.

Somewhat later—in a private conversation with LOYeK chairman E. Rapinya, A. Gorbunov expresses his support.

04.12.88—LOYeK official letter to I. Kezbers.

03.01.89—LOYeK letter to V. Bresis.

Everyone agrees, but with the proviso that for 2 years LOYeK will share the building with the puppet theater that had proven to be homeless.

Somewhat later—LOYeK's contract with the puppet theater is transferred to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers.

Journalists' congress—M. Vulfson directs a question concerning the building to V. Bresis. Answer: The matter will be resolved together with the matter of a building for the NFL [Latvian People's Front].

Somewhat later—NFL resolution to the effect that the two issues should not be linked artificially....

It seemed that the problem was at the point of being resolved at any minute. But suddenly the issue was readdressed to the city executive committee [ispolkom] "as a result of the fact that the transfer from one balance

sheet to another of a building with a value of less than half a million rubles is carried out by the city ispolkom." That was the decree of the Council of Ministers.

Early February—at a meeting between A. Rubins and representatives of all the cultural societies, the city mayor reports that he does not have any papers concerning the Jewish Home.

17 February—Official LOYeK letter to A. Rubins....

And then the most recent report—in the first 10-day period of March, K. Litsis, manager of the Council of Ministers, states that the building will not be transferred....

Once again the matter is up in the air. So it was then that people picketed for the first time. It was the first time because the society is ready to picket the city ispolkom every Wednesday until the building is transferred to its true owner.

P.S. In casting one's glance over the brief chronology of the fight for the building, one wants to ask how quickly and how productively the global tasks of restructuring will be resolved if what is essentially the insignificant problem of transferring the building to LOYeK has been blown out of proportions for several months by the republic leaders, public opinion, the press, television, etc.

Further Details on Riga Bomb Scare Reported

PM1105081989 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 28 Apr 89 p 4

[Article by LATINFORM correspondent S. Prokoshenko: "What Does Provocation Cost?"]

[Text] A disappointment awaited those who were hoping to do some preholiday shopping in Riga's Central Department Store on the afternoon of 27 April. The narrow streets adjoining the store were cordoned off by militiamen. Rumors multiplied among the crowd and telephones rang constantly in the editorial offices of newspapers, television, and radio: What has happened?

This question, asked by your LATINFORM correspondent, was answered by Colonel V.F. Bugay, acting chief of the Riga City Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration. He let me listen to a recording of a telephone call received at the administration's duty desk at 1120 hours. An unknown person uttered just one short sentence: "An explosive device was placed in Riga's Central Department Store 15 minutes ago." All subsequent actions by the militia were dictated by considerations of ensuring the safety of shoppers and workers in the store as quickly as possible.

A few minutes after the call duty inspector Lieutenant I.B. Belyayev was already in the store. It was he who had taken the call and reported it to the city duty officer.

Belyayev: Judging by the voice, the caller was a young man. He spoke Russian in a calm voice, with no outward signs of nervousness. After one sentence, however, he hung up. I reported the call to the duty officer and was ordered by him to proceed to the store. R.M. Lomikovskiy, deputy director in charge of personnel, and N.S. Kabakova, secretary of the department store party committee, were there from the management. They acted with efficiency and speed: At 1145 the store public address system announced that the store would be closing immediately for technical reasons. Administration representatives personally did the rounds of the departments, explaining the situation. Store workers who belonged to civil defense formations took all measures necessary to evacuate the shoppers. Within 25 minutes not a single superfluous person remained in the store. The surrounding area was cordoned off by members of the Kirovskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee [Rayispolkom] Internal Affairs Department.

N.S. Kabakova, secretary of the Riga Central Department Store party committee: To be honest, this is the first time the skills acquired during civil defense exercises have come in handy for us. We were primarily concerned about people's safety, of course. But the safeguarding of money and valuable goods on sale was not the least of our concerns either. It was all immediately put into special safes. It should be said that department store workers took the event in their stride, without panic. We hope that this incident will prove to be just a provocation. The main thing here is undoubtedly its adverse effect upon the public. But for us all this also has a financial aspect—every workday lost costs us at least R500,000. Yet we think we'll meet the monthly plan. And the May Day celebration meeting will be held, albeit a day late. [Kabakova ends]

...Sappers have already been at work in the department store for some hours now. They have quite a lot of work ahead of them, but it is hoped nevertheless that the store will be open to shoppers before the day ends. A kind of headquarters had been set up in the office of department store director E.B. Rudusan. I talked with Major V.A. Kipen, chief of the Kirovskiy Rayispolkom Internal Affairs Department.

"Such incidents in places where people congregate in large numbers destabilize public life in the republic," he said. "I would remind people that the Riga Central Department Store has around 75,000 customers a day. I should say that we have encountered such incidents increasingly often lately. In January a similar provocation occurred in a food store on the corner of Lenin and Lachplesh Streets. On 26 April a young person who had brought a home-made firework to a hockey match was injured at the Riga Sports Palace. The sappers will finish their work in a while, the store will open, and we will continue looking for the people responsible for the incident. We ask the people of Riga to telephone us on 02 to report any facts which may help us establish the identity of the caller."

...At 1730 the Riga Central Department Store opened its doors to shoppers again. No explosive device was discovered.

Lithuania's Brazauskas Press Day News Conference
PM1105153589 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 May 89 p 1

[ELTA report: "For Civic Boldness and a Firm Stance: Press Day Celebrated"]

[Excerpts] Vilnius, 5 May—Press Day was celebrated at the Art Workers Center today.

The celebration was opened by Domas Shnyukas, chairman of the Lithuanian Journalists Union Board and chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. [passage omitted]

The floor was then taken by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. It is hard to imagine a national revival in the late 20th century without the press. The press has achieved a lot in propagandizing the achievements of science, culture, and enlightenment. The press, radio, and television have educated a large detachment of journalists, and the sphere of the mass media's influence has expanded. The importance of journalism in the period of restructuring can be summed up in brief: It has played a remarkable role in changes which gratify us all. [passage omitted]

At the same time, the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee noted that the press, television, and radio still carry superficial, unprofessional, and hastily prepared material and programs. Authors at times pursue cheap popularity, articles and programs are short on objectivity. It is an important task to learn democracy and the culture of debate. Unfortunately, the press often sets what is not quite the best example. If someone's views do not coincide with views that have already been stated, people do not strive to persuade by argument and uphold their positions. They simply tag on labels. People must be helped to find their way better in the complex contemporary political and economic situation, and new forms of economic management must be propagandized.

Algirdas Brazauskas then gave a press conference. The first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee answered questions from press, television, and radio journalists and publishing house workers.

Question: The latest cutback in the management apparatus was highly promising, but ultimately the number of workers in this sphere even increased in places. Do you not see this as an example of how persistently the braking mechanism is operating on restructuring?

Answer: The management apparatus has been and will be cut back. Now, however, there are growing numbers of enterprises and associations beginning to work in conditions of economic autonomy, and they set their own management personnel numbers. Today nobody knows precisely yet how many management workers will be needed to ensure that basic production links operate in the best possible way. On the other hand, isolated figures mean nothing in the economy. Everything must be compared with something else.

Question: But what form will the republic's economic autonomy take in 1990?

Answer: The law on the republic's economic autonomy will be discussed at the 18 May Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session. I would say that this is a step we have been forced to take. The paths we have followed hitherto have so far failed to produce any tangible results. Today it is hard to say specifically to what extent and in which spheres we will be able to fully legitimize the concept of economic autonomy. A lot of complex work lies ahead.

Question: Some people believe that now there is no need to adopt a new constitution, that all that is needed is to introduce certain amendments. What is your opinion?

Answer: We all recall November of last year, when passions flared up and an ardent desire was expressed at the Supreme Soviet session to adopt a new Lithuanian SSR Constitution, without even submitting it to nationwide discussion. Now some people seem to be making a 180-degree turn. It is necessary to listen to every opinion, and especially the opinion of the parliament currently sitting. It is my profoundly held belief that the draft constitution is genuinely contemporary, embraces and legitimizes the fundamental ideals of our sovereignty, and reflects the contemporary political situation in Lithuania. But this is a matter for debate in the more distant future.

Question: The USSR Congress of People's Deputies is drawing nearer. The majority of deputies from our republic are "Sayudis" representatives. What form does your cooperation take, and how are you preparing for the congress?

Answer: We must protect the republic's interests unanimously. We have gotten together several times and discussed quite a few questions. Some of our proposals are bolder, others are more consistent. We consulted each other as to which deputies could be elected to either chamber, and which could represent our deputy corps on commissions or committees. Generally speaking, I perceive no particular confrontation within our group of 57 deputies (one of whom is yet to be elected).

Question: It is said that you have been offered the position of chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities?

Answer: First, I was elected in a territorial electoral okrug. By virtue of that fact alone, I cannot sit in the Soviet of Nationalities. Second, this is the first time I have heard of this. I have no plans to leave Lithuania.

Question: Will the composition of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee be renewed, following the experience of the CPSU Central Committee plenum? Have retirement applications already been received from pensioners who are members of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee?

Answer: This idea has been suggested. A plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee is scheduled for 9 June. True enough, the main item on its agenda will be agriculture questions.

Some Central Committee members are geographically distant from the republic, others are uninvolved in its affairs. We hope that there will be people who will realize the needs posed by present-day party life and will give up their duties as Central Committee members. I cannot say who will do this. Applications have not yet been received.

Question: You said in an interview with SOVETSKAYA KULTURA that at times we find ourselves quite close to a borderline which we have no right to cross, lest we wipe away all the achievements of restructuring. Could you say in which direction we are now moving—closer to or further away from that line?

Answer: We are moving in parallel with the line. As a matter of fact, I said these words prior to the tragic events in Tbilisi on 9 April.

A. Brazauskas also answered other questions from press workers.

The Press Day celebration was also attended by Yu. Paletskis, chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department, and A. Semashka, chief of the Central Committee Mass Media Section.

The press conference was chaired by Ch. Yurshenas, press spokesman for the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Mass Food Poisoning Reported in Ulyanovsk Area

LD1005111689 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 10 May 89

[Text] Ulyanovsk May 10 TASS—Dozens of people have been hospitalized with food poisoning in one of the districts of the Ulyanovsk region in the River Volga area. As of today, 169 people from the Pavlovsk district are in hospital.

Reports about an outbreak of acute intestinal poisoning came from several villages in the area on the night of May 7/8. According to preliminary information, the poisoning was caused by locally produced confectionery.

An investigation has been launched.

Moscow TV Documentary on Pollution in Sumgait

LD1105231189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 11 May broadcasts a 20-minute documentary entitled "The Dead Zone" on pollution in Sumgait which was produced by the Azerbaijan film studios.

The film begins with archive footage of the postwar construction in Sumgait which is followed by clips of Khruschev and Brezhnev visiting Azerbaijan in 1960 and 1970 respectively, and their praise for the rapid development of the republic's chemical industry. Hazardous working conditions in Sumgait's aluminum works are shown. It is stated that the works poison Sumgait's air basin with 70,000 tons of toxic discharges every year and that very many of the staff at the works are ill.

The documentary then goes on to show people living in a shanty town among industrial wasteland. A woman is shown throwing a bucketfull of slops into a stagnant pond with a crowd of children standing around. The commentator says: "How can this be possible today, here in Sumgait, a town that provides the country with R1.6 billion of profit a year? Yet Sumgait has more than 20,000 people living in slums, and as far as infant mortality is concerned, we hold the sad record of coming first in the country." "Some 65 percent of all children are born as blue babies. There isn't enough oxygen in their mother's wombs. And the results of this are mental handicaps and an irreversible degradation of generations," the commentator says.

On discharges into the sea, the commentator states that every year 67 million cubic meters of toxic petrochemical products are poured into the Caspian Sea alone.

The program ends with shots of a man running through wasteland and smashing official plaques by hurling them at the ground. The plaques read: "The USSR State Committee of the Azerbaijani SSR for Environmental Protection" and "The USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature." Finally a clip from one of Gorbachev's speeches is played, with Gorbachev saying: "Is this really the way things should be done under the banner of communism, with both nature in jeopardy and the interests of the people ending up somewhere at the back of the line? Things will not work that way, nor can they work that way, and they are already not working."

Economic

Foreign Economic Relations Expert Interviewed

PM1105140789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 May 89 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with I. Faminskiy, doctor of economic sciences, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Foreign Economic Relations under the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission, by A. Shabashkevich under the rubric "Topical Dialogue": "Hand on Exports"; date and place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] "It is known that state and cooperative enterprises are now permitted to trade on the foreign market. We are faced with the lifting of the monopoly on foreign trade—which, as is known, is the long-standing, longed-for dream of overt (Western) and covert (domestic) capitalists," V. Koshelev, a reader from Leningrad, writes PRAVDA.

The mail contains letters whose writers welcome the long-awaited freedom. It seems to V. Koshelev that the state's foundations are crumbling, while others believe that an open new democratic economy is being born. Who among the letter writers is mistaken?

This was the question that began my conversation with I. Faminskiy, doctor of economic sciences, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Foreign Economic Relations under the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission.

[Faminskiy] I believe that the state's monopoly used to be identified with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. We are now trying to create a system of not departmental but state regulation of exports and imports.

Time has changed our views on the essence of the concept of monopoly. The radical economic reform has enriched the possibilities for realizing state and national economic interests. One of the most important interests today is to include our economy in the world economy.

[Shabashkevich] We are trying to master complex instruments, albeit ones that are common in the practice of many countries. Joint enterprise zones, for example. This, too, is a means of state regulation, is it not?

[Faminskiy] Of course, a zone is a territory on which favorable economic conditions for investing capital and importing and exporting goods are created on the basis of state decisions. This means that taxes are lowered or abolished altogether, and imported products are free from customs duty. In addition to the use of economic methods, democratic principles of management will be developed there. For example, economic councils might be formed from representatives of Soviet, joint, and foreign enterprises. And a corporation set up using investments by zonal and nonzonal enterprises will tackle specific economic issues. Yes, joint enterprise zones represent a combination of interests: of the state, of state and cooperative enterprises, of mixed and foreign capital.

[Shabashkevich] Some letter writers are convinced that the zones are being created because we ourselves are unable to implement reform. But in my view the zones represent a commonplace economic option that is essential for achieving specific economic ends.

Which territories will gain the status of special zones?

[Faminskiy] In our view—and we argued it in a concept prepared at the institute—it is most advantageous to begin with the Far East. In Nakhodka, in particular. Favorable economic conditions for foreign capital are one aspect of the problem. In addition, it is necessary to create a modern infrastructure. Speaking of Nakhodka, this means hotels, accommodation for foreign and Soviet specialists, and the development of transport.

Elements of the infrastructure can be created with the help of foreign capital. In particular, it is more advantageous to develop the hotel economy on the basis of joint ventures.

Of course, there is a certain risk. We will throw millions into Nakhodka's New Vasyuki, but no one else will invest a plugged nickel in it. Therefore there must be phased creation of zones. The first to be developed can be the sectors based on what we now send abroad in unprocessed form.

The zone will gradually take shape and draw other enterprises into circulation. Joint production of personal computers, let us say, will arise first. We will gradually switch it to Soviet subassemblies. Why should we not create a motor vehicle plant in the Far East on such principles? We currently send motor vehicles there from the European part of the country. Why not organize assembly production with the help of those same Japanese or South Korean and U.S. firms, let us say?

It is possible that a joint enterprise will be created in the northwest of Leningrad Oblast (in the region of the Saimaa Canal), where there is a possibility of involving foreign companies in the development of production facilities based on our technologies.

However, I am saying all this for the good of their health, but perhaps also for the repose of their souls. All the same, U.S. and Japanese capital is not very active even in Chinese zones.

[Shabashkevich] But why? For it seems such a large market, does it not?

[Faminskiy] This is, of course, a matter which must occupy us, too. I think they are afraid to create competition for themselves. Political factors also tell, for it is a socialist country.

Proposal Without Pretensions

[Shabashkevich] This conclusion may be drawn: Joint enterprise zones, but not only with foreigners. It is more interesting here to create conditions for the merging also of internal capital—state, cooperative, and share capital.

[Faminskiy] All the same, the idea of joint enterprise zones presupposes the involvement of foreign capital, although joint ventures based on internal capital may also be developed there. There is tremendous potential here. Precisely joint ventures where sectors overlap could elaborate ideas which today simply fall outside the narrow field of vision of departments. In Nakhodka, for example, the huge modern "Vostochnyy" port with large throughput capacity. Its warehouses could be used as a base for European firms. If we organize well the shipping of freight on our railroads, we will earn big money.

[Shabashkevich] To judge from letters to PRAVDA, the publication of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the regulation of foreign economic activity plunged into doubt not only our newborn entrepreneurs but also hardened Western businessmen....

[Faminskiy] It is a matter of the kind of business in which they are "hardened." The licensing regulations concern only raw materials and are designed to encourage industrial exports. Enterprises which export their finished products must ask nothing of anyone. But strict control will be established over those who seek to earn a bit more by reselling raw materials. From the economic viewpoint it is efficient when this commodity goes through large state foreign trade associations. So, I will repeat, it is an issue only of the raw materials list.

[Shabashkevich] But it embraces a large proportion of our exports. Why the proscriptive principle again, and not the economic option? For example, a customs tariff which could equalize the state's interests and the entrepreneurs' aspirations?

[Faminskiy] The state does not, in principle, ban exports of raw materials but reserves the right to allow someone to do this who possesses the necessary conditions and proves the expediency and the effectiveness of the deal. As for the second part of the question, in my view there is one way: Improve the system of price formation. There will be no point in speculation when we bring raw material prices up to world prices.

The question is this: Who will trade in raw materials—a foreign trade organization, large qualified exporters, or individual slick operators who will clip coupons? The resolution proceeds from the premise that qualified exporters will deal with raw materials.

Question Without an Answer

[Shabashkevich] Let us go back to the beginning of the conversation. "A department is not the state, but just a department," Igor Pavlovich said. He put it accurately. But this is what happens when a department casts its net but makes out that it is concerned about the entire homeland.

The "Sovinterinvest" joint venture was set up last December. Participating in it on the U.S. side is the firm of Usko [name as transliterated], with 11 shareholders on the Soviet side. These include "Primorrybprom." The first project to be launched was the funding of repairs to our ships in South Korea through "Sovinterinvest."

Not such an elementary combination, and the Korean ship "Ocean Pioneer" appeared in the Sea of Okhotsk alongside the Japanese factory ship "Hoyo Maru," which for some 20 years had been the monopoly purchaser of our walleye pollack. The price of walleye pollack has risen substantially. And "Primorrybprom" invests the dollars obtained for above-plan fish in repairing the "Spassk" factory ship.

In just a few months' time it will be able to process walleye pollack and produce food at a price which we did not even dream of, for the country has not hitherto had such a commodity. Tell me who is badly off. Perhaps someone has taken a large profit? Judge for yourselves.

The "Sovinterinvest" joint venture invests its income in the joint venture's statutory fund on the "Spassk" factory ship. Primorrybprom will finally obtain a modern ship and will train people in South Korean yards and fish-processing plants.

True, 70,000 tonnes of above-plan walleye pollack will not end up on the domestic market in 1989-1990. And yet we have to live not just for 2 years. And we want to live well. But the sight of frozen walleye pollack on empty shelves does not improve our existence. The products that the "Spassk" will produce from walleye pollack are another matter.

Now the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry has risen supposedly to the defense of our interests. Far Eastern fishermen and "Sovinterinvest" are accused of all sorts of things: violating government resolutions, squandering the country's fish stocks. However, you cannot really believe in the ministry's sincerity when you read a letter dated 11 December 1988 from V. Zilanov, USSR deputy minister of the fish industry and the Soviet side's representative on the Soviet-Japanese Fishing Commission, addressed to H. Akaboya, head of the Japanese side's delegation. It states that the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry is prepared to examine the issue of deliveries of 300,000 tonnes of fresh walleye pollack to Japanese firms in 1989. Also, incidentally, to the detriment of the domestic market.

How is this to be understood? The bull may not do what Jupiter does? Although in this case things went far better for Jupiter's subordinates. For Mr Akaboya responded to the generous readiness of the Fish Industry Ministry with a refusal: He agreed to just 100,000 tonnes instead of 300,000.

One can only guess at the ministry's interests in this matter and wonder on which official's corn "Sovinterinvest" trod.

Letters signed by Minister N.I. Kotlyar and by V.M. Lushnikov, his deputy, are flying to the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. When you check their text against the documents, departmental ears stick out a mile. But will they check it? Alas, we sometimes have greater trust in lofty signatures than in the logic of life.

How can we judge here who is a qualified exporter? The Fish Industry Ministry or the industrialists association, which is essentially what "Sovinterinvest" is? You must not judge from one episode. In recent days PRAVDA has been inundated with telegrams and letters from, probably, all collectives of USSR Fish Industry Ministry associations displeased with this department's activity and, in particular, with its foreign trade subdepartments. Fishermen are demanding a congress of professional representatives.

But even at this complex time the department does not act out of character—It crushes its internal competitors. The licensing regulations encourage it now. An embryonic competitor is obliged to apply to the chief monopolist for a license.

Is this not absurd? Practice has proved that prohibitions in the economy turn into a shadow economy. And I am sure this will be the case this time—licenses and registration will acquire their own "black" price. All this really plays into the hands of our secret millionaires. But we are simply frightening away those few people who wish and venture to invest their capital in our economy.

[Faminskiy] I recently met a Western businessman. He reacted unexpectedly to the fact that on 1 April all enterprises in our country received the right to enter foreign markets:

"I have been dealing with your country for many years," he said. "I was attracted by the reliability and stability of state partners, but now I will have to run risks."

He is right: Frankly speaking, "uncivilized" cooperative members will flood onto the market. I have met such people in the Far East. Some guys sold a carload of timber to Japan. At a price substantially below that charged by the state. They bought motor vehicles. I asked them where they had gotten the wood. Very simply, they said they had bought it from a timber trade base. The point is not just that the clever guys earned pretty well but that they created a precedent which has affected trade as a whole. For then our partners will demand that we reduce the price.

All this is in addition to the fact that licensing is necessary. If cooperatives and joint ventures have an opportunity to earn without doing anything, this will hardly be right or painless for our economy. We must not forget when dealing with foreign businessmen that they are professional, highly skilled operators who are not to be trifled with. If we open the "raw material faucet," they will make good money out of us. It is against precisely this that a struggle is being waged.

And then, foreign economic relations are regulated in every state. In the United States, for example, businessmen are also obliged to obtain licenses from departments when they export certain commodities. So, by introducing our own system for regulating foreign economic activity, we are getting closer to world economic practice, not vice versa.

Opinion Without a Period

[Shabashkevich] There is no doubt that it is necessary and sensible to control the working of the "raw material faucet." There must be a state hand on exports. Therefore it is hardly worth farming everything out to sectoral ministries and essentially atomizing the state's privilege.

Yes, a licensing system exists in many countries and in no way fetters business life, but there are also laws there which protect individual, cooperative, and share ownership. It is time we also set about preparing such legislation.

Elimination of 'Unearned Wages' Encouraged

PM1105135589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 89 Second Edition p 3

[D. Valovoy, doctor of economic sciences, article: "The Economy at a Crossroads. Notes From a USSR Council of Ministers Session"]

[Text] The government's recent session was its last, both literally and figuratively. Out of the 115 members of the government whose photographs were published by PRAVDA 13 April 1984, only 22 will make it all the way to the Congress of People's Deputies when the government's term of office expires. Almost a complete renewal. The "changing of the guard" and restructuring are being effected on the move. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov has been head of government since September 1985. The new leadership inherited, figuratively speaking, not only an obsolete model car which was almost on its last legs, but also a road map showing the worst and essentially impassable route.

The gradual renewal of the government's work has been achieved in exceptionally complex conditions. The style and methods of its work underwent radical changes. They became more principled and creative, democratic and open [glasnyy]. Objective conditions for this were created by the revolutionary restructuring which unfolded in the country at the party's initiative, but we should not discount the professional and human qualities of the chairman of the government and many of its new members. Nonetheless, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies will have to face a difficult question: How do we reconcile a positive appraisal of the government's work with negative results? An objective answer to this question will be extremely necessary also for the new government which is due to be formed. I personally assume that the exacerbating crisis within the economy which, according to my estimates, began on the threshold between the seventies and the eighties, was only to be expected. And this is why.

Imagine that a faucet in your kitchen breaks and you are woken up by the sound of...running water. Instead of turning off the main water supply, someone turns on a faucet in the bathroom as well and then, clucking in consternation, you start baling out the water. We were "woken" by the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum. We discovered that there were tens of billions of rubles in circulation, that there were no goods on which they could be spent, and that a state of imbalance, just like radiation, had permeated our economy. While condemning the cost-based mechanism of economic management, dependence, wage leveling, and other evils which contributed to "flooding" the market with money and implementing measures aimed at their elimination, we not only failed to stem the flow of money in circulation but also actually intensified it further still. By way of proof, let us make our way to the source of the influx, known as **Unearned Wages**, and trace its "course."

It was the matter of unearned incomes that ran through the reports and speeches at the government session which discussed the results of the 1st quarter and immediate measures to boost the output of nonfood consumer goods. "A situation has developed," Yu. Maslyukov's report said, "whereby plans are fulfilled and overfulfilled, wages are paid out accordingly and material incentives funds are increased, but the economy's condition deteriorates." N. Ryzhkov added: "For 2 years running there has been no growth of food output, and yet incomes in agriculture are rising. Where from, how, why?"

Because the defective practice of planning the wages fund which **ignores the law of distribution according to labor** has long prevailed in our country, and has been aggravated and exacerbated by the reform. The essence of the "system" is as follows, in most general terms. Workers' wages have to be paid at rates based on the labor intensiveness of produced articles, with the enterprise's wages fund being determined as a percentage of the volume of gross (commodity) output. Let us assume that a plant's wages represent 25 percent of the volume of its output. This means that any articles whose production costs per R1 of value include a wages element that fits into this procrustean bed are profitable, while any which exceed the "norm" are unprofitable. Naturally, enterprises avoid the latter like the plague. Hence economic managers' allergy to physical indicators. This is the "gaping maw" which swallows with steadily growing voracity spare parts, aspirin, mustard plasters, fruit candy, medical and domestic needles, thimbles, soap, tablets, tooth brushes, and thousands of cheap "minor requisites." In his speech at the session, S. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, spoke about the headlong expansion of shortages and the uncontrolled rise of prices. Now, he said, it is easier to list items which are not in short supply....

On the other hand, the determination of wages funds using the average ceiling method—from volume to rubles—provides a capacious channel for the inflow of unearned money into circulation and for the development of **mass dependence.** This remuneration system stems from a scientifically unsubstantiated definition of enterprises' and sectors' contributions to the creation of material wealth. Contrary not only to the **fundamentals** of Marxist-Leninist economic theory but also to...common sense, the volume of gross (commodity) output—commonly known simply as gross indicator—has become the economy's **yardstick** and the main criterion for the evaluation of work, even though it is by nature totally unsuitable for this purpose. Judge for yourselves.

Specialization in production has created a situation whereby the technological path traveled by raw materials before they reach consumers in the form of refrigerators or television sets leads through up to 10 different enterprises, and each of them includes the value of raw materials in the volume of gross (commodity) and sold output. Hence the yardstick ends up being...elastic. The broader the development of specialization, without which scientific and technical progress is unimaginable, the further the yardstick stretches. In 1985, the total value of embodied labor taken into account twice or more was in excess of R540 billion. Its share in the structure of the gross social product accounted for almost 40 percent. This twisting of rubles artificially boosted the volume and growth rate of output and labor productivity, and ultimately misrepresented the economic situation as if it were being seen in a distorting mirror. In specific terms, this was graphically displayed in our conversations with M. Eydelman, director of the Scientific Research Institute for Statistics (PRAVDA 9 December 1985), and W. Leontieff, famous U.S. economist, Nobel Prize winner, and foreign member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (PRAVDA 27 February 1989).

Plans were being fulfilled and overfulfilled in terms of rubles for the sake of inflated rates and wages, while being wrecked in terms of actual manufactured output.

Therefore the current situation, which Yu. Maslyukov spoke about at the session, is deep-rooted. During my 30 or so years of scientific and journalistic activity I have not come across a single case of targets set by the 5-Year Plan or the annual plan for the manufacture of the most important types of output or for the commissioning of construction projects having been fulfilled. This is why, with each passing year, there was a steadily diminishing quantity of output in physical terms per ruble. The quantity of basic foodstuffs and industrial goods produced in 1985 per ruble of gross social product and national income was one-half the quantity produced in 1965 and between one-fourth and one-fifth the quantity produced in 1950. Of course, in these conditions capacities for the manufacture of money were being utilized much more "efficiently" than capacities for the production of goods. The manufacture of consumer goods doubled between 1971 and 1985, while the amount of money in circulation increased by a factor of 3.1. This contributed to the deformation of commodity-money relations under socialism into...**money-no-commodity relations.**

This economic management "procedure" in the process of restructuring has been repeatedly and resolutely condemned by the party and the government. The political report to the 27th party congress proposed:

To change the orientation of the economic mechanism, to overcome its cost-based nature, and to channel it toward enhancement of quality and efficiency. The main criterion should not be not gross output but the quantity, range, and quality of goods needed by people.

But this has not yet happened in practice. The reason? There are many reasons, but I think that the main one is the fact that the USSR Law on the 12th 5-Year Plan proposed to raise the rate of growth of commodity (gross) output **from the achieved** (or rather inflated by duplicated counting, higher prices, and false reporting) **level.** The wages fund and the consumption of material resources were "pegged" to this level, and this created **objective** conditions to enhance the dominant position of gross output, which has now reached its apogee. Figuratively speaking, the concept of acceleration was mounted on a chassis model of the twenties or thirties, which has had a foot in the grave for a long time now....

The 12th 5-Year Plan was compiled on the basis of the worst models of cost-based and wasteful planning. In my view, it proved to be a "road sign" pointing the new leadership of the economy in the wrong direction. I wrote about the theoretical and practical inconsistency of the principles retained in it specifically in the articles "Measurement of Acceleration" (PRAVDA 7 July 1986), "Economics in 'Human Measurement'" (PRAVDA 19 January 1988), and "Pyramid" (PRAVDA 19 September 1988), and I have spoken about it at a meeting in the "Ostankino" television studio. In January last year N.I. Ryzhkov instructed Comrades Sitaryan, Korolev, Gavrilov, Kirichenko, Kachura, Abalkin, and Plyshevskiy to examine the matters raised by me and to submit relevant proposals to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission on Economic Problems. The report they submitted prompts sad reflections. I would be glad to be proved wrong, but I am convinced that the crisis in the economy will exacerbate for as long as their conclusions are retained in practice. The report says specifically:

"Taking into account the fact that output growth rate for the current 5-Year Plan period was determined on the basis of commodity output, it is necessary to firmly state that this is only an accounting indicator and is used for analysis purposes only and not for evaluation of economic activity...."

Could the esteemed "fathers" of reform seriously assume that an indicator which is applied around the clock, and from top to bottom, to monitor the fulfillment of the 5-Year Plan, to determine the acceleration of our development, and to provide wages funds can be proclaimed to be an accounting indicator?!

Wages were previously subject to a rigid ceiling—the average plan level of wages multiplied by the actual number of workers. And not a kopek more! This was wage leveling. Lenin described it as an economic absurdity under socialism. Unfortunately, we went further than wage leveling and squared this absurdity: **Those who make bad use of land, machinery, raw materials, and labor and financial resources will be paid twice or three times as much as the front-rankers per unit of identical output.** This squared absurdity was legislated into a normative called the base wages fund, which is the foundation of economic accountability models. What can be said about them? I have already written that these are models not of economic accountability but of just one of its principles—income distribution. V. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, said in his speech that "the present form of economic accountability does not encourage production collectives to satisfy the needs of the market and the national economy." "Superb" economic accountability! But what does it encourage? It was noted at the session that it engenders "narrow-minded sectorial and group egotism." This exacerbates the contradiction between social and collective interests.

Scientifically substantiated prices are one of the most important principles of economic accountability. Now it has been universally recognized that some prices are inflated while others are deflated. Consequently, in my view, the real introduction of economic accountability should begin with price reform. And yet we have put the cart before the horse. Obviously, we will end up "committing follies" aplenty. After all, there are "innocent culprits" among loss-making enterprises, with scientifically unsubstantiated prices applying to some of their products. In all likelihood, most of them fail to fit within the aforementioned procrustean bed in terms of wage intensiveness. This also applies to a large number of

commodities which are being eroded at successful enterprises. It is highly regrettable that this is one more case when economic accountability has been cast in the role of...2d Lieutenant Kizhe [expression used to denote a nonexistent person who is by some misunderstanding presumed to be real]. Soon enough "our eyes will open" once more, we will realize the absence of economic accountability, and we will realize that our development will never be normal without the numerous goods and medicines which have vanished into oblivion thanks to "full economic accountability and self-financing."

In my opinion, the economic accountability models fail to stand up to criticism also from the viewpoint of income distribution. Incomes are determined **not according to labor** but, just as before, **according to ruble costs**, with the only difference that now there is no longer any rigid plan restriction on average wages. This has actually turned on a second "faucet" bringing tens of billions of rubles of unearned money into circulation, seeing that wage restrictions have been quite fairly lifted but wages have not been linked to output actually produced. Is it legitimate to treat profits earned through increased retail prices and erosion of the cheap range of goods as economically accountable income and to use this income to raise wages and other incentives funds? A bar of soap worth R1 gives an enterprise as much wages as five bars worth 20 kopeks each. This is what has boosted the acceleration of retail price rises and the erosion of the cheap range of goods, as many speakers said at the government session.

According to data produced by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Marketing and Demand, the rise in average retail prices accounted for around 30 percent of the goods turnover growth in 1971-1975, for more than 60 percent in 1986-1987, and for almost 75 percent in 1988. This must be taken into account when evaluating goods turnover growth. USSR Minister of Trade K. Terekh gave the session examples of goods deliveries being overfulfilled in ruble terms but actually declining in physical terms. This "economic accountability" demanded even more "efficient" utilization of capacities for the manufacture of...money. Last year money emission doubled against 1987 and quadrupled in comparison with the annual average during the 11th 5-Year Plan period. During the 1st quarter of 1989, USSR Minister of Finance B. Gostev said, "The uncontrollable growth of the population's incomes continued. Once again it became necessary to resort to printing money." In the past, Napoleon and Hitler shipped out forged money to undermine our country's economy. Surely, the money we are ourselves printing beyond all moderation performs the same function.

To curb inflation, controls of the correlation between the growth of labor productivity and wages were reinstated as of January 1989. This control failed to produce the desired results in the past. It cannot do so even in theory. After all, the methodology used to measure labor productivity is as far removed from science as the sky is from the earth. Now it is based on ruble costs, and its growth for the sake of securing cash for wages will be an even stronger encouragement for economic managers to raise prices and erode the cheap range of goods. Enhancement of labor productivity, according to Marx' labor theory of value, should reduce a product's costs and consequently its price. A classic example of labor productivity growth reducing the man-hour costs of consumption goods was offered by Marx in his work "The Poverty of Philosophy." Lenin described rising labor productivity without declining output costs as an absurdity. This is another absurdity that has been squared in our practice: **Enhanced labor productivity not only fails to bring prices down but, on the contrary, price rises are an important factor for "raising" productivity.**

I think that in order to turn off the inflow of unearned money into circulation, there must be broader application of the experience of capitalist countries—not from the period of free competition when market elements held sway, but their contemporary experience with broad introduction of economic planning and regulation. Their economic mechanism "revolves" on the basis of Marx's labor theory of value. They reject Marxism-Leninism in principle, but apply many of its tenets in practice. We do the exact opposite: We accept everything in words while rejecting much in deeds. Wages over there are calculated with due consideration for the quantity and quality of every worker's labor. Jobs, including employee jobs, have detailed job descriptions indicating the number of minutes needed to perform the job and its evaluation in money terms. People know what they take on when they start a job. If a worker fails to keep within material consumption norms or "botches" a job, the relevant costs are deducted from his wages.

Over there the manufacture of any output is preceded by a thorough calculation of labor and material resources cost per unit of output. This is accompanied by a harsh struggle to reduce labor intensiveness and materials intensiveness per unit of capacity or machine productivity. Profit is their objective, but they do utilize numerous qualitative value indicators to measure economic growth and for accounting and analysis purposes. But each individual capitalist, as the saying goes, could not care less about the resulting national income or national product growth rates in the country as a whole. This is why value indicators (excluding the total of recurrent addition of past labor) over there, just like a measuring instrument, reflect the real picture of the growth and dynamics of economic processes.

As for our economic mechanism, it "revolves" on an inflated volume in ruble terms with temporary physical satellites, most of which "pull out of the race" for various reasons and fail to reach the finish. The process of creating value and consumer value has been turned upside-down in our country. Even in the conditions of radical reform the labor intensiveness and materials

intensiveness of output are determined by the expenditure on wages and material resources per ruble of commodity (gross) output, using the "pot" method. Faster price rises, erosion of the cheap range of goods, and the expansion of recurrent addition of the objects of labor not only camouflage the rising labor intensiveness and materials intensiveness of output but also create an illusion that they are falling. This is why our value indicators and the growth rates based on them can be figuratively compared with a speedometer which is wound on in order to increase wages, write off gasoline so it can be sold on the side, and earn bonuses for "thrifty" use of rubber tires. A graphic illustration of this is provided by the letter sent to PRAVDA by N. Belousov, clerk of works at Kurgan's No 3 NGCh [precise expansion unknown] station, which, like a drop of water, reveals all the pollution to be found in the whole ocean. He writes in particular:

"It will soon be 4 years since restructuring got under way, but we still have not felt any of its effects. What are the ills from which we suffer? The main one, just as with all construction industry workers, is planning. The plan is in rubles, and the wages fund is expressed as a percentage of these rubles. This is what happens: The more state money we spend, the better all our indicators end up. Let me cite just one example: We were building railroad station platforms and bought ferroconcrete for retaining walls at R150-R220 per cubic meter, which was overpriced fivefold. We used 4-5 times more ferroconcrete than was necessary because the specifications provided for wider and higher walls. The result was 20-25 times more expensive, but we overfulfilled our plan, we built up a huge wages fund, we were praised and held out as an example, we were given bonuses, and yet we should have been locked up...."

How much has already been said and written about all this! Reports and speeches at the last government session and the one before last sharply but fairly criticized the state of affairs in the construction industry. It all fell on deaf ears! The "new" economic mechanism in the construction industry incorporated all the worst practices built up in this sector over the decades. Everything reasonable and sensible that survived the years of stagnation with so much difficulty was resolutely rejected, while the dominance of gross indicators and the "million mark" was elevated to absurdity. But the cost of this "contribution" was rather too high. N. Ryzhkov and Yu. Maslyukov cited facts showing that some people lawfully earn up to 100 [monthly] salaries a year in scientific research and planning and design institutions in the construction industry and other sectors.

The elaboration and introduction of elementary norms of economic accountability appear urgently necessary in the prevailing situation. It would seem expedient to determine the wages fund on the basis of normative (plan) labor intensiveness of produced and sold **consumer values**, bearing in mind that these are not the same as items, tonnes, or meters. In terms of consumer qualities, for example, a tonne of grain, tea, sugar beet, cotton, milk, or wool could be 2-3 times above or below a sector's average. The broad range of profitability norm fluctuations is also unjustified. It would be more expedient to set a standard profitability level in sectors. Add to this normatives for the expenditure of material resources per unit of output, and we would arrive at a scientific basis for wholesale prices. The creation of equally advantageous conditions for the production of all articles provides a firm basis for non-normative economic accountability or lease relations. This would provide an effective medicine to treat economic managers' and some scientists' allergy to physical indicators.

The impermissibility of remunerating the **identical** labor of workers in new cooperatives and leased enterprises at a much higher rate than in state enterprises, collective farms, and the consumer cooperative system is a fundamentally important element of the mechanism for distribution according to labor. Speakers at the government session gave examples of undeserved wage hikes in cooperatives which caused a "drain" of skilled workers from state enterprises.

And so, our economy has been seriously ill for a long time. The national economy's imbalance in terms of its basic parameters, the sizeable state debt, and the budget deficit did not develop just today or yesterday, even though the State Committee for Statistics still plays the same old tune and feeds us data on increased production efficiency which is determined according to the principle: more waste, "higher" efficiency. In order to make a more accurate diagnosis, it is necessary to stop winding on the "speedometer" not only in terms of rubles being pumped out but also in terms of physical indicators. Take meat for example. PRAVDA published a lot of material about quests for the 64 kg—now already 65 kg—of meat which, according to State Committee for Statistics data, are available per capita. The methodology of calculations deserves a separate discussion. The outcome of the quest was this: If it became necessary to introduce ration cards for meat, given the current level of imports and the structure of consumption, we would manage to provide just 1.2 kg of meat, including poultry, per capita per month from state resources. There is also a lot of "forgery" in data about grain, which is calculated in bunker weight. There is even more of it in calculations for the output of fruit, vegetables, and potatoes. Last year's deliveries fell short of the plan to the tune of almost R10 billions' worth of goods and many billions of rubles' worth of output for industrial purposes, and yet industry fulfilled its plan. There is growth and acceleration in ruble terms. But what is the good of this? I think that the time has come to smash the "distorting mirror" used by the State Committee for Statistics, to identify the depth of the crisis in the economy, and to map out ways of overcoming it.

It would seem expedient for the Congress of People's Deputies to adopt an emergency program to stabilize and balance the national economy—a program built not

on **costs** but on **targeted principles.** Primary importance must be given to satisfying the needs for medicines, grain, meat, vegetables, and housing. And until such time as we can satisfy these elementary needs of the population without imports, anything and everything—except sufficiently necessary defense—ought to be back-burnered. And the government's work in the future should be evaluated according to the dynamics of the implementation of targeted tasks. The time has come—it actually came a long time ago—to do away with the inflated gross ruble and physical indicators whose sway, according to Academician V. Glushkov's calculations, had cost more than the material losses incurred during the Great Patriotic War already in the seventies. I think that in the prevailing situation, the most resolute measures to stabilize the economy—even including the doubling of the volume of mass consumer goods imported during the oil and gold boom—will fail to produce the desired results for as long as the inflow of **Unearned Wages** is not turned off! It is necessary to resolutely and uncompromisingly put an end to dependence and to restructure ourselves on the principle: **"The way we work today will determine the way we will live tomorrow!"**

FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE: The PRAVDA publishing house is preparing the book "PRAVDA Against Gross Indicators" [PRAVDA Protiv Vala]. It will be in two parts. The first part is entitled "Preparation" [Podgotovka]. It contains PRAVDA material against the cost-based and wasteful methods in the years of stagnation. The second part—entitled "Restructuring" [Perestroyka]—deals with topical problems of the radical economic reform, including the material referred to in the article "The Economy at a Crossroads." Orders for the book can be placed through the book trade system.

Conflicting Ruble Exchange Rates Discussed

PM1105143989 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, May 89 (Signed to Press 4 May 89) p 23

[T. Valovaya article under the rubric "Glasnost Versus Rumors": "Announcement of...Devaluation"]

[Text] Don't you find this chart [reproduced by EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA at the top of the next column to the right], published by Britain's THE ECONOMIST magazine, rather amusing? The top line, depicting the official ruble-dollar exchange rate, suddenly starts to decline sharply in 1990. The chart is accompanied in the journal by an extensive commentary about the impending devaluation of the ruble.

Where has this reputable economic weekly obtained this information? Supposedly from the USSR Council of Ministers resolution dated 2 December 1988. It is well known that this document envisaged the introduction of a 100-percent surcharge on the exchange rate for freely convertible currencies into rubles in settlements for foreign economic operations as of 1 January 1990, and the introduction of a new exchange rate in 1991.

An Event That Never Happened

But do these decisions really mean a devaluation, in other words a reduction of the Soviet currency's exchange rate? Not at all—and this has been announced by representatives of the country's foreign economic departments. For example, it was clearly said in the interview entitled "A Right Given to All" (EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No 3, 1989) that the new foreign currency exchange rate does not affect the official exchange rate for the ruble set by the USSR State Bank [Gosbank] and essentially replaces the current system of multiple foreign currency rates. What is involved here is the introduction of new exchange rate relations exclusively in settlements between Soviet participants in foreign economic activity.

It is a pity that the EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA material went unnoticed by Western journalists, who hastened to announce the ruble's devaluation as an accomplished fact. Thus the same ECONOMIST informed its readers that "in December Russia announced that, beginning in January 1990, the ruble will be devalued by 50 percent against convertible currencies."

The magazine did not miss the chance of immediately recalculating the indicator of national income per capita in the USSR using the "new" exchange rate, and announced that it will fall from $3,400, being the level of Greece, to $1,700 which is the level of Jordan.

This externally effective comparison was picked up by other British publications.

Comparing the exchange rate for the ruble into Hungarian forints and Polish zlotys on the one hand, and the exchange rate for the currencies of these two European socialist countries into U.S. dollars on the other, the magazine drew the conclusion that the resulting correlation of the Soviet and U.S. currencies will be 40-50 cents per ruble. This is also reflected in the chart published by THE ECONOMIST: The top line shows the ruble-dollar exchange rate set by the USSR Gosbank, while the two bottom lines show the ruble-dollar rate calculated on the basis of "cross rates" [for Polish zlotys and Hungarian forints].

Let us try and work this out. I would like to quickly apologize to the readers for the numerous "arithmetical" operations but we cannot manage without them if we want to get in any way closer to an understanding of the problem's essence. And it would be a pity not to analyze the scant statistical data which are published.

It is well known that socialist countries set the exchange rate for their monetary units into Western countries' currencies with total autonomy and independently of one another. Moreover, a number of countries strive to reduce the exchange rate for their national currency into freely convertible currencies in order to stimulate

exports and attract tourists. In March 1989, for example, Hungary's National Bank announced a 5-percent devaluation of the forint with a view to boosting Hungarian exports and increasing the inflow of convertible currency. Let me repeat, it is the sovereign right of every state to set an official exchange rate for its national monetary unit.

The USSR Gosbank, for example, calculates that $100 are worth R62, while the Polish National Bank calculates that $100 are worth approximately Z40,000. But this certainly does not mean that R62 should be considered equal to Z40,000 or that Z1,000 are "worth" R1.55. Exchange rates for socialist countries' currencies are set according to agreements between them, and at the time the chart in question was published the rate set made Z1,000 equal to R6.17. What does this prove? A conclusion about increasing the zloty-ruble exchange rate can be drawn as successfully as the journal's conclusion about increasing the ruble-dollar exchange rate. In other words, the chart gives equal grounds to talk about the expediency of devaluing the ruble in relation to the dollar and of devaluing the zloty in relation to the ruble.

As a matter of fact, right after THE ECONOMIST's publication, the exchange rate for zlotys into rubles for noncommercial operations was reduced by approximately one-third. This is perfectly logical, because the rate of inflation in Poland, and in the Hungarian People's Republic for that matter, is considerably higher than in the USSR, and this must certainly be taken into account when determining exchange rates.

In short, the British magazine's reflections are more than superficial and are not backed by genuine economic analysis. This is a pity, because a serious discussion about the ruble's real exchange rate is indeed necessary.

Paradoxes, Paradoxes....

...Rumors about the ruble's devaluation have also spread in our own country. Moreover, they were supported in particular by the fact that the reference book "The USSR and Foreign Countries" [SSSR i Zarubezhnyye Strany], recently published by the State Committee for Statistics, notes that "the conversion of the indicator of produced national income in the USSR and a number of developed capitalist countries in dollars is done on the basis of both the official exchange rate and the real ruble-dollar, franc-dollar, and so on correlations, proceeding from the level of actual domestic prices for output comprising the consumption fund and accumulation fund in the national income of the countries being compared."

The admission that official exchange rates differ from real correlations is, of course, a remarkable fact in itself.

But what are these "real correlations" in the opinion of the USSR State Committee for Statistics? Using simple arithmetical calculations, we arrive at the conclusion that the average official exchange rate in 1987 was $1.54 to R1, while the "real" rate was $2.4 to R1. In other words, and contrary to rumors, the "real" exchange rate proves to be not lower but...higher than the official one. Proceeding from this, our country's positions in international comparisons appear considerably better. For example, using official exchange rates for national income indicators, the USSR with $924 billion came after not only the United States ($2,256,000,000,000) but also Japan ($1.24 trillion); using the "real correlation of prices," however, we take second place.

The substantiation of the ruble's exchange rate is now the topic of letters we receive from workers, engineers, pensioners, and generally people who would seem uninvolved in "high finance" but are not indifferent to our economy's fate and are by no means reassured by some official statements that "everything is fine" regarding the exchange rate, even though a multiplicity of supplements to it have to be used to encourage Soviet exporters.

For example, worker V. Pakhotinskiy writes from Tarnogskiy Gorodok Village in Vologda Oblast: "This is my first subscription to EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA. I had read a few of its articles in the past, and liked them very much—the arguments are intelligible and substantiated. Now I am a regular reader of the newspaper. I have just come across the list of foreign currency exchange rates. Suddenly I asked myself: Is it true that the rates for the ruble are higher than the rates for the dollar? If so, why is our ruble not circulating in the world market? I asked everyone I could think of, but got no answer."

This is what A. Shkil, deputy manager of the "Elektrostroy" Trust, wrote to the editorial office from Poltava: "R1 equals 100 kopeks, but why does it equal a dollar and a half?"

Seeking Lost Realities

Today's exchange rate for the ruble dates back to 1 January 1961, when our monetary unit was de facto devalued. True enough, earlier on people strove not to mention this, reducing everything to the fact that the ruble's gold content was increased from 0.222168 grams to 0.987412 grams, in other words increased by a factor of 4.4. There was, however, a simultaneous equalization of 10 "old" rubles to 1 "new" ruble, which meant a value increase by a factor of not 4.4 but 10! Some simple calculations would show that, as of 1 January 1961, the ruble was devalued by a factor of 2.3!

In other words, an attempt was made almost 2 decades ago to calculate a new exchange rate on the basis of the real correlation between the purchasing power of the ruble and foreign currencies in terms of the entire national product. Therefore, when we talk about the need to introduce a realistic exchange rate for the ruble today, it is necessary to study past experience most carefully and understand why past attempts to "come down to earth" were not crowned with complete success.

It is obviously necessary to involve the broad scientific public in a most thorough study and adoption of a standard methodology for calculating exchange rates and in the determination of the whole package of factors influencing them.

Many Western economists consider exchange rates to be "information reports" on the state of a national economy's health. This view contains a fair proportion of truth. Any deliberations about the extent and timing of an impending devaluation of the ruble are, of course, premature. But there is a really pressing need for a competent discussion of these problems, and our weekly is already engaged in it.

Agricultural

'Adverse' Weather Hits Kirghiz Crops, Livestock

PM1105134389 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 5 May 89 p 1

[KIRTAG report: "Pitting the Will of the People Against the Elements"]

[Excerpts] On 4 May there was a meeting with media workers and State Agro-Industrial Committee [Gosagroprom] specialists at the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee. The gathering was informed of the situation in the republic as a result of the adverse weather conditions and of the measures being taken to swiftly eliminate the consequences of the large amount of snow and frost covering more or less the whole of Kirghizia.

The journalists were addressed by U. Sydykov, first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosagroprom. [passage omitted]

The first blow hit farms in the Talas Valley. It snowed heavily during the night of 30 April. On some farms, such as the "Karakol" collective farm [kolkhoz], the snow was 15-20 cm deep. The Chuyskaya Valley and Issyk-Kul and Osh Oblasts were the next to be hit. According to hydrometeorological service figures, the critical temperatures in the Talas Valley were as low as minus 8 to minus 12 degrees. The temperature was somewhat higher on the fringes of the Chuyskaya Valley.

Because of the low temperatures and heavy snow the sheep-raising situation was serious. Lambs, calves, and foals began to be die in a number of areas of Osh and Issyk-Kul Oblasts and the Talas zone as a result of the sharp drop in temperature. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the sheep are on the feedlots and there is not enough feed for ewes and lambs, because the animals require more feed when the temperature drops.

In view of the difficult situation, the republic's Council of Ministers and Gosagroprom instructed the Kirghiz production association for grain products and procurements to release 11,000 tonnes of mixed feed for the farms from 3d-quarter stocks. The government has petitioned the USSR Council of Ministers for extra raw material resources to produce 100,000 tonnes of mixed feed. If it says yes, more mixed feed will be made available to farms.

The plant growing situation is rather difficult. Because of the low temperatures nearly all fruit buds, ovaries, and blossoms have been damaged on 26,200 hectares of orchards. Some 8,900 hectares of vineyards have been hit.

Some 280,000 out of 410,000 hectares of perennial grasses have been affected and farmers will lose 280,000-300,000 tonnes of hay.

More than 14,000 hectares of corn have been damaged. Some will have to be resown; the rest will need greater care in order to partially compensate for the damage.

In Osh Oblast more than 11,000 out of 30,700 hectares of cotton have been damaged, as well as 4,000 hectares of transplanted tobacco.

It is the republic's vegetable-growing sector that is the worst hit. Some 12,100 out of 16,700 hectares have been damaged in varying degrees, with 3,247 hectares having been completely destroyed.

In other words, according to preliminary estimates, because of the elements agriculture will lose gross output worth a total of R79.6 million and the processing industry will lose industrial output worth R33.6 million due to the loss of raw materials. Thus, overall losses will be of the order of R113.2 million. [passage omitted]

Military

Moiseyev Interviewed on Armed Forces Restructuring

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[Interview with Army General V.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by V. Syrokomskiy under the rubric "Page 13 Guest": "Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff"; first paragraph is NEDELYA introduction; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] One newspaper wrote: "He has experienced all levels of service as an officer, not missing a single one." He is a new-generation military leader. He celebrated his 50th birthday quite recently. He was born in a village on the Amur to a family of workers. He served as a private in the Red Banner Far Eastern District. He graduated

from tank school and the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. The names of the gold medalists in every graduating year are inscribed on the walls in the General Staff Military Academy ceremonial parade hall; Major General M.A. Moiseyev's name appeared there in 1982. Then he served in the Far East as an Army commander, district chief of staff, and later commander of the district's troops. Today Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and USSR people's deputy, is our page 13 guest.

[Syrokomskiy] We have now adopted a new defensive doctrine. Was the previous one really offensive?

[Moiseyev] No, our doctrine was never offensive. It was always defensive, this stemmed from our Leninist peace-loving foreign policy. Throughout the interwar period the country strove to avert another world war and create a system of collective security. Even during the war years the efforts of the party and the Soviet state were directed toward creating an international order on earth that would rule out new wars.

Right after World War II the Western countries unleashed the "cold war." By that time the United States already possessed nuclear weapons and the USSR faced a real nuclear threat. We had no intention of attacking anyone and only prepared to repulse aggression. To this end corresponding USSR Armed Forces groupings were set up in Europe.

The sides' mutual mistrust continued until the mid-1980's. Then came the events with which everyone is familiar linked with the Communist Party's activity to reduce the world military threat. Under conditions of the new political thinking, it was concluded correctly that it was necessary to go halfway to meet the Western countries alarmed at our military might and the presence of a strong grouping of forces in Europe.

On the basis of this premise and in order to make further progress toward reducing military tension and ensuring mutual trust, the Soviet Government decided to clarify our military doctrine and impart to it a greater purely defensive nature.

[Syrokomskiy] How is the Armed Forces General Staff restructuring its work in connection with the new doctrine?

[Moiseyev] The General Staff is now operating in a complex situation: Many stereotypes are collapsing and what seemed to be irrefutable theses are changing. Virtually all the tenets of our military theory and practice are being reviewed—in the spirit of restructuring and in order to implement in military matters the principles of the new political thinking and the directives of the 19th all-union party conference on switching Soviet military building to qualitative parameters.

The General Staff has defined the main area of its restructuring—the practical implementation of the demands of the defensive military doctrine, which involves giving the Armed Forces an unequivocally defensive structure, amending the theory of military art, and developing fundamentally new theses for training and using the Armed Forces in line with the new views.

This work is being stepped up. The structure of the General Staff is being improved in order to ensure that each of its organs promptly resolves all the tasks facing it. This work has still not been completed, it is continuing, but the results are already visible.

All General Staff generals and officers know their job and work with great responsibility. But old habits and stereotypes and excessive caution in the quest for nontraditional solutions can still be sensed in the approach to a number of matters, particularly when it is a matter of implementing qualitative parameters in building the USSR Armed Forces. That is understandable: Several generations of General Staff personnel were raised on quantitative parameters.

But the time now is such that we all must learn to think and work in a new way, take a bolder look ahead, and take the new atmosphere and the new demands into account. The General Staff also must more vigorously restructure itself, more promptly join in the practical work of restructuring at local level, and devote greater efforts to overcoming elements of stagnation once and for all and effectively resolving its tasks. It has to wage a more resolute struggle against departmentalism and seek out and make fuller use of internal reserves and capacities. It must be more exacting toward staffs and troops under its command.

[Syrokomskiy] What lessons have been learned from the Rust case?

[Moiseyev] That is an unpleasant case. We cannot shirk the blame. Everything has been taken into consideration in order to rule out such incidents in the future. The General Staff constantly analyzes data concerning the air situation received not only from the Air Defense Forces but also from the USSR Border Guards, the Ground Forces, and the Navy. Combat alert duty and monitoring of its performance throughout the country have been stepped up. Other steps have also been taken.

[Syrokomskiy] Perhaps you could tell us now about lessons that are far more serious—the lessons of Afghanistan....

[Moiseyev] So far as the political aspect of the presence of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is concerned, it is probably outside my scope to give an assessment. However, it is obvious from today's vantage point that such phenomena have become obsolete.

If you look at purely military aspects, the experience that our troops acquired will be used to train soldiers, officers, and formations and units as a whole. In combat servicemen from all categories of troops learned to set even greater store by troop fraternity and to value Soviet people's revolutionary and combat traditions.

The address of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers to the Soviet servicemen returning from Afghanistan says that the political and combat tempering that they acquired will help them worthily fulfill their military and civic duty, take an active stance in life, and make a weighty contribution to the cause of restructuring, the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, and young people's military-patriotic education.

At the same time the combat operations conducted on Afghan territory with the participation of Soviet troops highlighted a number of problems that must be resolved in the immediate future and that we will have to work on in the long term. Here are some of them.

Young people's training at schools, higher educational establishments, and enterprises for Army service (physical and psychological training) leaves something to be desired. The poor standard of this training compelled us to increase from 3 to 6 months the training period for soldiers sent to serve in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

It is obvious that formations and units intended for operations in a particular theater of operations should be equipped with combat hardware suited to effective combat use in precisely those physical geographical and climatic conditions.

A number of the provisions in our regulations and manuals regarding combat operations should probably be amplified and broadened.

In short, we have work to do.

[Syrokomskiy] It is well known that the Soviet Union has unilaterally decided to reduce its Armed Forces. Thousands of tanks and gun systems and many hundreds of combat aircraft will be withdrawn from Soviet troop groups in Europe.

The overwhelming majority of Soviet people ardently welcome the planned reductions, not only in connection with our leadership's new thinking but also in the hope that the released budget funds, manpower, and, partially, equipment will be used for peaceful purposes—to resolve the Food Program and the problem of rapidly constructing new housing and expanding consumer goods production.

But how have the NATO countries responded to our peace initiatives? Won't the unilateral reduction of troops and arms lower the defense capability of our country and its allies?

[Moiseyev] Western political circles have greeted the Soviet initiatives with satisfaction. The progressive public in these countries is urging governments to take reciprocal steps. But the ideas of the new thinking are finding it difficult to make headway in NATO military circles. There is a paradox: The Warsaw Pact countries are reducing their armed forces in Europe by more than 300,000 men, meanwhile NATO countries are intending to upgrade their arms and increase their nuclear potential. Moreover, they contrive to see the Soviet peace initiatives as a threat to their own security.

The NATO leadership's intentions to upgrade its arms naturally arouse our concern, not least because the Western side has hitherto shown no desire to take answering steps in response to our initiative.

As for Soviet public concern at a possible reduction in the defense capability of our country and its allies, let me say the following: Before deciding to reduce our Armed Forces and arms, we at the General Staff and corresponding staffs in the allied armies comprehensively considered everything. I can assure you that the unilateral implementation of the measure in question will in no way affect the reliability of our defense against possible aggression against the USSR and its allies from the NATO bloc. We are doing everything necessary. The Soviet people can be sure that their peaceful life is reliably safeguarded and guaranteed.

[Syrokomskiy] Now a few internal questions that cropped up after I saw a number of the General Staff's directorates and services.

We talked with Colonel V.M. Zabar, secretary of a directorate party bureau. It was interesting to learn how party life is being restructured in the spirit of democratization and glasnost: Communists' activeness has increased, and people are voicing criticism and self-criticism more boldly and taking a more implacable attitude toward shortcomings. But, asked "Are there problems?", the colonel began to talk sadly about-...housing matters.

For instance, he talked about one lieutenant colonel's family: His wife and three children have been renting an apartment for more than 2 years now—for R160 per month when his pay is R400.... The domestic problems of a senior General Staff officer certainly affect his state of mind and his capacity for work. And that affects and worries us all.

However, it is well known that the Armed Forces have a vast army of military construction workers. Is this really incapable of providing these General Staff officers—and they are not the only ones—with housing?

[Moiseyev] I think that the secretaries of our party organizations have many problems regarding party work with Communists, their Marxist-Leninist training, and increasing the effectiveness of service activity. Incidentally, no military educational establishments in our country train General Staff officers as professionals: These people are molded, so to speak, through individual training, actually at their workplace, notably by acquiring the experience accumulated by their predecessors and service comrades. Party organizations play a great role in this. In our country they are both the bearers and the custodians of experience and traditions, in the best sense of the word. They play a great role in creating and maintaining a microclimate in General Staff subunit collectives and they spend much time on matters of collaboration in work with Communists from other directorates.

I think that the party organization secretary to whom you spoke also has many problems in this work. He evidently correctly realizes that we all—from chief of General Staff to every officer—must tackle them.

Housing is indeed a sensitive issue today. Not only for the General Staff. Many tens of thousands of families of officers, warrant officers, and ensigns within the Armed Forces have no housing. Therefore the wives of many servicemen are forced to live with parents elsewhere or the families are forced to pay up to one-third of their wages to live in private apartments.

In Moscow alone there are more than 7,000 servicemen without apartments. According to the most modest estimates, officers of the General Staff and its subunits alone pay approximately R1.2 million to sublet housing from Muscovites. The impending discharge of officers who have completed prescribed periods of active service will cause difficulties, above all in the areas where they take up permanent residence. Thus the provision of housing for servicemen is a common task.

It is not that simple to solve it, although there is a government resolution concerning provision of housing for servicemen and a targeted program is being implemented actually within the Armed Forces. For instance, Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom] should annually allocate to the Ministry of Defense 65,000 square meters of housing, in accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers' decision. Last year everything was fine. But in previous years the Moscow Gorispolkom owed us more than 40,000 square meters: If we had received this housing in a timely fashion there would not be so many servicemen without apartments in the capital. This represents more than 700 apartments! Nor would the housing problem within the General Staff be so acute.

Of course, Defense Ministry construction workers could have done a great deal to erect housing. But their main task is to construct special defense facilities, mostly in those areas where there is no one to replace them. Moreover, the Defense Ministry has only limited appropriations for housing construction. Every ruble allocated for housing construction is strictly limited by the quantity of construction materials. Thus we have the same problems in this area as the rest of the country.

This does not mean that things have been allowed to drift. We are planning to increase the volume of housing construction actually in Moscow by using military construction workers, including for special purposes, to provide General Staff personnel and other personnel of the Defense Ministry central apparatus with housing. The problem may be partially resolved by constructing family hostels where officers can live until they receive permanent housing.

Undoubtedly, a General Staff officer's domestic problems affect his state of mind. We take that into consideration. This is also taken into consideration by party organizations, which also do much to ensure that officers without apartments also have a high capacity for work and that the results are always of good quality. A General Staff officer has no right to work any other way.

[Syrokomskiy] We visited the General Staff military-scientific library. It has a large stock containing unique publications, for instance, histories of various tsarist army and guards regiments over 200 years. It would be good if our modern regiments cherished the memory of their history so carefully.

The library is short of space, the staff is too small, and staffers' wages are too low. But that is not surprising (although conditions might be a bit better at the General Staff), there are poverty-stricken libraries virtually everywhere in our country. Something else is surprising: You subscribe to only 38 foreign periodicals, moreover, in only 3 languages. Even these journals, not to mention foreign military-scientific literature, are extremely rarely sought by readers.

Yet it is well known that during the century of the scientific and technical revolution and the information boom a specialist who does not know at least one leading foreign language cannot consider himself a real specialist. How is foreign language teaching organized for General Staff officers and generals?

[Moiseyev] First, let me talk about the history of the Army. We have done a great deal of work—both in the past and now—to study our homeland's historic past, particularly the Great Patriotic War.

Our study of the history of associations, formations, units, ships, and military educational establishments holds an important place here. By 1986 we had largely finished writing these histories. Moreover, troops and staffs keep historical records while ships keep historical logs.

A word about foreign periodicals. The General Staff military-scientific library largely contains literature covering problems of military science, the art of warfare, the building and development of the Armed Forces, and the improvement of arms and military hardware, including abroad. It is these matters of interest to General Staff officers and generals that are reflected in the 38 main foreign military periodicals stocked in the library.

In addition to the military-scientific library, the General Staff also has a number of other libraries which also receive various foreign language periodicals that are in demand among generals and officers. A number of General Staff directorates subscribe to a considerable number of foreign journals.

Officers study foreign languages at military colleges. They continue to improve their linguistic knowledge in military academies. General Staff generals and officers involved in military diplomatic work improve their knowledge via special courses.

As for the study of foreign sources: The General Staff has subunits where well-trained specialists with a knowledge of languages serve—they also translate foreign sources. Directorates' officers have an opportunity, where necessary, to make use of the translated material.

[Syrokomskiy] It is said that promotions for officers and generals in the U.S. Army, award of the next rank, and pay raises depend not least on regularly passing a compulsory series of sports exercises. After seeing the General Staff's sports facilities and talking with officers, we saw that skiing, volleyball, and tennis are quite popular among officers but that physical training and sport are not, to put it mildly, a compulsory element of a General Staff officer's way of life. What do you think about that?

[Moiseyev] Physical training classes for General Staff generals and officers are envisaged three times a week. Unfortunately, owing to their great workload and the so-called "daily grind" not everyone takes part in physical training and sport.

At the same time I must point out that there are regular competitions between the General Staff directorates in various types of sport. Many officers and generals take part in sport independently. They have a personal interest in that because their physical condition is reflected in their efficiency reports.

[Syrokomskiy] Mikhail Alekseyevich, NEDELYA is very grateful that, despite being so busy, you have been able to spare our weekly so much time. I would also like to talk about how busy you are.

It is well known that you go to work every morning at 0645-0700 hours and leave at 2100-2130 hours and you work every Saturday and much of Sunday. That is working "till you drop" indeed! Does that really benefit the state? What about your family?

[Moiseyev] Army and Navy life itself compels us to work like that. Not only the chief of the General Staff. Every district commander has an equally packed daily routine: I judge this from my own work in the Far East Military District.

Suppose I need to talk to the commander of the Far East Military District or the Pacific Fleet; if it's noon in Moscow, the working day has already ended in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Of course, I can call them at home.... I know that the working day of the commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany also lasts until after 2100 hours Moscow time.

These are details. In general there is a list of matters that the chief of the General Staff has to decide every day. That is why, irrespective of how intense my working day is, I must find time for them by "extending" my day. A military leader should use every free minute he can spend on himself. But let be me frank and say that time "to myself" once again often involves work. One must not lose touch professionally, I have to pay careful attention to new works of military-theoretical literature. And the press is now carrying a great deal of "old stuff" which is new to military men of my generation.

I do not merely read the press: Concrete decisions are adopted on many critical articles on military topics. Admittedly, I have encountered more articles recently that cause me irritation—not because of their critical tone but above all because an author talks incompetently and sometimes just naively about serious things like the country's defense capability, defense of the fatherland, the building of the Armed Forces, and military service.

If you are talking about free time, clearly, there simply won't be any. My election as USSR people's deputy will require strenuous work to justify the trust that the CPSU and the Soviet people have placed in me.

What about my family? Speaking in Army terms—I have a good and reliable rear. My wife is from the Far East, she was born in the city of Blagoveshchensk. She shares the entire burden of Army service with me. We have been stationed in approximately 20 garrisons alone. That is the fate of many Army families. If a woman chooses an officer as her life's partner she must be prepared to endure many of the difficulties of Army life. In servicemen's families the entire burden of raising children and housekeeping falls on the shoulders of the wives, our combat helpmates.

I have a good wife, she is a loving mother, that is, a real Army wife. She has done a great deal to raise our children, while at the same time she has a 20-year work service record. Our son is studying at a military college and our daughter is married to a military man. My granddaughter is growing up. Thus our entire family can be said to be involved in military matters.

During my leave I try to devote more attention to my family but leave is often limited since matters do not wait and must be resolved. That is the fate of many military men.

[Syrokomskiy] On behalf of NEDELYA, allow me to take this opportunity, Mikhail Alekseyevich, to cordially congratulate you and all the personnel of the General Staff on the upcoming Victory Day and to wish everyone health and success in military service and happiness in their personal life.

Lithuanian Commission Monitors Draft, Army Life
PM1105160389 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 May 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] It was already reported in the press that the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, with due consideration for wishes and suggestions expressed by the public, has constituted a Commission on Matters of Military Service by the Republic's Young Men under the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The functions of commission chairman have been assigned to Yu. Antanaytis, member of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and secretary of the Lithuanian Republican Council of Trade Unions.

The members of the newly constituted commission include USSR People's Deputies jurist E. Bichkauskas, writer S. Kashauskas, and physician Yu. Oleksas; A. Grishin, member of the the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and electrician at the Vilnius "Plasta" plant; V. Kazlauskas, reader at the State Conservatory; V. Shadreyka, deputy chairman of the Attorneys Collegium Presidium; R. Paulauskene, chief editor of the journal MOTERIS and deputy chairman of the republic Women's Council; L. Kanopke and D. Taraylene, members of the Lithuanian Women's Union Action Group; E. Montvilene, representative of the "Caritas" Catholic Association; and representatives of other public organizations.

The objectives of the Commission on Matters of Military Service by the Republic's Young Men are to deal with matters concerning young men's training for military service, to observe the procedure of their call-up to the Army, to find out about conditions of military service, to maintain contacts with military units and soldiers' parents, to take part in investigations of cases involving non-regulation relations in the Army and acts of violence, and to show concern for soldiers' families.

The newly created commission was instructed to cooperate closely with existing commissions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and, whenever necessary, to submit reports to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium, and to keep the public extensively informed of the commission's activity.

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